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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SOFT POWER AS THE NEW NORM: 
HOW THE CHINESE-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP (SOFT) BALANCES 
AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN AN ERA OF UNIPOLARITY 
by 
Chaka Ferguson 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
 This study explores how great powers not allied with the United States formulate 
their grand strategies in a unipolar international system. Specifically, it analyzes the 
strategies China and Russia have developed to deal with U.S. hegemony by examining 
how Moscow and Beijing have responded to American intervention in Central Asia. The 
study argues that China and Russia have adopted a soft balancing strategy of to indirectly 
balance the United States at the regional level. This strategy uses normative capabilities 
such as soft power, alternative institutions and regionalization to offset the overwhelming 
material hardware of the hegemon.   
 The theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation is neoclassical 
realism. Chinese and Russian balancing efforts against the United States are based on 
their domestic dynamics as well as systemic constraints. Neoclassical realism provides a 
bridge between the internal characteristics of states and the environment which those 
states are situated. Because China and Russia do not have the hardware (military or 
economic power) to directly challenge the United States, they must resort to their 
vii 
 
software (soft power and norms) to indirectly counter American preferences and set the 
agenda to obtain their own interests.  Neoclassical realism maintains that soft power is an 
extension of hard power and a reflection of the internal makeup of states.  
The dissertation uses the heuristic case study method to demonstrate the efficacy of soft 
balancing.  Such case studies help to facilitate theory construction and are not necessarily 
the demonstrable final say on how states behave under given contexts. Nevertheless, it 
finds that China and Russia have increased their soft power to counterbalance the United 
States in certain regions of the world, Central Asia in particular. The conclusion explains 
how soft balancing can be integrated into the overall balance-of-power framework to 
explain Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. hegemony. It also suggests that an 
analysis of norms and soft power should be integrated into the study of grand strategy, 
including both foreign policy and military doctrine.  
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CHAPTER I 
A NEW (SOFT) BALANCING ACT 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War nearly two decades ago, scholars and policymakers 
have debated how great powers would respond to an era of American unipolarity. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union ended the bipolar rivalry between East and West and left the 
United States as the undisputed hegemonic power on the planet. A number of scenarios 
were presented after the Cold War – some sobering, others more auspicious – to address 
this unique moment in world history. Some worried (or hoped) that the United States 
would be able stride the world as Gulliver unbound, pursuing its foreign policies in a 
unilateralist fashion. The world’s great powers had no choice but to kowtow to the 
Washington consensus or be left in its wake.1 Others predicted that disaffected great 
powers not allied with Washington would form balancing coalitions against the United 
States in an attempt to return the international order to one of multipolarity.2  Still others 
suggested that great powers would willingly accept Washington’s lead if they were 
allowed to partake in the public goods generated by the liberal international order 
established after World War II. Indeed, scholars of similar theoretical persuasions have 
supported and opposed the hypotheses outlined above. For example, some realists 
                                                 
1 For the strongest argument on this front, see Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign 
Affairs 70, no. 1, (1990-91): 23-33; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The 
National Interest, Winter (2002-2003): 5-17; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 
International Security 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999): 5-41; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar 
Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21, no. 4, 
(Spring, 1997): 49-88. 
 
2 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1, (December 
1997): 5-41; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ 
Unipolar Moment,” International Security 31, no. 2, (Fall 2006): pp 7-41. 
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support the contention that balancing is unlikely against the United States in the near 
future, whereas other realists cite recent behavior by some great powers as evidence of 
nascent balancing strategies.3 
 The present study wades into this contentious debate concerning great power 
strategic reactions to American hegemony. The main question posed here is how will 
great powers not allied with the United States formulate their grand strategies in a 
unipolar international system? In other words, will they bandwagon with the United 
States or attempt to balance American hegemony or some combination of both? Will 
conflict or cooperation define their overall relations with the United States? Will they 
seek to return the system to one of multipolarity or are they satisfied with the stability 
provided under American hegemonic leadership? Moreover, from a theoretical and 
analytical standpoint, what are the major causal determinants of great power behavior in a 
unipolar system? Are they mainly exogenous or endogenous? Which theoretical 
frameworks can best explain such complexity? And finally, will the study of great power 
behavior under unipolarity contribute new insights to International Relations theory?  
 To start with the last question first, the answer is yes. A hegemonic system 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze how great powers will react to extreme 
                                                 
3 For example, see G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Introduction: 
Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 1-27; 
Stephen Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, 61, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 86-120 and William 
C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (Jan. 
2009): 28-57; John G. Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of Balance of Power, (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2002); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International 
Security 30, no. 1, (summer 2005): 46-71; Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” 
International Security, 30, no. 1, (summer 2005): 7-45; T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, 
eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2004); Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing 
and U.S. Policy Toward China,” Security Studies 17, no. 2, (2008): 363–395; Stephen Walt, Taming 
American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). 
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imbalances of power. Traditional International Relations theory focused on the role of 
alliances and arms buildups to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power. However, little has 
been written about balancing against an actual hegemon, and current theory is weak in 
explaining or predicting what happens when the balance of power breaks down and a 
state achieves hegemony. The current study hopes to help fill that void. 
Consistent with the theoretical tradition or realism, I argue that great powers not 
allied with Washington are likely to balance against U.S. hegemony and have, in fact, 
begun to do so. Unlike previous eras, great power balancing in the current unipolar 
system is likely to use indirect measures to ward off hegemonic ambitions. Traditional 
defensive alliances and internal arms buildups are ineffective strategies in a system where 
the sole hegemonic power’s material capabilities far outstrip those of all its nearest 
competitors combined. Therefore, great powers that view America’s globalizing 
influence as a threat or constraint must adopt alternative strategies to insulate themselves 
from U.S. imperium. Thus, this study argues, the grand strategy likely to be adopted by 
great powers not allied with the United States will be one of “soft balancing.”4  A soft 
balancing strategy adopts indirect means or “low level efforts” such as the formation of 
limited diplomatic coalitions, ententes, regional alignments and use of international 
institutions to restrain hegemonic power.5 
The aim of my study, then, is two-fold: the first objective is to identify and 
explain the causal determinants that drive great powers – in this case China and Russia – 
                                                 
4 See Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States;” Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. 
Primacy;” and Robert Art, “Striking the Balance” International Security 30, no, (Winter 2005-06): 177-
185. 
 
5 Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” 
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to soft balancing. The second interrelated goal is to improve realist theory by including 
variables often neglected by realist scholars, specifically normative or soft power 
capabilities, into the realist framework.6 In a hegemonic system, norms can be viewed as 
one of three pillars that uphold world order – the other two are military and 
political/economic pillars. The latter two “material” capabilities are necessary for the 
former, but the former reinforces the latter in a feedback loop, a point generally 
recognized by Gramscian and liberal theorists of hegemony, but largely neglected by 
realists.7 The thrust of my argument is that the structure of the international system is the 
main determinant of great power behavior, but the system must include a third dimension 
of capabilities, which are normative. The insertion of normative capabilities might seem 
an odd addition to realism, but it is an important rectification that will lead to many 
insights about state behavior in contemporary international politics. For example, 
Mesbahi has shown that norms function within a third social domain of capabilities 
separate from, but interrelated with, military and economic dimensions at the strategic 
                                                 
6 For strong arguments of realism’s failure to address normative issues, see Stefano Guzzini, “Structural 
Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” International Organization 47, no. 3, (Summer 1993): 
443-478; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing or 
Rereading,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1, (Spring 2002):  73-79; Ken Booth, “Security in 
Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” International Affairs 67, no. 3, (July 1991): 527-545; 
For a major treatment on this topics, see Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, (New York: 
Columbia University, 1986). The Liberal tradition of International Relations has taken the lead in dealing 
with the concept of normative or “soft” power. See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
 
7 For liberal conceptions, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and The 
Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) and Robert 
Keohane, After Hegemony, (Princeton University Press, 1984); for Gramscian views see Stephen Gill, ed., 
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) and Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); for a constructivist stance, see John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace: 
America and World Order in the New Era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).  This point is 
also made in the emerging field of critical geopolitics. See Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, 
Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development, (Boston: Brill NV, 2004). 
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level.8 These dynamics work symbiotically, he argues, but can be analyzed separately. 
However, triangulating these concepts requires a synthesis of theory into a coherent 
framework, something which an eclectic approach can accomplish.9 
Specifically, this study explores the strategies China and Russia have developed 
to deal with U.S. hegemony by examining how the two great powers have responded to 
American intervention in Central Asia. In general, realism anticipates that great powers 
not aligned with a hegemonic power will seek to balance it, especially if a hegemonic 
power encroaches territorially.10 One way to achieve some measure of independence in a 
unipolar world is the creation of regional spheres of influence as a buffer to hegemonic 
encroachment. Under hegemony, the fear of encirclement is exacerbated by the 
projection of soft power because a hegemonic system is one of rule rather than one 
simply of brute force. 11 In other words, “as a world-system wide phenomenon, 
                                                 
8 The theoretical and analytical frameworks developed in this study were influenced by, and adapted from, 
Mesbahi’s research on the normative dimensions of state power, particularly in American-Iranian relations. 
See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Public Diplomacy, Power and Normative Challenges,” paper presented at 
International Conference on Bridging the Divide Between the United States and Muslim World Through 
Arts and Ideas: Possibilities and Limitations,” June 6-7, 2009, New York University. Also see Mesbahi, 
“The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the International System: 30 Years of Mutual Impact,” paper 
presented at The Islamic Revolution 30 Years After, Sharif University, Tehran, December 22-23, 2008;  
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and Policy,” Central Asian Survey 23, no. 2, (June 
2004): 109-139; Mesbahi, “Iran's Foreign Policy Towards Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus,”  in John 
L. Esposito and R.K. Ramazani, eds., Iran at the Crossroads, (New York:  Palgrave, 2001).  
 
9 Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, “Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development by Mehdi  
Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling.” Slavic Review 65, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 179-180. 
 
10 David J. Myers, Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response, (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1991); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2001). There are exceptions to this: some realists argue that maritime great powers, 
unlike their continental counterparts, are not likely to face balancing coalitions. See Jack S. Levy and 
William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global 
Power?” International Security 35, no. 1, (Summer 2010): 7-43. 
 
11 As Joseph Nye notes, soft power can lead to attraction or repellence of the hegemon’s political and 
normative agenda. See “Foreword,” in Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell, eds., Soft Power 
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hegemony denotes a unipolar structure of capability matched by a unipolar structure of 
influence.”12  Unlike previous great powers, which faced military and economic 
challenges,13 China and Russia also face normative challenges from the United States. 
The normative dimension is a crucial variable in understanding responses to American 
hegemony because it links domestic factors to systemic level structures and is the crux of 
a soft balancing strategy.  
For example, Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States is shaped by both 
the internal characteristics of the Russian polity and American capabilities. Regardless of 
political ideology, members of the Russian foreign policy elite have advocated for a 
multipolar international system.14 However, whether elites believe that this objective 
could be achieved by cooperating with, or competing against, the United States is based 
partly on the values of those in power. For example, the so-called Euro-Atlanticist school 
of Russian foreign policy embraced the values of a Western model of development and 
eventual rapprochement with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
whereas the neo-Euro-Asian school valued the reassertion of the Russian state as a pole 
                                                                                                                                                 
Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
2008).  
 
12 David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (1999):  142. 
 
13 Paul Kennedy’s magisterial work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, demonstrates the role of 
material capabilities in the international system. However, Kennedy’s work, like many before him, focused 
on bipolar and multipolar systems, where emphasis on material capabilities is paramount. The gap between 
relative strength of the great powers in those systems is not large, and therefore, traditional balancing 
methods were adopted. In a unipolar system, there is a gulf between the capabilities of the superpower and 
the other great powers. See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987). 
 
14 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 12, 
no. 2, (1993): 181-215. 
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of power to balance the West.15 Similar to Russian foreign policy, Chinese relations with 
the United States have a domestic dimension to them as well. Akin to the neo-Euro-Asian 
school in Russia, “many Chinese increasingly fear [that the United States] will not just 
seek to contain China’s foreign policies, but will also actively seek to convert China’s 
society and polity in America’s own image.”16 
To be sure, how China and Russia perceive norms they consider to be Western or 
American colors their responses to U.S. hegemony; however, these concerns are the 
outgrowth of U.S. military and economic might, as realists maintain, not the norms in and 
of themselves.17 Similar Western norms are advocated by smaller European states, which 
are of little strategic concern to Russia and China. Nevertheless, the normative 
component of hegemony becomes increasingly significant because of the ability of the 
superpower to project its domestic ideology on a universal plane. The projection can be 
demonstrated by the U.S. promotion of the so-called “Colored Revolutions” in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-2000s. These “revolutions” clearly disturbed China, 
Russia and the autocratic rulers of the smaller Central Asian states, who perceive the 
advancement of Western notions of democracy and human rights a threat to their rule.18 
                                                 
15 Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia,” 185 and Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 
“Regional and Global Powers and the International Relations of Central Asia” in Adeed Dawisha and 
Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
 
16 Peter Hays Gries, “Forecasting U.S.-China Relations, 2015,” Asian Security 2, no. 1, (2006): 75. Also see 
Yizhou Wang, “China’s State Security in a Time of Peaceful Development: A New Issue on Research 
Agenda,” China & World Economy 15, no. 1, (2007):  77-86. 
 
17 For an opposing viewpoint on the causative role of norms in state behavior, see John Gerard Ruggie, 
“What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4, (Autumn 1998): 855-885.  
 
18 Stephen Blank, “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and their Challenges,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of 
Post-Soviet Democratization 15, no. 3, (Summer 2007): 312-334; Eugene Rumer, “The United States and 
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Until recently, realism largely has failed to address the distribution of normative 
capabilities across the international system and how this capability affects great power 
relations.19 As outlined above, rectifying this negligence requires the inclusion of 
domestic variables such as identity and political ideology because a hegemonic power 
will seek to remake other states in its own image.20 Indeed, classical realists readily 
recognized the importance of ideas, and structural realists were not completely indifferent 
to them, although neither incorporated or integrated them into their theories. Hans 
Morgenthau noted the “cultural” component of imperialism; E.H. Carr wrote about the 
“harmony of interests” a great power sought to achieve by projecting its interests onto the 
system; Kenneth Waltz viewed the “white man’s burden” to “civilize” native peoples as a 
Western ploy to achieve its hegemony in the developing world; Robert Gilpin argued a 
major objective of states was to increase their influence over each other to fulfill 
“political, economic, and ideological interests [emphasis added]”; and John Mearsheimer 
recognized the power of nationalism as an ideology.21 As Murielle Cozette maintains, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Central Asia: In Search of a Strategy,” in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, 
(Armonk, N.Y: ME Sharpe, 2007) and Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” The 
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2,  (Spring 2004): 63-77. 
 
19 For some of the more trenchant criticisms of realism’s inability to adequately incorporate domestic 
factors such as identity and ideology into its framework and still remain “realist” see Jeffrey W. Legro and 
Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”  International Security 24, no. 2 (Autumn, 1999): 5-55; 
and John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An 
Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science 
Review 91, no. 4, (Dec. 1997): 899-912. On the problem of realism’s lack of a social dimension, see John 
Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” and Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the 
Constructivist Challenge.” The author argues that realism can, and should, incorporate domestic factors 
into its paradigm. Neoclassical realists have made a strong case for this position, which is dealt with below 
and more thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
 
20 Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3, (2005): 7-19. 
 
21 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); E.H. Carr, The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939, (New York: Palgrave, 1981); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 
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realists understand the importance of ideas: “but were cautious of cloaking interests in a 
guise of moral principles. … While not providing a precise vision of the future of 
humankind, realism certainly recognizes that meaningful political action is always 
infused by something that transcends pure power politics; that is, by an ideal for which to 
stand, and a belief that it can be realized, however imperfectly.”22 Despite an awareness 
of norms, identities and ideas, realism largely neglected ideational or normative factors 
except in an ad hoc manner.23 However, critics of realism’s indifference to norms have 
been generally aimed at structural or neorealism.24 
Although cloaking interests in moral principles is a valid concern, soft power is 
not incompatible with the tradition. Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of “soft 
power” to mainstream International Relations scholarship, argues that there is no conflict 
between realism and soft power and that concept goes at least as far back as Machiavelli, 
if not further.25  The concept of “soft” or “normative” power, according to Nye, fell out 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981):  24; John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe 
After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 5-56. 
 
22 Murielle Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations,” 
International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008):  678. 
 
23 Although realists generally have not integrated norms into their theoretical frameworks, “most realists 
recognize states are not simply motivated by considerations of the balance of power of relative capabilities. 
They also pursue distinct normative or ideological agendas, usually in response to domestic political 
factors, which might include spreading religion, championing the rights of the oppressed or furthering a 
particular political cause. However, in practice, most states have proved ‘rational’ in the sense that they are 
keenly aware of structural distribution of power in the system, and do not pursue their normative agendas at 
the expense of their vital national interests,” writes Adrian Hyde-Price in “A ‘tragic-actor’? A Realist 
Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe,’” International Affairs, 84, no. 1 (2008): 3.  
 
24 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 
1, (Summer 1995): 39-51. 
 
25 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
10 
 
of the realist framework as a result of neorealism’s attempts to make power measurable 
for their structural judgments.26 “Power was reduced to measurable, tangible resources. It 
was something that could be dropped on your foot or on cities, rather than something that 
might change your mind about wanting to drop anything in the first place.”27 Indeed, 
Chinese diplomats have recognized potential of soft power throughout the millennia. 
From the Qing dynasty to Mao and into the modern day, China has maintained an “active 
cultural diplomacy” toward other nations.28 
To address the limitations of the classical and neorealist approach to power 
politics, I utilize a neoclassical realist framework to help explain Chinese and Russian 
responses to American hegemony.29 The theory most closely aligned with the study of 
power politics continues to be realism (both in its classical and structural guises) and this 
study takes the position that realism still provides the best explanations for interstate 
relations, although it must be reoriented or readapted to specific systemic configurations 
and contemporary contexts. Systemic structure continues to drive great power behavior; 
however, neoclassical realism argues specific great power responses and policies derive 
                                                                                                                                                 
American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the 
World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
26 Nye, “Foreword,” in Soft Power Superpowers, xii. 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Thomas A. Breslin, Beyond Pain: The Role of Pleasure and Culture in the Making of Foreign Affairs, 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). 
 
29 Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 1-32. For similar approaches, see Stephen G. Brooks 
“Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 445-477; and Brian Rathburn, 
“A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural 
Realism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2, (2008): 294-321; Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of 
Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1, (October 1998): 144-72. 
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their hue not only from system polarity, but global norms and regional and domestic 
dynamics as well. As Brian Rathburn notes, “Anarchy in structural realism provides 
strong incentives for states to accumulate power, but we cannot understand power 
without reference to what happens within states and how people think and what they 
believe.”30 
Realism, specifically its “neo” variant, long has neglected the role of non-material 
capabilities and human agency, which has contributed to the misjudgments made by 
many neorealists after the Cold War.31 The crude version of hegemony adopted by 
realists also has limited the efficacy of realist theory in explaining state behavior in a 
unipolar world, where global norms can be more threatening than armies and navies.  
Robert Jervis makes this case when he points out that a hegemonic project goes 
beyond simple material dominance; hegemony has ideological or normative as well as 
economic and military components. “For the United States, the frontier is ideological 
rather than geographic, but the basic point is the same: preservation of a desirable and 
ordered zone requires taming or subduing areas and ideologies of potential 
disturbance.”32 The reverse of this logic runs true as well. If ideology or norms are an 
important element in establishing hegemony, they could be important in de-establishing 
hegemony as well. From this standpoint, soft balancing becomes a viable strategy to 
                                                 
30 Rathburn, “A Rose by any Other Name,” 301.  
 
31 Structural realists have made a number of erroneous predictions after the Cold War, particularly that 
great power rivalry would break out in Europe and hard balancing would occur against the United States. 
See for example, Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”; Waltz., “Structural Realism After the Cold War”; 
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, 
no. 4, (Spring, 1993): 5-51.  
 
32 Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” 13. 
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restrain hegemonic ambitions when great powers cannot match the material might of the 
hegemonic power. In fact, adding norms to the repertoire of great power capabilities does 
not undermine the realist paradigm, but rather enhances it.  As Mesbahi notes, realism 
can be “enriched” by including soft power as a capability, which can have an 
incommensurate qualitative affect as a multiplier of hard power.33 
Problem 
 As mentioned earlier in the document, one goal of my research project is to 
determine the causal mechanism that shape great power reactions in a unipolar system. 
The contention put forth in this study is that great powers not allied with the United 
States will favor a “soft balancing” strategy to balance American power rather than 
bandwagon. Such a strategy uses low level or indirect measures to restrain American 
power by focusing on the political and normative dimensions of hegemony. In addition, 
states adopting a soft balancing posture are likely to create or utilize regional spheres of 
influence as a buffer to U.S. hegemonic reach. In a unipolar era, regions could be 
considered “poles of power” where great powers can coordinate to fend off hegemonic 
interventions.34 The end of the Cold War and rise of American unipolarity also led to the 
formation of “regional security complexes,” which provide actors greater autonomy and 
more room for maneuver in a hegemonic system.35 In fact, regions can be viewed as 
                                                 
33 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Public Diplomacy, Power and Normative Challenges”  
 
34 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power Values, and the Constitution of International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): especially  243-261. 
 
35Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions as Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the 
American Imperium, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005). On Central Asia and the Caucasus as a 
regional security complex, see Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Eurasia between Russia, Turkey and Iran,” in Maria 
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balancing mechanisms distinct from traditional alliance politics.36 Soft balancing also can 
occur in a military context when states adopt tactics that seek to indirectly offset U.S. 
supremacy through denial of forward basing rights through diplomatic means, hindering 
American command and control capabilities by targeting satellites, and politically 
constraining American maneuverability through institutions such as the UN Security 
Council and regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Why China and Russia 
China and Russia provide an opportune case to test great power reactions to 
hegemony, specifically the concept of soft balancing. Both are considered great powers 
and rank among the largest states in the world in traditional great power metrics: military 
spending, population, GDP, territory and influence. Neither state is ally or enemy of 
Washington. Explaining their behavior has been problematic because, although they are 
status quo powers, neither is integrated into the Western world order. Indeed, their 
position in the Western order could be deemed “non-fraternal”37 and they are considered 
by some as “fellow travelers out of the periphery” of Western power.38 Furthermore, the 
study of great powers is still important for contemporary International Relations because 
they are largely responsible for setting the rules of engagement in global politics. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Raquel Freire and Roger Kanet, eds., Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the 
‘Great Game,’ (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 
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China and Russia also provide a suitable test case for soft balancing because their 
reactions to American hegemony are disputed and could be subject to falsifiability, 
although such a goal is not easily achievable in a case study.39 Some scholars argue that 
the two great powers are not balancing U.S. hegemony whereas others maintain that the 
strategy is one of “soft bandwagoning” or hedging rather than balancing.40 A major 
problem, however, is that many analyses of Sino-Russian relations are theoretically or 
analytically incoherent. Many theorists simultaneously argue that Russia and China have 
joined forces to counterbalance the United States, but that they are not actually balancing 
the United States. Regional specialists also are at odds over whether the Sino-Russo 
partnership in Central Asia constitutes balancing or some other behavior.41 For example, 
regional and area specialists have identified consistent behavior by China and Russia to 
oppose U.S. policies in Central Asia (and other regions of the world), yet deny any larger 
phenomenon is at work. In fact, some of their own analyses contain antipodal views on 
Chinese and Russian behavior.42 
                                                 
39 The term “reactions” is used in this context because it is relatively neutral. Reactions to American 
hegemony can be positive or negative (depending on the reference of an actor) or there could be no reaction 
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40 Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a U.S.-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” 
International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 77-94.  
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Rajan Menon’s recent report on Sino-Russo relations, for example, is indicative 
of such analyses. Menon, a specialist in Russian regional policy in Central Asia, argues 
that viewing strategic partnership as a reaction to “the new Cold War” amounts to 
sophistry and rejects “the erroneous belief that that Russia and China have formed a de 
facto anti-American alliance.”43 Yet further in the report, Menon writes that Russia and 
China have used the SCO to oppose U.S. intervention in Central Asia and have joined 
forces to oppose NATO expansion. More importantly, however, is Russia and China’s 
security predicament in a unipolar world. “The appropriate response to such a challenge 
in Moscow and Beijing’s view is for other governments to organize a multipolar order, in 
which new centers of power counterbalance the lone superpower, or ‘hegemon’ 
[emphasis added],”44 
It is generally recognized that China and Russia do not view the United States as 
an existential or territorial threat; that is, neither great power expects the United States to 
violate their territorial sovereignty absent some unforeseen circumstances (the same holds 
true for the United States). Yet, if territorial violation were not a concern, why then 
would China and Russia try to “organize a multipolar order” to “counterbalance the lone 
superpower”? Again, viewing norms as a system-level capability helps to explain this 
quandary. Because the United States already has established military supremacy, 
Christopher Layne argues its “quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, 
deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great 
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power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and 
geography.”45 In other words, the United States pursues material and ideological interests 
in Central Asia and elsewhere, although from a realist viewpoint, the former outweighs 
the latter. In this case, “norms or ideal interests can considerably reinforce, legitimize and 
help sustain a realpolitik inclination to intervene when they are accompanied by major 
material interests or proximity to [a] Great Power or its major allies.”46 
Why Central Asia 
A decade into the 21st century, there are only a few regions in the world that 
possess the prerequisites necessary for such “soft” balancing to take place. Specifically, 
great power responses to unipolarity are likely to occur in regions where a hegemonic 
power has intervened as an “off-shore” balancer.”47 It is likely in these regions that great 
powers outside of the Western order will challenge Washington’s diktat. One such region 
is Central Asia, where great powers Russia and China have formed a “strategic 
partnership,” which, at least publicly, is aimed at returning the international system to one 
of multipolarity. This partnership has manifested itself in regional institutions such as the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has evolved from a regional security 
regime into a platform to reduce American influence in Central Asia. Conceivably, the 
region could serve as a focal point for great power balancing in contemporary 
international affairs.  
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Similar to the era of the Great Game,48 contemporary Central Asia “has become 
an arena where several nations hope to extend their influence, and fear the consequences 
of their opponents doing so.”49 Central Asia, like the Middle East, is also a region where 
great power rivalry is extant and acute, though not necessarily hostile.50 Both exogenous 
and endogenous factors have shaped the formation of the region. In the case of China and 
Russia, each has strategic, economic, energy and security interests in the region. Regional 
dynamics, such as the threat of transnational terrorism and the “Islamic factor” have 
fostered regional cooperation between China and Russia51 and the presence of U.S. troops 
in the region has hardened it. As Menon points outs, “For now, there is an intersection of 
interests between Russia and China because of the shared suspicion of the American 
military presence in the region, symbolized by U.S. access to the Kyrgyz airbase at 
Manas; the common concern about Islamic radicalism in Central Asia; and ‘the strategic 
partnership’ formed in response to a U.S.-dominated unipolar world.”52 Nevertheless, 
elements of cooperation exist between the three major powers and latent conflict between 
China and Russia could undermine any alignment against the United States.53 
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Central Asia also constitutes a “regional security complex,” defined by Buzan and 
Wæver as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or 
both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another.”54 As a regional security complex, Central Asia can be 
studied as an autonomous unit and serve as a test ground for soft balancing. Advocates of 
soft balancing argue that the means are largely political and indirect rather than military 
because of the disparity in power relations between great powers and the United States. 
Another major component of soft balancing is regionalization or the creation of regional 
spheres of influence. Many of these tactics have been utilized in Central Asia, where 
China and Russia have tried to block Western nations and organizations from the 
region.55  
Organization of Study 
This study has two objectives – theoretical and analytical – and the structure of 
the study builds toward those goals. The introduction outlined the theoretical problems 
facing the concept of “balance of power” and how this lack of cohesion has made it 
difficult to explain the Sino-Russo partnership. To achieve these dual purposes, the study 
attempts to merge theory and analysis. Such an approach should make the work appealing 
to scholars and policy analysts.  
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical tradition adopted by this study (realism) 
methodology and case selection. Although the work falls largely within the realist 
tradition, Chapter Two makes a case for theoretical eclecticism. In fact, neoclassical 
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realism provides a bridge to other paradigms and methodological procedures because it 
focuses on the interplay between domestic and external factors. Competing schools of 
thoughts are rarely completely incommensurable and there is plenty of fruitful ground for 
cross-fertilization of theories. 
Chapter Three explores the concept of “balance of power” and its different 
variations, including soft balancing, which is the strategy this study argues has been 
adopted by China and Russia against the United States. It provides definitions of some 
key concepts, such as hegemony, capabilities and power projection, and describes what 
behavior could constitute balancing.  Chapter Three also incorporates normative 
capabilities into the balance-of-power framework, which I argued above, has been 
neglected to the detriment of realist theory. Furthermore, it seeks to develop a systematic 
methodology that can test for occurrences of such a strategy. This goal is necessary to 
distinguish soft balancing from harder varieties and to specify the domain under which it 
applies. Such a framework would help analysts as well because it could eliminate much 
of the ambiguity surrounding the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership. 
 In Chapter Four, the study describes how Central Asia has evolved into a 
“regional security complex” (RSC) since the end of the Cold War, and more recently, 
following American military intervention in the region after the September 11, 2001 
attacks. It maintains that the intervention of the United States in the region facilitated a 
“strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which used the SCO and other 
mechanisms as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. Chapter Three also focuses on the 
strategic vision Beijing, Moscow and Washington have of Central Asia. Strategic vision 
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involves the long-term security, military, economic and normative objectives each actor 
has in the region and how those regional objectives fit in their overall global vision.56 
 The Chinese and Russian conception of soft power and international norms is 
dealt with in Chapter Five. Beijing and Moscow have their own interpretation of 
democracy and international institutions, which compete with those of the United States, 
although retaining the same terminology. The struggle to define international norms can 
help states achieve “milieu goals” that create an international environment conducive for 
their preferences. China and Russia often work in concert within international and 
regional mechanisms to balance the United States at the normative level, which is a form 
of “strategic language politics.”57 Such rivalry over language follows the logic of soft 
balancing, where rivalry among great powers takes place across the normative rather than 
material dimension of power. Analyzing the role norms plays in the balance of power 
also links the domestic to the international. The soft power China and Russia would like 
to promote is a reflection of their domestic culture and vision of world order. Defining 
the rules of the game is just as important as playing the game itself.  
 Chapter Six focuses on the specific soft balancing responses China and Russia 
have adopted to counter American intervention in Central Asia. It examines how China 
and Russia have used the Central Asian security complex to counterbalance the American 
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presence in Central Asia. It analyzes Russian and Chinese bilateral relations with one 
another, their multilateral relations with the smaller Central Asian republics, and their 
influence in regional institutions such as SCO. The chapter demonstrates how states can 
use regional spheres of influence as well as deploy normative measures, such as 
alternative conceptions of democracy and differing institutional arrangements, to offset 
ideas and ideologies that they find threatening.  
 In Chapter Seven, the study examines Chinese and Russian foreign policy and 
military strategy from the theoretical standpoint of soft balancing. There has been a 
dearth of literature the role soft balancing plays in military rivalry and this chapter seeks 
to fill that vacuum. The chapter explores how China and Russia have tried to use soft 
balancing to undercut U.S. military superiority without engaging American power 
directly. For example, Chinese defense doctrine in regards to the United States is 
predicated on the concept of “strategic denial” or “anti-access,” a goal that Russia shares. 
Moreover, Chinese and Russian strategists include “soft” or “normative” power as 
strategic capabilities in their military doctrines and foreign policy. Alternative norms, 
such as the concept of “sovereign democracy,” allow China and Russia to deliberately 
ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the 
United States.  
 The conclusion discusses the policy implications of the new Central Asian “great 
game” and the role regionalization could play in the future. Regional dynamics could 
affect the balance of power in the international system. Russia and China (and to a lesser 
extent Iran, India and the EU powers) each seeks a return to multipolarity and would like 
to establish themselves as leaders in their respective subsystems. From a geopolitical 
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standpoint, changing security relations in Central Asia could affect energy distribution in 
the region (through pipeline reconfigurations, for example), the battle against Islamic 
extremism and terrorism, and attempts to reduce weapons proliferation and drug 
trafficking. The outcome of great power rivalry in Central Asia will have ramifications 
not only for the region, but for the entire international system.  
Lastly, a much more rigorously defined concept of soft balancing can help 
analysts of the contemporary international system make informed decisions about foreign 
and defense policy. New analytics are required to study the strategic role of language 
politics in international affairs and to assess the effect of soft power on the overall 
strategic balance of power. Failure to understand these new dynamics could lead to 
flawed policy. Underestimating the Sino-Russo strategic partnership, for example, could 
leave U.S. policymakers unprepared for the dissemination of new norms and economic 
development models antithetical to Western interests. On the other hand, fears of a full-
blown Chinese-Russian anti-Western alliance could cause American policymakers to 
overreact diplomatically and militarily, and unnecessarily raise tensions between the 
United States and a newly-formed Eurasian bloc. Such an outcome would be a self-
fulfilling prophecy, and indeed a tragedy of great power politics. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The Role of Theory in Social Science  
 
Despite their differences, all theories share the assumption that theory in itself is 
important to understanding the world; all explanations of the world are based upon some 
theoretical assumption, whether acknowledged or not. Indeed, outcomes cannot be 
explained without recourse to cause and effect. Fundamentally, theories simply attempt to 
demonstrate how A causes or leads to B.  Explaining causation, however, does not mean 
that theories can predict all outcomes. Evolutionary theory, for example, explains how 
living organisms change over time, but evolutionary theory cannot predict what a specific 
organism will evolve into in the future.  
This study takes the position that, although theory is extremely important, it 
should not straightjacket the study of social phenomena. Scholars should not be enslaved 
to theory; theory should serve scholarship. Theory should not be devoid of validity or 
devolve into mere abstractions; it should be applicable to the “real” world. Therefore, 
sound International Relations theory must be grounded in history, geography, politics and 
other social science disciplines. Theory should provide a holistic framework that helps 
identify and explain patterns. Similar to a roadmap, theory is a guidepost that can direct 
us, although we might not be able to see all the bumps along the way. A broader 
conception of theory does not give license to pick and choose evidence that backs up our 
preconceived notions about phenomena while throwing out evidence that can disconfirm 
our views. Rather, we should recognize that elegant theories cannot capture all the 
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complexity of social relations. To capture that complexity, this work strongly advocates 
for theoretical eclecticism. Just as astrophysicists, for example, have borrowed from 
quantum mechanics to improve their understanding of black holes, International 
Relations theorists similarly can adopt insights from other social sciences to better 
explain relations between states.  
To that end, this chapter discusses the main theoretical paradigm to be used in this study, 
realism, and demonstrates how realism can be improved by incorporating ideas from 
other schools of thoughts. 
Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical and methodological approach to this study is neoclassical realism. 
The neoclassical paradigm provides a sophisticated, overarching framework that can 
subsume the eclectic themes enumerated in Chapter One into a streamlined explanation 
of great power responses to American hegemony. Although sharing similar ontological 
and epistemological assumptions, neoclassical realism was developed as a response to the 
“hyperrealism” advanced by structural realists such as John Mearsheimer and Kenneth 
Waltz before him.58 “Its purpose is to argue that, although the neorealist movement has 
added much to our understanding of international affairs through its careful examination 
of the impact of polarity on state behavior, it also has jettisoned the concern for unit 
attributes and interactions that was crucial to traditional realist theory.”59 
Despite some important differences, neoclassical realism holds a set of 
assumptions about international politics that places it into the overall realist research 
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program. These attributes, which all realists accept to one degree or another, constitute 
the “hardcore” of the paradigm. They are: an acceptance of anarchy as the organizing 
principle of the international system; a focus on the international system as a main 
variable affecting state behavior; a state-centric approach; a view of international politics 
as competitive; an emphasis on material factors; and an assumption that states are 
egoistic and autonomous actors that pursue self-help.60  
Yet there are areas where neoclassical realism clearly diverges from its brethren. 
For example, neoclassical realists depart from classical realism’s strict emphasis on the 
domestic origins of foreign policy and neorealism’s strict focus on systemic constraints. 
These extremes, as Stephen G. Brooks points out, are the result of an overreliance on 
particular aspects of human nature – aggression (classical) and fear (neo) – to generate 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the adherents of classical and neorealism both assume that 
states rely primarily on the use of threat of military force to secure their objectives and 
concentrate solely on the balance of military capabilities.61 Neoclassical realists do not 
object to these assumptions, but rather argue that states can adopt a wide range of 
strategies to counter threat. Military means are a major component of statecraft, though 
not always the primary option. 
The limitations in neorealism’s approach to international politics were highlighted 
after the Cold War. Changes in the bipolar system ushered in a new wave of complexity 
that “so overwhelmed neorealism's ultra-parsimonious, structural formulation that it now 
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appears more as a theoretical straightjacket than a progressive research paradigm.”62  The 
main deficiency of neorealism was its inability to account for the rules that govern the 
international system. These “rules” do not arise solely out of materiality, although that is 
a necessary component of rule formation, but from social systems as well, an aspect of 
international politics largely discounted by neorealists.63  
Here, the neoclassical conception of hegemony shares much in common with 
Gramscian, neo-Marxian and liberal notions, which account for the role of domestic and 
international institutions to imbed norms that constrain actors.64 Peter Katzenstein, a 
constructivist theorist, articulates this point when he writes: “The primary foundation of 
rights and rules is in the power and interests of the dominant groups or states in a social 
system.... In every social system the dominant actors assert their rights and impose rules 
on lesser members in order to advance their particular interests.”65 
There are several benefits for using a neoclassical realist framework to analyze 
Russian and Chinese response to U.S. hegemony. First, the non-probabilistic nature of 
neoclassical realism opens it to productive dialogue with non-realist paradigms.66 
“Domestic politics and ideas are fair game for realism, and neoclassical realists have 
taken up this mantle.”67 The challenge, however, is “to do so while remaining consistent 
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with what scholars from both approaches consider their core assumptions.”68 The 
problem of incommensurability is not as difficult to overcome as might seem at first 
glance because there is a great deal of consonance and overlap among paradigms. 
According to Mohiaddin Mesbahi, many of the disputes among paradigmatic approaches 
are over terminology rather than substance: 
 One can, for example, defend realism, especially the traditional version, for 
recognizing the ambiguity of the notion of interest and understanding the role of 
the mythology of power and prestige, not just material interest, as a driving force; 
or the Kantian variety of liberalism, which both assumes a certain connection 
between typology/identity and behavior and the composite nature of the actor; or 
Gramscian Marxism (to which critical geopolitics is indebted) for recognizing that 
the role of ideas is key to hegemony and self-assertion and resistance; or 
constructivism, especially the rule-oriented version that recognizes the co-
constitutionality of agent and structure. A more nuanced understanding of 
competing paradigms reveals fewer distinctions and more complementarity and 
mutual enrichment and borrowing.69 
 
Neoclassical realism is also similar to some neoliberal and neo-Marxist 
approaches because it focuses on the interplay between systemic and domestic factors 
without abandoning neorealism’s emphasis on structural constraints. Gideon Rose 
describes how scholars studying the interaction between exogenous and endogenous 
forces can remain realist in nature: “[Neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both 
external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from 
classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's 
foreign policy is driven first and fore most by its place in the international system and 
specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They 
argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is 
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indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”70  
Furthermore, neoclassical realism opens the “black box” of the state for 
investigation. This is an important rectification for those who view the reification of the 
state as problematic. Neoclassical and classical realists do not deny that domestic 
interests groups advance their foreign policy goals by pressuring the state to formulate 
and implement policies favored by particular interests. Indeed, those who capture the 
helm of state are in position to decide the state’s interests. However, as realists argue, 
once interests are articulated, states will pursue them the best way they can. Interests 
accrete from below and then are carried out above by those autonomous “black boxes.” 
Nonetheless, how states pursue interests – and whether they are obtained – is greatly 
determined by their position within the international system. Although powerful domestic 
lobbies can push their objectives on the state as they please, states do not always have the 
willingness or capacity to carry them out.  
For neoclassical realists, the state is more holistic than for advocates of structural 
realism, who generally ignore domestic characteristics or utilize endogenous factors 
when they see fit. Steve E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro describe the 
more complex conception of the state as “top-down.”  
Neoclassical realism acknowledges there is no universally accepted definition of 
the state. Nonetheless, a starting point is Weber’s classical definition of the state 
as a human community that claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
Neoclassical realism presents a ‘top-down’ conception of the state, which means 
systemic forces ultimately drive external behavior. The executive … is best 
perceived equipped to perceive systemic constraints and deduce the national 
interest. Nonetheless, while the executive is potentially autonomous from society, 
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in many contexts political arrangements frequently compel it to bargain with 
domestic actors  (such as the legislature, political parties, economic sectors, 
classes or the public as a whole) in order to enact policy or extract resources to 
implement policy choices.71   
 
The interplay between the state and society is invariably complex and the case of 
China and Russia highlights such indeterminacy. The domestic bargaining among sectors 
(bureaucracies, lobbies, parties, etc.) in China, Russia and the United States, however, is 
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, other domestic factors are pertinent to the 
balance of power in Central Asia. Many analysts, for example, postulate that the latent 
conflicts between Moscow and Beijing will eventually undermine their “strategic 
partnership” and any attempts to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. The conflicts, of course, 
are the result of tension between domestic and foreign interests. Russia, for instance, is 
concerned about the rapid population growth of ethnic Han along its Siberian border with 
China and the rise of China as an economic and military powerhouse.72 China is 
increasingly concerned about potential overreliance on Russia for obtaining energy and 
weapons. Nationalists within both countries are wary of the other. Yet overshadowing all 
of these concerns is the specter of U.S. hegemony.   
The arms trade between China and Russia illuminates the necessity of analyzing 
both endogenous and exogenous factors to explain their relationship. From a neorealist 
standpoint, Russia should be wary of feeding the beast by transferring advanced weapons 
and platforms to the Chinese dragon. Although the domestic military industrial complex 
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factors heavily into Russia’s decision to sell weaponry to China, Robert H. Donaldson 
and John A. Donaldson find that identity plays an important role, too.73 They write: 
“Russia’s status and identity as a superpower remain important to its conception of its 
self-importance and role in the international arena. For a significant segment of the 
foreign policy and security elite in Russia, fear of U.S. domination is mixed with 
wounded pride and resentment … [and] China’s identity as Asia’s most important and 
powerful country clashes with the goals and interests of the United States.”74 
Neoclassical realism argues that domestic factors, ideas and identities do make a 
difference, but are shaped by significant systemic pressures. The case of arms transfers 
above is indicative of this as well. Russian and Chinese identities are fashioned largely by 
their global standing in relation to the United States, and their arms trade is a result of 
their relative weakness in regards to U.S. capabilities. Another example is both states’ 
overall grand strategies. China’s concept of “peaceful rise,” for instance, can be viewed 
as a strategy to avert the disastrous outcomes of Japanese and German attempts at 
hegemony during World War II. Yet, this trajectory is still dependent on outside factors, 
including American opposition to Chinese desires to reunify with Taiwan.75 In the case of 
Russia, alliance patterns and regional cooperation, too, result from identity shaped by 
external relations. In its relations with the Muslim world, Russia, like the West, fears the 
rise of Islamic radicalism. Yet tensions between Islam and the West might present Russia 
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with an historical opportunity to make overtures with Muslim states in Central Asia and 
the Middle East, despite the potential for a clash of civilizations. Both these examples 
demonstrate the complex interplay between exogenous and endogenous factors. Realists 
give greater weight to external constraints, but neither variable can be quantified by any 
reliable measure, a problem that is addressed in the proceeding sections. 
Selection of Case Study 
The case to be evaluated is contemporary and constantly evolving. However, the 
focus will be on Russian and Chinese reactions to American intervention in the region 
since the September 11, 2001 attacks, which resulted in the U.S.-led war against al Qaeda 
forces and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  Using 9/11 as a benchmark narrows the 
scope of the case to a period of about a decade, although the United States had made 
initial and limited forays into the region before that point. The region will be defined as 
the five former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), China and Russia. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization is a linchpin that organizes these states into a regional security complex 
(save the obscurantist and isolationist Turkmenistan, which is a non-member). Other 
important extra-regional actors include SCO observers Iran, India, Mongolia and 
Pakistan; and Afghanistan, the European Union and Turkey, however the policies and 
interests of these states are addressed only insofar they relate directly to the Chinese-
Russian strategic partnership. Finally, although this study is of a contemporary case, a 
brief historical overview of the region’s dynamics will be provided in the fourth chapter.  
In terms of scope, this analysis is restricted to the strategic reactions of China and 
Russia to the United States and does not include in depth analysis of the five smaller 
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states of former Soviet Central Asia. These states have attempted to utilize the SCO and 
their bilateral relations with China, Russia and the United States to leverage concessions 
from each other and the great powers, but as small states, their behavior is peripheral to a 
study focusing on the strategies of great powers. The interests of the smaller states, 
therefore, will be analyzed largely in the context of their interaction with the three major 
powers, for example, how democratization, terrorism or energy security in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan affects the overall balance of power in the region. 
The internal dynamics of the smaller states is beyond the scope of this study. 
Methodology  
This case study should be viewed as a heuristic project that helps to facilitate 
theory construction, not necessarily the demonstrable final say on how states behave 
under unipolarity. Furthermore, it adopts an eclectic approach to theorizing through the 
utilization of insights from other paradigms to enhance the efficacy of realist theory. 
There are strengths and weaknesses to utilizing heuristic case studies and eclectic 
theoretical approaches, but overall, this study maintains that such a research program 
advances our knowledge of the world, although with some important caveats. 
Heuristic case studies, as Alexander George explains, are “used as a means of 
stimulating the imagination in order to discern important new [emphasis in original] 
general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially 
generalizable relations that were not previously apparent. In other words, the case study 
is regarded as an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, 
to develop further the existing framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially 
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available theory employed by the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the 
particular case examined.” 76  
A single case study also can be “useful for evaluating causal explanations if it is 
part of a research program [and] if there are other single observations, perhaps gathered 
by other researchers, against which it can be compared, it is no longer a single 
observation.”77 In the case of the Chinese-Russian relationship, there is a bountiful 
literature, much of it at odds, on their responses to American unipolarity, in general, and 
U.S. intervention into Central Asia, in specific. There is also emerging research on the 
role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the international system. Much of the 
literature on this burgeoning institution, however, has come from Chinese, Russian and 
Central Asian area specialists, who have not systematically analyzed the SCO through the 
contextual framework of IR theory.78 This study maintains that viewing the SCO through 
the lens of IR theory could help reconcile some of the disparate and diverging views of 
Chinese and Russian reactions and the role of the SCO, which range from highly alarmist 
to extremely skeptical. Addressing the void of SCO analysis in IR scholarship also could 
provide new theoretical and analytical tools to better understand the contemporary 
international system.  
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Furthermore, the study contributes to the growing debate about soft balancing. 
The concept is still relatively in its early stages and there is much dispute about its 
efficacy in explaining state behavior. Proponents of soft balancing argue there is a need 
to flesh out its methodological concepts, provide empirical evidence of its efficacy, and 
theoretically incorporate it into the overall balance of power of schema. This study 
attempts to do all.  
Toward Theoretical Eclecticism 
Although this study mainly adheres to a neoclassical framework, it explicitly 
incorporates insights from other theoretical paradigms. Peter Katzenstein, a major 
proponent of theoretical eclecticism, argues that although there are risks to synthesizing 
paradigms, the potential payoffs are worth it.79 “The recognition of the existence of, and 
possible complementarities between, multiple research traditions holds forth the prospect 
of translating the analytic languages and theoretical insights of each in the process of 
improving transparadigmatic knowledge on specific substantive problems.”80 
Despite some scholars’ misgivings about integrating paradigms,81 cross-
fertilization across different approaches can lead to productive new theory. Building a 
broader conception of hegemony, for instance, can be achieved while maintaining 
parsimony by synthesizing compatible elements into a new whole. On issues of ontology 
and epistemology, liberalism, historical structuralism (particularly Marxism) and certain 
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versions of constructivism do not diverge much from realism, despite some deep 
methodological differences.82 Ontologically, for historical structuralists, liberals and 
realists, material forces are the main cause of state behavior.83 Some constructivists also 
view the structure of the international system as a constraint on actor behavior; although 
for constructivists these structures include international norms.84 Nevertheless, 
constructivists should not hold a monopoly on norms. Realists should – must – also 
address the role norms play in the system. 
On the role of international norms, however, an assessment of the contemporary 
international scene demonstrates that the collective ideas of the major Western powers 
have been a source of concern for China, Russia and other middle powers such as Iran 
and Venezuela.85 “What is clear is that states have often differed in their reactions to 
international rules – some accepting them, others no. Such attitudes can enhance or 
undermine overall order.”86 In fact, the concept of soft balancing was developed to 
explain how disaffected weaker states would respond to a hegemonic order they deemed 
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unsatisfactory. In sum, neoclassical realism offers a viable framework for bridging the 
philosophical gap between competing paradigms and weaving their compatible insights 
into a synthetic whole. 
Scope and Limitations 
International Relations theory in general, and realist theory in particular, is an 
ongoing process. My work is designed to be a contribution to the larger body of realist 
thought by offering an explanation of the behavior of great powers under unipolarity.87 In 
fact, it could be considered what Imre Lakatos referred to as a “progressive research 
program.”88  Nevertheless, the study does not claim to offer a deterministic theory of 
international politics, but rather a guide to how states are likely to respond to a unipolar 
world structure. Although social science theory attempts to predict events, it cannot do so 
in terms of numerical probabilities as the natural sciences, but only in large-scale trends 
and generalizations.89 For the purposes of this study, I share the view that social sciences 
must accommodate indeterminacy, irregularity and unpredictability.90 Although we may 
strive for prediction, we may have to settle for less accurate forecasts. As John Lewis 
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Gaddis writes, forecasts can be neither deterministic nor conditional; they are 
probabilistic statements (If A, then probably B).91 
The drawback of such an approach is the oft-cited problem of indeterminacy, 
which is faced by many researchers.92 Suffice it to say, the social sciences, including 
International Relations, are currently ill-equipped to render precise predictions about 
social phenomena and such clairvoyance is highly unlikely: “There are so many 
complexities and ambiguities in the foreign policy process that many influences are likely 
to be found in any explanation of any particular policy shift.”93 
The same largely holds true for Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. hegemony. 
Different scholars have offered different causal explanations for Russian and Chinese 
reactions to U.S. intervention in Central Asia, even though they generally concur on the 
outcomes. The objective of this research project is to reconcile some of the disparate 
explanations through a neoclassical realist conceptual framework. If such a framework 
can identify a consistent pattern of behavior by China and Russia to undermine, 
counterbalance or counteract U.S. ambitions in the region, then there might be a larger 
phenomenon at work. The goal, then, is to determine which factors, if any, are the major 
causes of Chinese and Russian behavior. Realists argue that the causes generally lie 
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within the system – for example, the intervention of a hegemonic power into a region – 
although they recognize outcomes are shaped by other mitigating factors. Studies of this 
sort, which offer large-scale generalizations, make falsification difficult, though not 
impossible. However, I concur with Paul Diesing that “disconfirmation is very useful, but 
it is a limited, peripheral process that leads to modification rather than total rejection of a 
theory.”94 Furthermore, if adaptations to a theory can explain more than its predecessors, 
then it should be viewed as progressive.95 This is what Thomas Kuhn meant when he 
wrote in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that: “to be accepted as a paradigm, a 
theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, 
explain all the facts which it can be confronted.”96  
 In the author’s view, this study does offer a much more comprehensive and 
holistic account of great power behavior under unipolarity than recent works. There are 
few analyses that systematically examine a case of purported soft balancing at the length 
attempted in this study. Few works of Chinese-Russian relations adopt any explicit 
theoretical orientation; and those that do give only cursory treatment in the length of a 
chapter or less. Furthermore, there is a dearth of the role of norms and soft balancing 
across the military dimension (Chapter Six) of state relations. The transformation of 
military doctrine to include norms is beyond the scope of this study. However, it does 
begin the conversation on how normative power can affect, and change, hard power and 
the role soft power could play in the future of great power relations.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
SOFT BALANCING AS A HARD CONCEPT 
 
“America acts like a pachyderm, rather than a T. rex. This beast inspires discomfort, not 
existential angst.” 
– Josef Joffe97 
 
 The “balance of power” is an essentially contested concept because there is no 
consensus for its meaning. Yet despite the “elasticity” of the notion, the fundamental or 
basic objective that underlies most balance of power abstractions involves what Dana 
Zinnes describes as a “a particular distribution of power among the states of that system 
such that no single state and no existing alliance has an ‘overwhelming’ or 
‘preponderant’ amount of power.”98 Under Zinnes definition of balance of power, the 
concept could be both strategy and/or outcome. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish 
between “balancing” and “balance of power” for analytical purposes. In his theoretical 
model, T.V. Paul offers a clear distinction between the two, which will be followed in 
this study: “In tune with the commonly understood meanings of the terms, balancing is 
viewed as a state strategy or foreign policy behavior while balance of power are regarded 
as outcomes at the systemic or subsytemic levels, that is, as conditions of power 
equilibrium among key states [emphasis in the original].”99 
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To be sure, balancing is one of a range of possible strategies that can be adopted 
by states to pursue their interests as well as a possible outcome of state behavior, whether 
intentional or not. However, a strategic “balance” (or “equilibrium”) is not fated to occur, 
as some neorealists are wont to argue, and states do not automatically balance against 
rising power despite other factors, such as domestic politics, elite perceptions, aggressive 
intentions or geography. History is replete with cases of states and polities that failed to 
balance, underbalanced, remained neutral or chose other strategies such as bandwagoning 
or buck-passing.100 History also shows us “that threat is not a necessary derivative of 
power and that the emergence of powerful states has not always been accompanied by the 
rise of a challenger or counter coalition. Consider the cases of nineteenth-century Britain, 
which controlled three-quarters of the world and yet remained in ‘splendid isolation,’ as 
well as the emergence of the United States as a Great Power before World War I without 
the formation of a balancing alliance.”101 In other words, balance of power is not a 
tautology, rather a probable, though not destined, outcome. 
Consistent with the theme of this research project, this chapter utilizes the 
neoclassical realist framework and draws on the theoretical eclecticism outlined in 
Chapter Two to analyze and locate soft balancing within the balance of power 
framework. First, it provides a review of classical and structural balance of power 
theories to demonstrate that different systemic configurations generate different balance 
of power logics: alliances are more suitable to multipolar systems; internal arms buildups 
are more effective in bipolar systems; and soft balancing is likely the best balancing 
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strategy in a unipolar system. Such an analysis can help locate state behavior along a 
continuum of strategies rather than just view balancing as an either-all proposition. 
Secondly, it attempts to identify the relevant exogenous and endogenous factors that 
affect balancing behavior and outcomes under unipolarity. External constraints might 
induce certain balancing strategies, but whether states decide to balance or not is located 
in the domestic level of politics. Finally, this section examines more specifically the 
literature on soft balancing and attempts to develop a methodology that can test for 
occurrences of such behavior. Developing a methodology is necessary to distinguish soft 
from hard balancing and specify the domain under which soft balancing applies. 
Developing a third balance-of-power logic provides sound theoretical footing for 
proponents of soft balancing who argue it is a distinct form of state behavior adopted by 
countries such as Russia and China to counter U.S. hegemonic ambitions.  
Balance of Power: An Overview 
Balance of power is one of the four foundations of realist theory, whether in its 
classical or structural variants.102 Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau viewed 
balance of power as a mechanism to ensure the survival of the system through 
equilibrium of the units. “Consequently, it is the purpose of all such equilibrium to 
maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements 
composing it.”103  Similar to Morgenthau was Hedley Bull’s version of balance of power. 
For Bull, balance of power logic requires only two neighboring states in anarchy seeking 
to survive (what he called a “simple” or bipolar balance of power system as opposed to 
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“complex” or multipolar balance of power system). Unlike the mechanistic view of 
structural realists, Bull’s logic doesn’t necessarily presume that states are unconsciously 
guided to balance due to the anarchic structure of the international system – balancing 
can be either “fortuitous” or “contrived.”104 For Bull, the existence of general balance of 
power serves to prevent the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal 
empire; the existence of a local balance of power protects the independence of states from 
absorption by a neighboring predominant power; and both the general and local balance 
of power provide the conditions on which other institutions of international order depend 
to exist.105 Kissinger buttresses this point when he argues that balances of power often 
come about de facto based on systemic pressures, but also can be the conscious policy of 
statesmen, who must “tend” or manage balances whether balancing is conscious or not.106 
Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, approached theory differently than their 
predecessors, but their assumptions generally corresponded to those of Morgenthau and 
Bull.107  Under Waltzian theory, for balance-of-power politics to prevail, only two 
requirements must be met: the international order must be anarchic and states wish to 
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survive.108 In a self-help system, when states face a threatening power, they will seek to 
form a balancing alliance whether consciously or not. Waltz’s theory simply explains the 
interests and motives of states, rather than describing what they will actually do, and 
therefore offers little utility as an analytic.  
Other theorists have attempted to rectify Waltz’s sparse balance-of-power theory 
by adding variables or revising assumptions of state behavior under anarchy to better 
predict state behavior. Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer, for example, argue 
that great powers don’t simply seek to survive in an anarchic system, but attempt to 
dominate it because “survival mandates aggressive behavior” and dominance is the best 
way to ensure survival.109 On the other hand, defensive realists such as Jack Snyder 
maintain that great powers are more secure when they refrain from power maximization 
and seek to defend the status quo.110  
Stephen Walt formulated a “balance of threat” theory by adding “intent” to the 
traditional metrics of economic strength, military power and population size in 
determining balancing outcomes.  “States that are viewed aggressively are likely to 
provoke others to balance against them,” Walt suggests.111 Walt’s addition of “intent” 
resolves some of the existing anomalies in balance of power theory by explaining why 
great powers did not initially balance against the United States after the end of the Cold 
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War.112 In the specific case of the United States, Walt writes: “The anomaly of states 
failing to balance U.S. power vanishes when we focus not on power but on threats 
[emphasis in original]. Although the United States is enormously powerful relative to 
other states, it has not been perceived as a major threat by most other powers.”113  
Other factors also played a role in limiting balancing against the United States; its 
geographic isolation relative to other great powers has made it difficult for the U.S. to 
engage in territorial expansionism; and because other great powers lie in close proximity 
to each other rather than the United States, they tend to worry more about one another 
than American power.114 However, as offensive realism predicts, the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks induced the United States to pursue a more unilateral 
foreign policy and assertively intervene in regions once considered off limits during the 
Cold War.115 
In the abstract, balance of power simply predicts that states will seek to arrest the 
rise of a threatening power (either because of its capabilities, intents or a combination of 
both), at the regional or global level. Both classical realism and neorealism generally 
agree on this ontological premise, but on different epistemological grounds.116 Although 
balance of power as a system is a foundation of realism, the two traditions do diverge 
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from there, with classical realism focusing more on agency (foreign policy/strategy) and 
neorealists more on structure (system-wide distribution of capabilities/outcomes).117 The 
divergence between theory and practice should not be viewed as “degenerative,” but 
rather complementary. Indeed, neoclassical realism has provided a bridge between the 
two realist strands. Brian Rathburn demonstrates that a convergence of neorealism and 
classical realism can better explain balance of power both as a system (theory) and 
strategy (practice):  
Neoclassical realism in particular can be defended as having a coherent 
logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the way we would 
expect structural realism to do so. This is the natural outgrowth of 
neorealism, serving it in two ways. First, ideas and domestic political 
variables are significant factors in a state’s ability to harness latent 
material power.  … Second, on questions other than power, it is not that 
ideas and domestic politics do not play a role in structural realism, only 
that the system is biased against such influences, so that any effect is 
generally circumscribed to negatively affecting foreign policy. 
Neoclassical realism explains when states cannot properly adapt to 
systemic constraints and points out the serious consequences that result.118 
 
Given the almost doctrinal acceptance of balance of power theory among both 
classical and neorealists, the absence of hard balancing against the United States poses an 
anomaly. The existence of this anomaly can result in either one of two outcomes – the 
wholesale abandonment of the theory or the reformulation of theory to account for 
discrepancies. Following in the rich tradition of balance of power scholars, this study 
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attempts the latter by adopting a neoclassical realist framework.119  Before this task can 
be undertaken, this chapter reviews the limitations of balance of power theory by 
addressing several factors that might cause the balance of power to break down. 
A Disappearing (Balancing) Act 
Critics of soft balancing theories have cited a number of reasons why American 
hegemony has gone unbalanced. William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that 
American predominance in every critical dimension of power explains why no 
challengers have arisen.120 Since no potential rival can match the United States in 
material capabilities, there is no need to try, and bandwagoning is the preferred strategy 
by other great powers in a unipolar system. And despite America’s war-making and 
aggressive unilateral behavior abroad since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Keir 
A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander maintain that U.S. power is not threatening enough to 
provoke a countervailing coalition. “The major powers are not balancing against the 
United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post-September 11 
world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by 
tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly 
threatening.”121  
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Great powers also might find American hegemony less dangerous because it is a 
maritime rather than a continental power. According to Jack S. Levy and William R. 
Thompson, great-power balancing coalitions are more likely to form against states 
amassing high concentrations of military power in autonomous continental systems rather 
than states amassing high concentrations of naval (and air) power and wealth in the 
global maritime system.122 Dominant continental powers raise armies, which are more 
likely to seek territorial empires and threaten the borders of other states. Dominant 
maritime powers raise navies to protect and expand trade.123 Because the strategies and 
behaviors of great sea powers differ from their continental counterparts, their interaction 
with other great powers is dissimilar. Levy and Thompson argue that, although maritime 
powers are unlikely to educe coalitional balancing, they could face soft balancing 
coalitions and internal balancing. “We can certainly imagine the United States behaving 
in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke 
a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that 
threatens other great powers, not the fact of U.S. power.”124 
On the other hand, China and Russia might prefer to bandwagon with U.S. 
hegemony rather than balance it. Rosemary Foot makes the case that China’s strategy is 
not soft-balancing, but rather “soft bandwagoning.” Under this strategy, China tries to 
make its interests coincide with those of Washington. “In this sense, while Beijing’s 
strategy can be viewed as accommodation with the current U.S.-dominated global order, 
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it also contains an important ‘hedging’ element, or insurance policy, through which China 
seeks to secure its future.”125 Foot states flatly that: “China is neither part of, nor 
determinedly seeking, to build anti-hegemonic coalitions. Consequently, other emerging 
states such as Brazil, India and Russia should not expect too much in the way of 
sustained cooperation from China on this front, assuming they are interested in forming 
such coalitions.”126  
Systemic, though not necessarily structural, changes also could affect the balance 
of power.  Even discounting the use of nuclear weapons, war among developed nations 
would be so devastating that to undertake it would be irrational and thus militates against 
costly balancing.127 Economic interdependence, too, has made war among great powers 
largely obsolete, argues Richard Rosecrance.128 Democratic peace theorists, such as 
Bruce Russet and John R. O’Neal, maintain that the liberal nature of the United States 
makes it less threatening to other great powers, especially if they are democratic as 
well.129 Liberals point to the role that international institutions play in tamping down the 
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balance of power. Such institutions, G. John Ikenberry posits, are crucial “in establishing 
order and securing cooperation between unequal states.”130  
Theorists taking a constructivist approach have pointed to changing identities, 
ideologies and shared norms among great powers to account for the decrease in balancing 
behavior.131 For them, threats are not the result of intentions per se, but rather how states 
construe another’s intentions. In the case of the United States, its liberal character makes 
it less threatening than other great powers because the domestic nature of the United 
States allows it to pursue a multilateral foreign policy. The main causal mechanism is 
thus located internally. “A multilateral vision of world order is singularly compatible 
with America’s collective self-concept as a nation. Indeed, the vision taps into the very 
idea of America [emphasis in original]’’132  
 For these scholars, the balance-of-power mechanism is reduced in a unipolar 
world because power is too concentrated in the hegemon; is militated by the liberal nature 
of the United States and/or its character as a maritime power; overcome by globalization 
and economic interdependence; or circumvented by the changing norms of great power 
relations in the contemporary international system. If they are correct, then what does this 
say for Waltz’s inviolable and immutable theory of balance of power? After all, even if a 
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great power behaves with moderation, restraint and forbearance, “unbalanced power, 
whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.”133  
Systems Logic of Balance of Power  
A central argument of this study is that the configuration of the international 
system is the main determinant of the type of balancing strategy states are likely to adopt. 
In other words, the main independent variable is the polarity of the system, an exogenous 
factor, and the dependent variable is the balancing outcome. Realists have mainly focused 
on the balancing outcome of multipolar and unipolar systems.134 The debate has centered 
on which system is the most stable, and therefore, the most likely to foster peace. It was 
not until the end of the Cold War that realists began to carefully analyze the stability of 
unipolar systems.135  
Scholars such as Robert Pape argue that unipolarity is a distinct system with its 
own balancing logic different from that of bipolar and multipolar systems (see Figure 3-
1). Pape’s theoretical insights can be viewed as an extension of classical realism. For 
example, Hans Morgenthau recognized that “the reduction of the number of nations that 
are able to play a major role in international politics has had a deteriorating effect upon 
the operation of the balance of power.”136 Although Morgenthau never extended this 
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logic in Politics Among Nations, simple propositions can be drawn from his inference. 
Morgenthau’s balance of power framework was shaped mainly by the classic multipolar 
system of Continental Europe. Therefore, the reduction of five great powers to two would 
deteriorate the balance of power if “balance of power” is viewed simply in terms of 
alliance politics. However, what is occurring is not “deterioration” in the balance of 
power, but a transformation of one balance of power logic into another. Realists shaped 
by the first two World Wars and the Cold War understood the differing logics of 
multipolar and bipolar systems, but apparently failed to envision a unipolar world 
because none of their works before the end of the Cold War account for it.  
 
  
 
 
 
Despite the criticisms, recent neoclassical realist theory has focused on efforts by 
China and Russia to counteract the United States by analyzing exogenous and 
endogenous factors.137 The two external factors that largely account for the operation of 
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the balance of power in the international system are the number of great powers and the 
spread of nuclear weapons.138 Kenneth Waltz pointed to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons among great powers for the mitigation of balancing behavior: “In a world of 
second-strike nuclear forces, alliances have little effect on the strategic balance.”139 And, 
as mentioned above, Morgenthau noted the reduction of the number of great powers also 
suppresses balancing behavior.140  
The nature of the international system also can affect balancing strategies.141 In a 
multipolar system, the increased number of great powers enlarges the pool of possible 
dyads for alliance formation. This was manifested in the Eighteenth Century Europe, 
considered to be the classical age of balance of power. “All the assumptions of the 
structural model were in place: international anarchy, coherent states as rational 
positionalists, and a multipolar distribution with Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria 
constituting the classic system of five great powers.”142 The use of alliances was less 
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effective as a balancing strategy during the Cold War bipolar system, where defections 
from either bloc had little impact on the overall strategic balance. As Waltz explained: 
The withdrawal of France from NATO’s command structure and the 
defection of China from the Soviet bloc failed even to tilt the central 
balance. Early in the Cold War, Americans spoke with alarm about the 
threat of monolithic communism arising from the combined strength of the 
Soviet Union and China, yet the bloc’s disintegration caused scarcely a 
ripple. American officials did not proclaim that with China’s defection, 
America’s defense budget could safely be reduced by 20 or 10 percent or 
even be reduced at all. Similarly, when France stopped playing its part in 
NATO’s military plans, American officials did not proclaim that defense 
spending had to be increased for that reason.143  
 
In a unipolar system, the capabilities of the hegemonic state or superpower so far 
outstrip those of its nearest competitors that neither alliance formations nor internal arms 
buildups are effective. Although aspiring hegemonic powers of the past such as 
Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany eventually provoked balancing coalitions, the 
United States is “likely to buck the historical trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and 
west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less 
vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main 
potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile— China, Russia, Japan, and 
Germany—are in the opposite position.”144 
Endogenous factors enter the equation as well, including uncertainty combined 
with risk-loving preferences, conflict-averse preferences, offensive technological 
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advantages, economic growth, and technological and political rigidities in the formation 
of alliances and rivalries.145 The novelty of unipolarity also is cited as a factor for the lack 
of hard balancing against the Untied States. Indeed, “The world is in a great geopolitical 
adjustment process [emphasis in the original],” writes G. John Ikenberry, who finds that 
great power reactions aimed against the United States have been ad hoc because they are 
still learning and adapting to a new international system.146 Uncertainty also arises from 
the inability of actors to immediately assess all the variables that make up national power 
(such as national will and morale and effective government). As Morgenthau notes:  
It is impossible for the observer of the contemporary scene or the explorer 
of future trends to assess even with approximate accuracy the relative 
contributions of these elements may make to power differentials. 
Furthermore, the quality of these contributions is subject to incessant 
change, unnoticeable at the moment the change actually takes place and 
revealed only in the actual test of crisis and war. Rational calculation of 
the relative strength of several nations, which is the very lifeblood of the 
balance of power, becomes a series of guesses the corrections of which 
can be ascertained only in retrospect.147 
 
 Structural realists attempted to streamline theory by removing many of the 
endogenous variables of power cited by Morgenthau, Kissinger and other classical 
realists. Such abstract models explain how structure constrains units and shapes behavior 
of actors over the long term, but cannot adequately address how individual units will 
respond to barriers at any given moment. Structural theories, specifically Waltz’s 
mechanistic version, have often been cited as the embodiment of the balance of power in 
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the realist tradition. This is unfortunate because Waltz’s sparse model is the start for 
much realist theorizing, not the end. Waltz’s archetype resulted in a rigid view of balance 
of power, but others have demonstrated that balancing in the international system is 
fluid.148 Recent neoclassical reformulations have expanded the view of balance of power 
to account for the fluidity of systemic outcomes. Indeed, if balance of power is viewed as 
a continuum, a dynamic rather than static process is conveyed. State policies could range 
from soft balancing to soft bandwagoning (see figure 3-2).149 The remainder of this 
chapter develops a framework that can be used to determine whether states such as China 
and Russia indeed are soft balancing against the United States. 
 Soft Balancing as a Hard Concept  
 Balancing of the hard variety  is a core tenet of the realist research program. 
Unlike hard balancing, however, soft balancing is likely to involve alignments rather than 
arms buildups and formal alliances. Glenn Snyder’s definition of an alliance provides a 
strong description of what is generally thought of as traditional external balancing: 
“formal associations of states for the use [or nonuse] of military force, in specified 
circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”150 Snyder’s theory of 
alliance politics is based on the Austro-German alliance of 1879, which was targeted at 
France, and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-1894, which countered the Austro-
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German pact. Although Snyder’s work is more about alliance formation than balancing 
itself, it does demonstrate what external balancing behavior might look like.  
Another form of hard balancing is an arms buildup by one or more states to 
roughly match the power of the targeted state, or to at least develop defenses effective 
enough to make invasion cost prohibitive.151 Neither of these versions of hard balancing 
appears to be relevant to contemporary international affairs. No state has undertaken a 
massive arms buildup to match the military might of the United States and no formal 
alliances have been established against the U.S. because of the high costs. 
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Bandwagon Soft/Bandwagon Neutrality Soft/Balance Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alliances in favor Alignments in favor Buck passing Alignments against Alliances against 
Accommodation** Incentives Avoidance Coercion, bribes Arms buildups 
Formal treaties for Indirect, non-military 
means Neutrality 
Indirect, non-military 
means 
Formal treaties 
against 
 Baiting* Hiding Buffering*  
 Bonding*  Hedging**  
57 
Strategies of Engagement* 
 
Strategies of Resistance* 
*The terms engagement, resistance, baiting, buffering and bonding come from Ikenberry, “Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence.”    
**The terms accommodation and hedging comes from Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a U.S.-Hegemonic Global Order.” 
Table 3-2: Model of the Balance of Power Continuum 
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New “balancing” strategies 
Soft balancing began to surface as a concept in the mid-2000s to account for the 
conspicuous absence of hard balancing against the United States after the demise of the 
Cold War. Proponents of soft balancing argued that, contrary to predictions that the 
“balance of power” had no utility in a post-Cold War world, balancing strategies were 
indeed emerging. Supporters maintained that the balance of power dynamic still persisted 
in international politics, but that changes in the configuration of the international system 
required new balancing logics. They also argued that the absence of strategic balance as 
an outcome did not mean that states were abandoning balancing as a strategy because 
balancing is not always a successful policy. Furthermore, balancing strategies in a 
unipolar world would require new tactics to deal with an existing hegemonic power, a 
rare phenomenon in world history.152  
Soft balancing theorists describe that strategy as the adoption of indirect tactics to 
counterbalance U.S. interests. Robert Pape, a leading soft balance theorist, defines it as: 
“Actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use 
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military 
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policies.”153 This can be through international institutions, economic statecraft and 
diplomatic arrangements. T.V. Paul offers a similar description, concluding that “in the 
post-Cold War era, second-tier major power states have been increasingly resorting to 
soft balancing strategies to counter the growing military might and unilateral tendencies 
of the United States without harming their economic ties to it.”154 Regionalism is a major 
component of the soft balancing concepts laid out by Pape, Paul and Robert Art, each of 
whom argues that soft balancing encompasses regional security concerns great powers 
face from the power projection capabilities of an off-shore hegemonic power.155  
Another major proponent, Stephen Walt, amended soft balancing concepts by 
incorporating them within his “balance of threat” paradigm. According to Walt, hard 
balancing focuses on the overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a countervailing 
coalition that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in check, whereas soft 
balancing does not seek or expect to alter the overall distribution of capabilities. Instead, 
a soft balancing strategy accepts the status quo, but seeks to obtain better outcomes 
within it. In the current era of U.S. dominance, therefore, soft balancing is the “conscious 
coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. 
preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other 
some degree of mutual support.”156 
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Christopher Layne’s calls such behavior “leash slipping” when states try to free 
themselves from the yoke of the U.S. liberal order.157 Layne’s notion of “leash slipping” 
is crucial because it imbeds a normative component into the soft balancing framework. 
As Layne points out, the U.S. “quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, 
deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great 
power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography 
[emphasis mine].”158 In the liberal economic order established by the United States after 
World War II, leash slipping is less about the fear of being attacked by a “predatory land-
grabber” than a way for states “to conduct an independent foreign policy.”159  
As a liberal and maritime hegemonic power, the United States is unique. British 
hegemony and naval supremacy in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, 
though similar, does not compare to American hegemony in a unipolar system because 
U.S. capabilities relative to its challengers are far more superior than Britain’s 
capabilities compared to its rivals at the time. Nevertheless, both states faced no serious 
balancing coalitions because their goals were generally to extend control over markets 
rather than territory.160 The wealth and power of these liberal hegemons allowed them to 
create normative structures that benefited their interests. Although the concerns some 
great powers have about U.S. hegemony are in many cases ideational or normative, these 
are effects rather than causes. Normative threats emanate from domestic sources, but their 
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gravity is the result of a state’s position within the international system, a central tenet of 
structural realism.161 
Theoretical limitations of soft balancing 
 Kenneth Waltz viewed unbalanced power as threatening in itself, and posited that 
such a threat will provoke a reaction from other actors within the international system. 
Smaller states are likely to bandwagon with the hegemon, but other great powers have 
more options at their disposal.  Walt’s addition of “threat” to the soft balancing 
framework, however, rectifies some of the anomalies in Waltz’s theory because it 
explains why the American military presence in Europe is not considered menacing by 
the states in that region, whereas a smaller U.S. footprint in Central Asia has provoked 
consternation among the Russians and Chinese.162 Walt’s concept of soft balancing, 
however, is so broad that it covers issue areas ranging from global climate change to 
international trade; any act that seeks to undermine American policy, from European 
objection to genetically modified foods to French/German/Russian opposition to the 
Second Gulf War is tantamount to balancing. This expansive view limits the utility of 
Walt’s version of soft balancing because it does not offer criteria to distinguish between 
soft balancing and diplomatic bargaining or friction among states; even allies at times 
have conflicts and try to block the interests of one another. Furthermore, including such 
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“low politics” under the rubric of balancing diminishes the stature of balance of power, 
which generally has been limited to the arena of “high politics” and security. 
Other formulations of soft balancing also lack some theoretical cohesion at one 
level or the other. Paul’s notion of soft balancing involves “the formation of limited 
diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially in the United Nations, with the implicit threat 
of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals.”163  Pape 
characterizes balancing as the use of “assets [which] include military forces, economic 
power and leverage, formal alliances, informal alignments, and voting or veto power in 
international organizations. The first three can be conceived of as hard assets; the last two 
as soft assets.”164 According to Pape, these “assets” can include territorial denial 
(especially basing rights), entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening (regional 
trading blocs, e.g.), and signals of resolve to balance.165  
Although these definitions broadly describe what can be considered soft 
balancing, critics rightfully argue that the tactics they suggest, by themselves, are hard to 
distinguish from other state behavior and are not formulated in a manner that can be 
systematically tested. Indeed, how can one differentiate the denial of basing rights as a 
measure of soft balancing from a maneuver by a government to quell public displeasure 
with a foreign military force stationed in its country? And by what mechanism can the 
United Nations be used to balance against U.S. power other than a possible Security 
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Council veto given that little authority resides in the General Assembly?166 Nevertheless, 
proponents of soft balancing have laid the groundwork for a fruitful theory, even if their 
conceptions suffer from imprecision. Below, combined is what the author believes to be 
the most important elements in determining a soft-balancing strategy. 
Analytical Framework 
A review of soft balancing literature finds that it is largely a regional strategy 
designed to counter American influence in geographic areas proximate to other great 
powers. Regionalism is a central aspect of soft balancing because great powers need not 
exert themselves challenging the United States at the systemic level. In this study, soft 
balancing is defined as nonmilitary alignments of at least two states (external) and/or the 
increase of soft power by one state (internal) designed to reduce or remove the military 
presence and external influences of another power at the regional or global level. 
Analytically, a state’s increase in soft or normative power to counter that of another state 
or states could be considered soft balancing. Additionally, an alignment that adopts the 
three following tactics can evince soft balancing behavior: attempts to reduce the military 
presence of the external actor from a specific region; the removal of any local actors 
allied politically with the external great power; and decreasing economic, cultural and 
normative influences associated with the outside great power from the region. The first 
tactic is necessary to identify a soft-balancing strategy, the latter two sufficient for soft 
balancing. Below, the framework’s terms and concepts are further explicated. 
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Systemic Configuration: Hegemonic and Unipolar 
Proponents of soft balancing argue that it is most likely to be practiced in unipolar 
systems. A unipolar system is hegemonic because it consists of only one superpower. 
Multiple regional hegemons could exist at one time, but such a system would be 
multipolar rather than a unipolar at the global level if the regional hegemons were 
relatively close in their material capabilities. Nevertheless, there is vigorous debate 
among scholars and analysts over whether the United States is actually a hegemonic 
power.167 A number of terms have been used to describe America’s current 
preponderance in the international system – superpower, hyperpower, hegemon and neo-
empire are some examples. Substantively, there is little that distinguishes these terms and 
they generally convey the concept of hegemony adopted in this study: a state that not 
only can project its military capabilities abroad, but economic and cultural norms, too.168  
Some scholars maintain there can be unipolarity without hegemony, but this 
position appears untenable.169 A unipolar system is by default a hegemonic system 
because only one state has the means to project power globally. Furthermore, hegemony 
is about leadership and establishing rules and norms to govern the world political 
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economy.170 Nevertheless, brute material capabilities are necessary to establish what 
Gramscians refer to as a “hegemonic bloc” or “dominant ideology.” In the current 
international system, the United State is the only power capable of establishing such a 
world order. William Wohlforth makes a strong case for this viewpoint: “To qualify as 
polar powers, states must score well on all the components of power: size of population 
and territory; resource endowment; economic capabilities; military strength; and 
‘competence’ … Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has 
appeared: 2-1=1. The system is unipolar.”171 
Analytically, hegemony can be examined over three dimensions of capabilities: 
military, political/economic and normative. A state that can project power across these three 
planes of capabilities could establish hegemony in a regional or international system. Power 
projection is the ability of a state to effectively deploy its assets across international borders. 
From a military standpoint, this means a state that can invade and occupy territory that is 
non-contiguous and maintains a global network of bases on foreign soil. From a political-
economic standpoint, this means a state that takes the main role in creating international 
institutions that govern different issue areas in international politics, such as trade, 
monetary and security affairs; examples would include institutions in the economic realm, 
such as the WTO and IMF, and political realm, such as the United Nations, and security 
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realm, NATO as well as bilateral treaties with other major powers. In these organizations, the 
hegemonic power should have the leadership position. In the normative realm, power 
projection would be the creation of the “rules of the game” established by the hegemonic 
power. These rules can be codified in international institutions, treaties, law, organizations 
and regimes.172  
A hegemonic state also should have the world’s leading currency and can use its 
economic and political might to punish states bilaterally or through multilateral 
diplomacy and institutions.173 Projecting economic and political power also could be viewed 
as the “vanguard of globalization,” 174 for example, when multinational corporations from a 
home country are dominant around the globe and have a number of subsidiaries or affiliates 
in a host country on multiple continents. By projecting power in the normative sphere, a 
great power must play a prominent role in establishing international law and regimes; for 
example on human rights and democracy, but also through the globalization and 
propagation of its culture, which can include consumerism, sports and entertainment.175 
The normative sphere also could be disseminated through non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs), which like militaries and multinational corporations are the 
gendarmes of the hegemonic power. A state that is dominant in all three faces could be 
considered hegemonic.  
Although hegemonic powers must have sufficient military capabilities to protect 
the international political economy that it dominates and rebuff challenges from 
adversaries, systemic-level factors are not sufficient alone. Indeed, “a great power “must 
have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and 
competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods. … The importance of 
controlling sources of raw materials has provided a traditional justification for territorial 
expansion and imperialism.”176 But as Robert Keohane argues, hegemony should go 
beyond the “crude” power theory of the strong state. “Strength alone does not give a 
hegemon the incentive to project power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures, 
and decision making processes are also important.”177 Even in decline, a state can remain 
hegemonic if the status quo is locked into place through extant institutions.178        
Regions in the Balance  
Because the hegemonic power’s capabilities at the global level are much greater 
than its closest competitors, attempts at balancing in a unipolar system are likely to occur 
at the regional level. “Although not stated in so many words, the military doctrines and 
defense plans of second-ranked powers, including those of China and Russia, rule out a 
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major war with the United States and increasingly focus instead on regional and internal 
security challenges.”179In fact, regions can become a balancing mechanism distinct from 
traditional alliance politics and arm buildups. Regional powers view the intrusion of a 
superpower into their sphere of interest as threatening. “In order to attain international 
significance, regional systems must be able to refract power projected by external actors 
from the larger global environment.”180 Indeed, regional security complexes can be 
viewed as poles of powers themselves and “in that context, they may get treated is if they 
mattered to the global balance of power.”181  
Regions have been important to international politics longer than superpowers 
because no states or polities were able to project power globally until recently.182 In 
antiquity, the Persian invasion of the Greek city-state system in the Fifth Century BCE 
led to the temporary formation of a regional balancing strategy, including alliance 
between future rivals Athens and Sparta.183 More recently, scholars have looked at the 
role of regions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and across 
Africa and Latin America.184 
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Regions also can be viewed as sites of contestation in the international system.  
According to John Mearsheimer, regions are a major variable in the international balance 
of power. Powerful states attempt to dominate their regions because domination is the 
most optimal way to ensure survival. If a great power establishes regional hegemony, it 
can use that as a launching pad for global dominance. However, hegemony could lead to 
a security dilemma because “regional hegemons in one region of the globe will attempt to 
check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that 
dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe.”185  Yet attempts at offshore 
balancing, or the strategy adopted by a regional hegemon to keep others from achieving 
the same status, is likely to be met by countervailing coalitions.186 Nevertheless, 
Mearsheimer’s theoretical implications are supported by U.S. defense policy on peer 
competitors and the possible use of nuclear weapons; the Pentagon’s concern with 
emerging powers such as China, and Iran in the Persian Gulf, for instance, can be 
discerned in its development of offensive nuclear weapons.187 
 The formation of regional spheres of influences or regional security complexes is 
an important element of soft balancing. However, these complexes do not have to be 
formal arrangements or explicitly aimed at rebuffing the encroachment of a hegemonic 
power. In fact, any coordination between great powers to use a region as a buffer in a 
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unipolar system is likely to be in the form of indirect alignments or partnerships rather 
than formal alliances as was the case in past balancing strategies.   
Non-military alignments 
 
 In contrast to formal alliances, Glenn Snyder defines alignments as tacit 
agreements “based solely on common interests, although the latter can be as 
consequential as formal arrangements.”188 For Snyder, alliances are ways of 
strengthening alignments and are based on elements of specificity, legal and moral 
obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking from informal alignments, which 
generally don’t have an explicit pledge of military support. Applying Snyder’s work to 
balancing provides a demarcation between the soft and hard varieties.  
Strategic Partnerships as Soft Balancing 
 The strategic partnership between Russia and China follows the logic of 
alignment patterns and thus can be an important element in soft balancing. From a 
bilateral standpoint, strategic partnerships are simply about achieving mutual interests, 
for example improving trade and security relations. However, from geopolitical 
perspective, strategic partnerships can help weaker states gain leverage against a 
hegemonic power by joining forces in international institutions or through regional 
complexes. In this case, the axiom “two is better than one” counts. Furthermore, strategic 
partners can lessen the influence of the hegemon by offering another axis or pole of 
power for smaller and emerging powers dissatisfied with the status quo. By forming a 
strategic partnership at the geopolitical level, states can increase their influence greatly. 
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Unlike traditional alliances, however, the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” is 
more about political, rather than military, deterrence, an association that corresponds to a 
soft balancing strategy. For the partnership to be “strategic, it must entail building a 
larger framework for global and regional security, rather than just bilateral 
cooperation.”189 According to Sangtu Ko, the strategic component of the Russian-Chinese 
relationship was institutionalized and extended beyond bilateral relations when the two 
powers cooperated to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which added a 
regional dimension to the partnership in Central Asia. As Ko notes, “the SCO’s creation 
might be seen as the first step in a Chinese and Russian policy of renouncing the U.S. 
vision of a world dominated by a single pole.”190  
Although not a formal defense treaty, the “strategic partnership” between Russia 
and China falls under the alignment concept and goes further than a simple regional 
security regime or bilateral coordination. Forming a partnership “implies a long-term 
reciprocal commitment” and “broad consistency of purpose.”191 In addition, the 
partnership must be vital to each member’s mutual interests and both sides must attach 
great importance to it.192 The partnership allows both sides to coordinate their 
expectations while at the same time offering each considerable freedom of action to 
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pursue other interests. In this case, the partnership combines tactical expediency with 
strategic calculus and provides a unified front internationally.193  
Indeed, the “strategic partnership” could be conceived of as a new model in 
contemporary alliance formation. The partnership or alignment is as much about gaining 
leverage against the United States as it is about bilateral relations. For example, in 2006 
and 2007, there was near 100 percent similarity in Chinese and Russian votes in the 
UNSC, including vetoes.194  “For China, cooperation with Russia helps to promote 
greater multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening U.S. influence. Russian leaders share 
Chinese elites’ discomfort with U.S. power and relative predominance, in particular with 
the U.S. perceived penchant for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion, 
and unilateral diplomatic and military actions. “195 
Tactics 
 The main goal of soft balancing would be an attempt by the alignment or 
partnership to reduce or remove any military bases, garrisons, air fields or naval ports 
maintained by the outside hegemon or great power. Secondarily, a soft-balancing 
alignment could seek to co-opt, and if unable, to remove or replace, any head of a state 
(party or individual) in the specific region which has aligned or allied with the outside 
actor. Of tertiary concern, the members of the alignment or partnership might seek to 
remove or eliminate indirect influences in a specific region associated with the outside 
great power, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported by the outside 
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actor, multinational corporations (MNCs) based in the great power and cultural 
institutions (subversive elements of cinema, media, artwork, music, etc.) derived from the 
outside actor (see table 3-3). 
 
These ends can be achieved by a number of means: the use of covert operations, 
coercion or military assistance to opposition forces to remove regional officials who have 
allied with the outside hegemonic power; bribes or other incentives to buy the support of 
regional political, economic, cultural and religious leaders; the use of proxies or non-state 
actors to attack or harass U.S. facilities in the region; and the use of other inducements, 
such as economic and military aid to autocratic rulers with “no strings attached,” and 
providing cover for autocratic leaders in international institutions such as the United 
Nations. Each tactic singularly could be used to pursue a myriad of state interests. 
However, if these tactics are combined systematically in the presence of an external 
actor, those tactics could be taken as evidence of the formation of a soft balancing 
Table 3-3: Instruments of Soft Balancing 
 Military Political Economic 
Goals Reduction of outside 
military forces 
Reduction of outside 
normative influence 
Reduction of outside 
economic influence 
Tactics Pressure on regional 
leaders to remove foreign 
troops from region 
Pressure on regional 
leaders to break ties 
with outside power 
Pressure on regional 
leaders to break ties 
with outside power 
 Support for non-state 
actors or proxies to 
harass outside military 
forces or remove bases 
Covert ops to remove 
leaders tied to outside 
power; use of bribes or 
coercion to break ties 
Use of bribes, coercion 
to reduce outside 
influence and make 
favorable conditions for 
 Military support to 
opposition forces of 
external power 
Political support to 
opposition forces of 
external power;  
creation of alternative 
norms and institutions 
Use of institutions or 
organizations to create 
favorable conditions for 
alignments MNCs and 
other economic actors 
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alignment. The overarching goal of this strategy would be to increase the costs of 
intervention by a hegemonic power, which would reduce its capabilities over the long-
term. 
Geopolitical and Strategic Objectives of Soft Balancing Alignment 
 Although a soft balancing strategy utilizes non-confrontational means to 
counteract hegemonic power, the goal is to achieve tangible outcomes.196 Unlike hard 
balancing, soft balancing is not adopted by great powers seeking security from 
hegemonic attack; for them the United States is not an existential threat. Strategically, 
however, soft balancing alignments are formed to create more favorable conditions for 
great powers to obtain interests at odds with the reigning hegemon. For example, 
removing American political influence and military forces from Central Asia could help 
China and Russia obtain major geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the region. A 
significant strategic objective for Russia is to limit any American role in deciding the 
routes of gas and natural oil pipelines through Central Asia and the Caucuses. The United 
States prefers pipeline routes to Western allies bypass Russia and attempts to bolster the 
independence of the smaller republics from Moscow to increase American leverage in the 
region.197 Such an outcome could severely reduce Russian revenues from energy rents 
and weaken the Russian economy and defense sectors. Energy security, too, is a long-
term concern to the Chinese defense sector and economy, and procuring adequate 
supplies from Central Asia is a strategic priority.198 To be sure, China and Russia 
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approach Central Asian energy resources from different perspectives – China as an 
importer and Russia as an exporter – yet they share a common interest in 
counterbalancing U.S. influence in the region and cooperating on energy matters.199 
Broadly, great powers mainly pursue soft balancing because it can create 
conditions favorable to obtaining preferences contrary to those of the hegemonic power 
without direct confrontation. Soft balancing is done largely through diplomatic 
maneuvers and in institutional arrangements (states also can incorporate soft balancing 
measures into their military doctrines, which are taken up in Chapter Six). Like other soft 
balancing theories, under this framework, the alignment does not confront the outside 
great power/hegemon directly (it doesn’t even have to be named), and therefore, is 
unlikely to be subject to military reprisals.200 The balancing effort is localized to a 
specific region (sphere of influence or regional security complex), and if successful, the 
removal of the great power’s influence (hard and soft power) opens space for members of 
the regional alliance to “conduct an independent foreign policy” outside the framework of 
the normative and rule-based liberal order managed by the United States. These tactics 
also follow the logic of offensive realism of Mearsheimer. If hegemons (e.g., the United 
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States) in one region of the world are expected to balance against potential hegemons 
elsewhere (e.g., China or Russia), one should logically expect a counteraction by the state 
or states being off-shore balanced against (an “off-shore defense”). In an era of 
unipolarity, great powers do not have the material capabilities to physically evict a 
hegemon or superpower from their region. Therefore, states that wish to achieve their 
strategic interests must resort to soft balancing if they “wish for ways to fend off 
[America’s] benign ministrations.”201 
Conclusion 
 This chapter endeavored to explain how different systemic configurations affected 
the balancing strategies adopted by great powers. It also aimed to develop a more 
rigorous framework that could test whether states are using a soft balancing strategy to 
counteract U.S. hegemonic ambitions. When determining whether states are utilizing a 
soft balancing strategy, the level of analysis should focus on regional systems rather than 
at the international level because of the limited capabilities great powers have in carrying 
out a global balance-of-power strategy against the reigning hegemon. Soft balancing also 
relies on balancing against “soft power” capabilities rather than traditional military 
balances. An expanded and more sophisticated conception of hegemony reveals that it is 
open to challenges on three fronts and that countering one dimension can reduce the role 
of the others, or at least restrain them. Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, the 
framework outlined in this study also integrates soft balancing into the realist paradigm. 
Security is a main interest of states, but insecurity does not come solely from existential 
threats. Access to energy resources and a climate of political stability are important 
                                                 
201 Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” 3. 
77 
 
priorities, too, and each can be undermined by outside powers. Realist theories focus on 
competition for security and power, and it matters only by degree whether that 
competition is in the form of military confrontation or normative rivalry.  
The next chapter examines Central Asia as a regional security complex, which is 
the main unit of analysis in a soft balancing strategy, and the strategic vision each of the 
major players have for the region. The chapter provides a contextual backdrop for the 
contemporary chess game in Central Asia and links the theoretical insights expounded 
upon in this chapter to the geopolitical realities currently faced by China and Russia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX 
The current study argues that regional security complexes are likely to be a main 
component of soft balancing. Indeed, soft balancing theorists have maintained that 
regionalization is an appealing strategy for great powers trying to insulate themselves 
from U.S. hegemony (see Chapter Two). Nevertheless, soft balancing theories have taken 
regionalization as given and provide cursory, if any, analysis of regional dynamics and 
formation. An underlying assumption of regions as a “balancing” mechanism, thus, is 
that regions can be conceived of as autonomous units. Construing regions as autonomous 
does not mean that regions themselves can act or have agency, but that regions can serve 
as a focal point for balance of power behavior separately from the systemic level. To 
claim that regions are a “unit of analysis” is significant and must be examined. For the 
purposes of my study, this chapter utilizes the Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver to establish Central Asia as a distinct 
regional security complex (RSC). 
 Regarding Central Asia as a RSC is important for three reasons. First, it allows 
for the study of Central Asia as an autonomous unit separate from the individual states 
that constitute it; in other words, Central Asia as a whole can be viewed as analytically 
distinct from its parts. Second, regional security complexes are sites of contestation 
between great powers and serve as an intermediary between domestic and international 
levels. From this standpoint, Buzan and Wæver’s conceptual framework parallels that of 
neoclassical realism, which also focuses on the dynamic between domestic, regional and 
systemic levels. Third, “the regional level is where the extremes of national and global 
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security interplay, and where most of the action occurs.”202 Theorists must go “where 
most of the action occurs” to test their assumptions and propositions.   
 The first part of this chapter will review Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT and fit it 
within the overall soft balancing framework. The second section provides a brief 
historical overview of Central Asia and its evolution over time. The third section outlines 
the geopolitical objectives China, Russia and the United States have in the region as well 
as areas of convergence and divergence among the three great powers. That is followed 
by an analysis of the internal and external factors that have established Central Asia as its 
own distinct RSC.203  It concludes with an assessment of the causal mechanisms driving 
regionalization and the role external pressures have played in forging a “strategic 
partnership” between Russia and China. 
Regional Security Complex Theory 
Regional security complex theory (RSCT) is a useful complement to soft balancing 
theory and parallels neoclassical realism in many of its theoretical assumptions. In 
regards to soft balancing, RSC is also complementary because it demonstrates how 
regions are affected by, and affect, systemic outcomes. “What links the overarching 
pattern of distribution of power among the global powers to the regional dynamics of 
RSCs is the mechanism of penetration. Penetration occurs when outside powers make 
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security alignments with states within an RSC.”204 As a theoretical concept, RSCT draws 
on an eclectic array of thought, which is similar to the approach taken in this study. As 
Buzan and Wæver write, “RSCT uses a blend of materialist and constructivist 
approaches. On the materialist side it uses ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution 
of power that are close to those in neorealism. … On the constructivist side … RSCT 
focus[es] on the political processes by which security issues get constituted.”205 
Regional complexes are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary 
international affairs and have become much more commonplace since the end of the Cold 
War; they include such diverse groupings as the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Visegrad 
Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Mercosur. During the Cold War, 
“local security systems existed, but they were overshadowed by the ability of external 
powers to move directly into the local [security] complex with the effect of suppressing 
the indigenous security dynamic.”206 The reemergence of regional complexes as a major 
factor in global politics is largely the outcome of changes at the systemic level, although 
each individual RSC has evolved individually to address local peculiarities. “This trend 
is, in part, a response to the fragmentation of great-power blocs, especially in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, but it also reflects the need to react to the pressures created by 
economic globalization through local means.”207 
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Buzan and Wæver define a regional security complex as “a set of units whose major 
processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security 
problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”208 
Territoriality is an important part of this definition because threats travel more rapidly 
over shorter distances than others. Although RSCs do not have to be contiguous, “simple 
physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than 
among states located in different areas. ... The impact of geographical proximity on 
security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and 
environmental sectors.”209 Nevertheless, “regions do not just exist as material objects in 
the world. Geography is not destiny. Instead, regions are social and cognitive constructs 
that can strike actors as more or less plausible.”210 To be sure, RSCT recognizes the roles 
identity plays in regional formation. Polarity, for instance, might affect, but it does not 
determine, the character of security relations between states. The processes of 
“securitization” are essentially open, and subject to influence by a host of factors.211  
These factors include the domestic politics of the states within the region; the state-to-
state relations within the region; the region’s interaction with other regions; and the 
region’s interaction with global powers. Conceptualizing regions along these analytical 
lines provides a two-way examination of regional formations; RSC creation can be top-
down or bottom-up or a combination of both. For example, the motives behind the 
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formation of a RSC could be to combat regional security threats or counter the threat of 
intervention by a hostile external power. Nevertheless, once established, the RSC could 
be used to contain either or both threats, even if that was not its initial purpose. Normally, 
the pattern of regionalism stems from endogenous factors “and outside powers cannot 
usually define, desecuritize, or reorganize the region. Unipolarity might in its extreme 
form be an exception to this rule.”212 Yet, “other things being equal, the expectation is 
that outside powers will be drawn into a region along the lines of rivalry existing within 
it. In this way regional patterns of rivalry may line up with, and be reinforced by, global 
power ones, even though the global power patterns may have had little or nothing to do 
with the formation of the regional pattern [emphasis mine].”213 
Structural realism’s emphasis on systemic variables can help to explain why external 
great powers intervene into regions outside their sphere of influence. The rise of a peer 
competitor is a strong cause for regional intervention. As Mearsheimer argues, a 
hegemonic power in one region will likely intervene to check the rise of a potential 
hegemon in another region.214 “Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons 
in other regions because they fear that a rival great power will be an especially powerful 
foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power’s backyard. Regional 
hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions 
because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather 
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than on the distant hegemon.”215 Such a policy of pitting two nearby powers against one 
another could be doomed to failure, however. The presence of an offshore hegemonic 
power could lead to the formation of regional alignment if the external hegemon’s 
intentions are perceived to be aggressive or threatening by regional actors.216 
Constraints and incentives are two other important variables that drive external great 
power intervention into regions outside their geographical sphere. When constraints are 
low and incentives are high, great powers are likely to intervene; if constraints are high 
and incentives low, intervention is unlikely; if constraints are low and incentives are low, 
intervention is generally unnecessary; and if constraints are high and incentives high, 
non-intervention or limited intervention is more likely with the exception of occasional 
limited use of airpower.217   For example, the existence of the Soviet Union was a barrier 
to U.S. entry into Central Asia, which was not high on America’s strategic radar in the 
first place. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the structural obstacle of another 
superpower. Furthermore, American interest in the region was heightened after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks because Central Asia served as a nexus for 
transnational terrorist groups operating from the Middle East to Afghanistan.218 
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 Historical Evolution of Central Asian Security Complex 
Central Asia continues to be shaped by its ancient, imperial and colonial histories. 
The region is a complex mixture of Persian, Turkic, Mongolian, Slavic and Chinese 
ethnicities, religion, art, language and culture. The introduction of Islam organized the 
fragmented and nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe into a semblance of a regional unit, 
although this was contingent on the vagaries of empire. For example, the region could be 
treated more or less as a unit under the imperial rule of Genghis Khan or Nineteenth 
Century Muscovy, but was much more inchoate and fractious under the numerous petty 
khanates that ruled intermittently in the absence of empire. Islam remains central in 
forming the identity of Central Asian peoples and the rise of “radical” Islam continues to 
be a threat to China and Russia (and more recently, the United States). In fact, Islam 
could be considered a centripetal force that organizes Central Asia into a locus of 
engagement for external and internal actors, both state and non-state (e.g., as an 
organizing identity for the peoples of the region and as a source of threat for the great 
powers within and without).219 
China and Russia have ties to Central Asia that date back millennia. China had 
intermittent suzerainty in the eastern regions of Central Asia for more than 2,000 years, 
beginning with the Han dynasty, as caravan traffic carrying Chinese silk to the Roman 
Empire carved out what eventually became known as the “Silk Road.”220 China’s grip on 
the Eastern reaches of Central Asia ended when the Tang dynasty lost control over 
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Sinkiang to the Abbasids, but was restored in modern-day Xinjiang under the Manchus 
and incorporated into the PRC shortly after World War II.  
Central Asia long had been an integral part of Russian strategic calculations from 
the tsars to the Bolsheviks, although Muscovy’s entrance postdated Han incursions.221  
The region was a chessboard of the Nineteenth Century imperial rivalry between Great 
Britain and tsarist Russia in what was called the Great Game. During the Game, Britain 
feared St. Petersburg had designs, via Afghanistan, on the British crown jewel of India.222 
As a prelude to the Twenty First Century rivalry between the SCO and the United States 
in Central Asia, the Great Game similarly contributed to the formation of a regional 
security complex through the policies of extra-regional actors, which generally ignored 
the internal makeup of the region or the conception its inhabitants had of themselves. 
“The grand eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concept of Central Asia envisioned the 
region as a distinct geopolitical whole: Iran, Afghanistan, inner [or western] China, and 
the territory of the present-day Soviet Central Asian republics, all divided into local tribal 
domains and khanates.”223 
For analytical purposes, the region can be examined over five historic epochs: 
pre-Islamic, Islamic, post-Islamic, Soviet and post-Soviet.224 Through most of these 
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major historical periods, Central Asia served as nexus between steppe and pastoral 
peoples, and the main east-west trade route, the Silk Road, intersected the northern and 
southern routes connecting the Middle East to India and to the northern forest-steppe 
region. “In this way Central Asia became heir to both Perso-Islamic tradition of the 
Middle East and Mongol heritage of the steppe, and was open to the influence from major 
cultural regions of the pre-modern world – China, India, and the Islamic world.”225 
Although the region was divided throughout history by culture, language, 
religion, nationality, empire and statehood, Hooman Peimani argues that the history of 
modern Central Asia is that of a region, not of five separate political entities (or states): 
Over time Central Asia has been ruled either by foreign empires, which 
incorporated the region into their territories as a single political unit, or by 
a few regional multiethnic states. Rulers of these states never identified 
themselves with specific ethnic groups. As a result, for most of their 
history, the indigenous ethnic groups of this region have seen themselves 
as members of a regional community sharing the same fate, rather than as 
citizens of different states. Despite their recent independence, there are 
indications that Central Asians will share more or less the same fate, 
which will be that of the region.226 
 
 If past is prelude, then the people of Central Asian will continue to share the same 
fate, at least for the present. As in the past, the region continues to be shaped by extra-
regional actors, which include both familiar and new faces. Since its beginnings as a 
region, complexity has marked the evolution of Central Asia, but external forces have 
continued to bind it into a complex. 
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Pre-Islamic Period 
The settled areas of Central Asia have been civilized for more than 4,000 years. 
The Persian Achaemenid Empire (330-59 BCE.) was the first recorded political unit to 
rule the region in the pre-Islamic era.227 The region played a significant role in the 
political affairs of Persia, including its ancient rivalry with Macedonia, under Alexander 
the Great, for control of trade routes linking India and China to the classical 
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Mediterranean. After the invasion of the Huns in the Sixth Century C.E., the areas that 
make up modern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were the only remaining part 
of the Persian Empire under the Sassanid dynasty.228 The arrival of Turkic-speaking 
peoples from Inner Mongolia in the Sixth Century “Turkified” the region and brought 
nearly the entire Eurasian steppe under Turkic rule for three centuries.229 Under the 
Seljuk Khanate, the Turkic tribes established control over the major cultural centers along 
the Silk Road until the khanate’s downfall at the hands of the Mongol Golden Horde in 
1141.230 As an ancestor to the Turks, the Seljuks established an ethnic link between 
Central Asia and modern-day Turkey. 231 Finally, from the Fifteenth to Sixteenth Century, 
the ethnolinguistic trend in Central Asia transformed the predominantly Persian-speaking 
region into a Turkic-speaking one. “The last great nomadic wave from the Kipchak 
Steppe introduced a critical mass of Turkic and Turkicized Mongolian nomads into 
Central Asia, a portion of whom eventually settled in the oasis towns and merged with 
the sedentary population.”232 
Islamic Period 
The Arabs entered Central Asia after their rapid conquest of the Sassanid Empire 
in 651 CE and until the arrival of the Golden Horde in the Twelfth Century. After nearly 
a century of dominance, the Arab conquerors brought the region firmly into the Islamic 
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fold and the institutionalization of Sufi Islam became an integral part of the political, 
social and cultural life of Central Asia.233 With Central Asia in its grasp, the Abbasid 
Caliphate expanded Islamic rule to the borders of modern Mongolia and Sinkiang, 
converting the Turkic-speaking peoples in the region and bringing Islam to the doorstep 
of Tang China.234 The continued expansion of Islam to the East erupted into battle in 751 
CE between the Tang dynasty and Arab forces under Ziyad ibn Salih, the governor of 
Samarkand. The resulting Arab victory changed the regional dynamics for centuries, and 
established the region’s Islamic identity among the Turko-Mongolian peoples, which 
outlasted Soviet communism. “The Arabs’ victory had more lasting and far-reaching 
consequences than this relatively obscure battle [in 751] seemed to promise, for China 
never again ventured to claim mastery of territories beyond Sinkiang – with the minor 
exceptions of the Ching (Manchus).”235 
The Arabs Islamicized the Turkic, Mongol and Persian ethnic groups of the 
steppe, but the Abbasid Empire was eventually overrun in the Twelfth Century by the 
nomadic tribes of the Golden Horde, led by Genghis Khan. Unlike the Arab invasion five 
centuries earlier, “the Mongols did not impose their culture, religion, language or 
government on the people of Central Asia. Soon after the Mongol invasion, the initial 
destruction and shock of conquest were substituted by unprecedented rise in cultural 
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communication, expanded trade, and improved civilization.”236 Tamerlane, a descendant 
of the Genghissid dynasty, reinforced the Turco-Mongolian tradition of the steppe, with 
Samarkand as its seat. Bound to the East by Sinkiang (Xinjiang) on the Chinese frontier 
and to the West by Arab and Persian lands of the Middle East, the region became a center 
of civilization in the ancient Islamic world. Islam also served as an organizing force for 
the conquerors of the region. Although the Turco-Mongolian tribes shared common 
cultural, linguistic and religious histories separate from the Arabs, the heirs of the Great 
Khan continued their conversion to Islam that began under the Abbasids in an effort to 
unify a diverse group of people. Nevertheless, the nomadic lifestyle of the steppe made 
unification extremely difficult. 
Post-Islamic Period 
Although organized under the rule of the descendants of the Great Khan, the 
nomadic lifestyle of the steppe did not lend itself to unity and the khanates failed to join 
together, leaving them vulnerable to colonization by Russia and Manchu China in the 
Nineteenth Century. By the late Eighteenth Century, Russia had occupied the khanates of 
Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand and began to incorporate them into the Russian empire 
while China completed its annexation of the Uighur-inhabited territories of Xinjiang.237 
The rapid colonization of Central Asia by the two great powers, particularly Russia, 
touched of the mad imperial scramble historians later termed the Great Game. 
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During the Great Game, Mackinder’s logic of the Heartland as the “geographical 
pivot of history” governed the region’s dynamics.238 Russia’s expansion into Central Asia 
ultimately placed the Russian Tsar in conflict with the British Crown, sparking a rivalry 
that endured for decades. During the scramble for Central Asian supremacy, the region 
was shaped largely by outside forces jockeying for position within the larger geopolitical 
balance of power. “British India was by the mid-nineteenth century stretching ever 
northward towards the great barrier ranges. On the other side of the mountains, another 
power, Imperial Russia, was advancing inexorably towards the same lofty peaks, and fear 
of foreign invasion was another prime cause for territorial aggrandizement. It can be said 
with considerable assurance that anxiety, first over French and then over Russian 
invasion, was the chief influence on British Indian foreign policy throughout the 
nineteenth century.”239 In fact, many of the same concerns the Russian foreign policy and 
military establishment has about the United States today – military, economic and 
normative – applied to Britain of the Nineteenth Century.  
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The Great Game in Asia was played by the British for two reasons, one 
strategic, the other cultural. By 1829, Lord Ellenborough and the Duke of 
Wellington, the two men who began the game, were alarmed by the 
expansion of the Russian empire in Asia; fearing that whenever Britain's 
interests were opposed to Russia's in Europe, the Russians would threaten 
to invade India. They wanted both to contain this expansion, and to 
counter any threat of invasion, as far from India as possible. The means 
they chose were commercial, to open the Indus to navigation in order to 
flood central Asia with British goods. In the heady atmosphere of the early 
Nineteenth Century they assumed that Britain's goods would be followed 
by her values; what interested Ellenborough was the political not the 
commercial gain. Khiva and Bokhara would prefer to associate with 
progressive Britain rather than backward Russia. They would appreciate 
that Britain, unlike Russia, wished to preserve and not to threaten their 
independence.240 
 
Although nowhere near as acute as the Great Game, the current regional balance of 
power shares many of that period’s characteristics. The region was a site of contestation 
between the major powers of that day, including extra-regional actors such as Britain, 
Persia and Germany, and the outcome of the regional balance had an effect on the larger 
systemic balance of power. Geopolitics, economics, norms and the military balance 
played a role in externally forging a regional security complex.  
As Bruce R. Kuniholm maintains, the scramble of the Great Game period offers 
lessons about contemporary dynamics in Central Asia. The history of the region’s 
geopolitics, he agues, could provide a “sea change in perspective and offer some 
instructive cautionary observations to U.S. officials.”241 For example, in the Nineteenth 
Century, Kuniholm writes that “the expansion of British sea power in the Indian Ocean 
and Persian Gulf and the expansion of Russian troops into the Transcaucasus and Central 
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Asia eventuated in a struggle for power across a region that stretched from the Balkans to 
Afghanistan. Each great power – driven by the dictates of empire, motivated by fears of 
dangers both imagined and real, or trying to ‘contain’ a rival by defensive action – sought 
to serve its perceived interests and clashed with the other.”242 Indeed, similar fears 
resonate today.243  
The Soviet Period 
 During the period of Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were basically an 
appendage of the Russian state. Although technically independent, and like the other 
republics, constitutionally allowed to secede from the Union, the five republics of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were thoroughly 
under the iron fist of Stalin by the time of the Second World War. The Communist Party 
monopolized all aspects of social and political life in Central Asia, while culture and 
economic development were subjected to communist ideology from Moscow.244 
Attempts by the indigenous people of the region to maintain their historical roots or 
national identities were declared signs of backwardness by the Bolsheviks. Russification 
was the primary policy used by the Soviet Union to suppress religion and bring European 
family patterns, particularly emancipation of women, to the region. The imposition of the 
Cyrillic alphabet and Russian language “helped to establish cultural ties between Russia 
and Central Asia and performed an ideological function of making all previously 
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published books, mostly of religious and anti-Soviet content, obsolete and not available 
to the mosques.”245 
 Soviet leadership also sought to reinforce its rule in the region through cultural 
hegemony, a theme that echoes to the present. Michael Rywkin, for example, called 
Stalin’s nationality policy in the region the “teacher-pupil relationship,” because, in 1929, 
one of the Soviet leaders explained the aims of Soviet policy in Central Asia as “teaching 
the people of the Kyrgyz Steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower, and the Turkmen 
gardener the ideals of the Russian worker.”246 The paternalistic relationship continues 
today, with Moscow still the major political, economic and military influence in the 
region and the Central Asian republics still subordinate to a neo-colonialist Russia.   
The Post-Soviet Period 
 The dissolution of the Soviet state is a unique phenomenon in history given that 
the center was not pulled apart from the periphery, but rather imploded on itself.247 This 
historical peculiarity left the small Central Asian republics responsible to govern 
themselves, a role they had little experience in carrying out. The confusion in the 
aftermath of dissolution unleashed a number of crosscurrents in Central Asia. Submerged 
nationalistic aspirations, including pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements, had been 
growing throughout the post-Cold War period. The transformation from Soviet identities 
to nationalists ones, however, crosscut the former Republics’ reliance on Russia in the 
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military, security and economic sectors. “The initial euphoria of independence was 
coupled with a sense of bitterness and distaste at being treated by Russia in the early 
stages of forming the Commonwealth of Independent States as secondary partners of 
lesser importance than its Slav European neighbors. In a bid to stand on its own, the 
Central Asian leaderships preferred to not follow the Russian ‘jump into economic 
uncertainty,’ and endeavored to preserve in a slightly modified form the old Soviet-type 
economy.”248  
 The ethnic and national fallout from the breakup of the USSR were of severe 
concern for the Kremlin, which feared for the safety of Russian ethnics living in the 
former republics. An advisor to then-President Boris Yeltsin lamented that one Republic 
with a sizeable Russian population, Kazakhstan, “could soon degenerate ‘into one 
thousand Yugoslavs.’”249 Ethnic and civil flareups did erupt in the post-Soviet period, 
most noticeably the Tajik civil war from 1992-1997 and deadly Osh riots of June 1990 in 
Kyrgyzstan between irredentist Uzbek factions and Kyrgyz nationals. Despite 
independence, the smaller states remained reliant upon Moscow. The Soviet Union 
created the Central Asian republics in part to destroy the old identities that followed the 
trade routes and waterways, a practice continued by modern-day Russia. The objective 
was partly a failure because the old identities are still crucial in defining a Central Asian 
identity, but also a success because the new states help determine the discussion about 
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regional entities today.250 “The combination of these factors has proven to be problematic 
as the Central Asian states are too weak to consolidate all the ethnic groups within their 
borders and the ethnic borders are so diffuse that they can not provide a base for a strong 
nation-state.”251 
Although ethnic tensions at times have been high, and national and religious ideals 
among the smaller republics endure, they should not be exaggerated. Centrifugal forces 
are unlikely to break up the security complex as long as its affairs are tightly interwoven 
with those of its larger neighbors.  Furthermore, Russia remains a major pole of power in 
the region and main guarantor of security in post-Soviet space.252 The next section 
explores the role Russia, and increasingly China and the United States, play in organizing 
the Central Asian security complex.  
Central Asia as a Regional Complex 
If a regional security complex is defined as a set of units whose security interests are 
so interlinked that they cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another, then Central Asia clearly meets the criteria. Initially, as Buzan and Wæver point 
out, Central Asia was a subcomplex of the Russian super-RSC, which included most of 
the former Soviet republics under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent 
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States (CIS).253 However, the CIS regime was ineffective in maintaining regional order 
and quickly became obsolete. As one observer put it: “one problem with the CIS was that 
European, Caucasian, and Central Asian sections had virtually no common interests. 
Plans for economic integration could never be realized; some states like Belarus and 
Kazakhstan sought closer economic integration with Russia, while others looked to 
Europe or the U.S.”254  
The creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which became 
effective on 28 April 2003, delinked Central Asian security from the overarching Russian 
RSC, and established the region’s autonomy separate from its predecessor, the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST). The CSTO’s “mission was to combat terrorism, drugs trafficking, 
and Taliban influences from Afghanistan. Moreover, it was a response to what was 
perceived as American intrusion into Russia's security zone in Central Asia.”255 With the 
disintegration of the CIS apparatus, which was mainly the result of Russian weakness in 
the 1990s, the CSTO became the major vehicle for Russian influence in Central Asia and 
the umbrella for which a regional concert was developed.256 Unlike the SCO, however, 
the CSTO is a formal military alliance.  
Whereas the CSTO is a vehicle for Moscow to protect its periphery, it is also 
considered another buffer to U.S. penetration of the former Soviet sphere. Furthermore, 
the organization has bound Central Asian military elites closer to their Russian 
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counterparts and given Moscow greater control over the members’ military 
establishments. “The CSTO since its formation in 2002 has served not only to train 
Central Asian officers in Russian military academies and the Central Asian militaries in 
anti-insurgent tactics at its Rubezh (frontier) military exercises but is also a framework 
for delivery of both Soviet-era and more modern military equipment to the Central Asian 
militaries at Russian internal prices.”257  
Some critics of the Sino-Russo axis argue that Russia uses the CSTO not only to 
counter American influence in Central Asia, but to limit Chinese advances in the region 
via the SCO as well. However, the CSTO has been much less effective than the SCO at 
excluding American influence from Central Asia. Moscow’s weakness in this regard has 
pushed it to rely more on the SCO.258 “Russia’s failure to maximize the CSTO’s role in 
removing American influence from the region has been offset by its success in creating a 
multilateral opposition to America’s presence in the region inside the SCO.”259 
The specter of terrorism and Islamic radicalism also has been a main organizing 
principle for the Central Asian security complex since the end of the USSR. The five 
smaller republics, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and the United States all 
view the region as wellspring of instability and extremism.260 The attacks of September 
11, 2001 changed the power relations within the region and “made Central Asia the 
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epicenter of geopolitical shocks on a global scale and redefined the political situation 
surrounding Central Asia.”261 
However, regional formation in Central Asia is not limited to the threat of terrorism 
and radicalism alone; energy security, pipeline politics, trade and economic development 
also factor heavily into the equation.262 Geopolitical rivalry also centered on the 
normative agenda that would define Central Asian ideology and political identity. For 
much of the first decade of Central Asian independence, Western policies have been 
driven largely by energy. This focus was also defined in a zero-sum, geopolitical context, 
with an emphasis on securing export routes along a “carefully constructed strategic map 
aimed at bypassing Russia and isolating Iran.263 “Through the 1990s, the promotion of 
Turkey as a key U.S. proxy force in the region was also designed to bolster broader 
geopolitical objectives of countering Russia and Iran and campaigning for pro-western, 
secular democratization.”264 
The remainder of this chapter examines the interplay between the domestic, regional 
and international dynamics that have forged the Central Asian RSC. First, it investigates 
the domestic interests of China, Russia and the United States in the region. That is 
followed by a review of the external factors that have reinforced the Central Asian 
complex into one of the world’s most complex and contested regions. Lastly, it 
demonstrates that, despite divergent interests among China and Russia, the presence of 
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even a small American footprint in Central Asia has pushed Beijing and Moscow to soft 
balance the United States.  
Domestic Interests 
China 
China’s broad goals in Central Asia are to strengthen security cooperation, fight 
terrorism, promote regional stability, extend economic and trade relations, broaden 
cooperation with Russia, create a new diplomatic image of China and promote 
multipolarity.265 Increasingly, water security is becoming a strategic concern for the PRC 
as well, and Central Asia will be looked to as source for dehydrated regions of inner 
China.266 Central Asia also is viewed as an important future source of energy for China’s 
rapidly growing economy. “China’s rising imports of oil at present and natural gas in the 
future have made energy security one of the top concerns for the government.”267 For 
some analysts, the formation of the SCO can be interpreted as an effort by Beijing to 
secure energy security in Central Asia.268   
Equally important for China is the rise of separatism in its restless Xinjiang 
province, which makes up one-sixth of China’s territory and holds natural resources 
critical to the PRC’s development. In fact, pacifying the region is a necessary component 
of China’s geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Any pipeline infrastructure from Central 
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Asia would have to pass through Xinjiang, and thus is susceptible to sabotage from 
Uighur separatists.269 Uighur secessionists also are linked to transnational terrorist 
organizations such as al Qaida and frequently find sanctuary with their co-ethnics in 
border zones along Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. “The region has historically shielded 
China from invasion from the Central Asian steppes and today provides areas of low 
population where military maneuvers and nuclear testing can be conducted.”270 
Furthermore, China’s “strategic rear” is crucial to its overall state security. “China’s 
strategic focus will remain in the southeast in the foreseeable future, with western China 
continuing to be the ‘rear’ in China’s master strategy for many years to come. 
Nevertheless, only if the rear is secured will the strategic frontline be free from worry ... 
As the squeeze on China’s strategic space intensifies, a stable western region takes on 
additional importance as a strategic support for the country. The strategic significance of 
western China is self-evident [emphasis mine].”271  
Finally, identity plays a role in reinforcing Central Asia as a strategic locale in 
Beijing’s strategic vision, which demonstrates the significance norms play in the national 
interest of states. 
For over 2,000 years, control over the region has been perceived by the 
ruling powers of China as their “right,” an assertion of sovereignty which 
is today every bit as emotion-ridden as the PRC's claim to Taiwan. This 
position illustrates Chinese self-identity, another important ingredient in 
Xinjiang's importance to China. Secondly, Central Asia has historically 
been a stage upon which the heirs of Confucian civilization have played 
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out their image of themselves, an image of cultural superiority, benevolent 
rule and civilizing mission. … Suppression of ethnic languages and 
history in Xinjiang is not related to political expediency alone.272 
 
Russia 
Similar to Beijing, Moscow has sought to combat Islamic terrorism and 
radicalism and foster stability along its southern flank.273 Viewing Islam as a threat is not 
a new phenomenon, however; since the tsarist period, Russia has been concerned with 
pan-Turkic and/or pan-Islamic movements in the region.274 Russia also wants to reassert 
its influence in the region and maintain control over Central Asian pipeline routes for 
transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea basin.275  Furthermore, the region 
remains central to Russian military strategy. Under the CSTO, for example, Moscow 
continues to train, arm and station troops in the region.276 Indeed, the CSTO has allowed 
Russia to increase its control over Central Asian military elites through its joint staff and 
command structure. On a planning level, all CSTO military exercises are proposed and 
planned by the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Bishkek, which is officially supervised 
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by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) director. “Given the role of former 
security officials in Russia and their personal sense of loyalty to Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, clear formal and informal links exist between the ATC and the highest 
members of the Russian government.”277  
Regional concerns go beyond the military and security sectors. Russia is re-
establishing strong economic and political links to the region that frayed after the 
implosion of the Soviet Union by defining Central Asian interests and priorities and 
concentrating the region’s resources in Moscow’s favor. To do this, Moscow has sought 
to develop pro-Russian integration projects and to overcome the inefficient forms of 
cooperation within the CIS framework.278 However, the CIS arrangements did not fully 
realize the objectives of promoting regional Eurasian cooperation. Since 2000, the 
Central Asian states had made efforts to improve the CIS in an effort to create a more 
stable regime for post-independence inter-state cooperation. Irrespective of these efforts, 
“outbreaks of insurgency and terrorism have created a region-wide sense of alarm that 
has, in turn, contributed to a renewed sense of urgency to find formulas to enhance 
cooperation in the region.”279 
Geopolitically, Central Asia could link Russia in a “triangle” consisting of China 
and India that could form a competing bloc with the United States and EU. Such a 
strategic alliance would buoy the Russian arms industry – China and India purchase 
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approximately 70 percent, or $3 billion annually, of total Russian arms exports.280 
Although such prognostications might be premature, India could play a pivotal swing role 
in the Central Asian balance of power by becoming a rival or a partner of China and/or 
Russia or shifting to the West. “This is why Indian commentators consider that ‘India can 
be an important swing player’ in the evolving international system; able to cooperate with 
Russia and to an extent China in their strategic trilateral arrangement; yet also courted by 
the United States and Japan in their particular alignments.”281 
 Finally, similar to China, the civilizing mission plays a strong role in Russian 
policy in Central Asia. Moscow views itself as a uniquely Eurasian actor, which can be a 
dynamic agent of ideational change in the region. Mesbahi makes this case when he 
describes how Modern Russia seeks to transform the ‘Asian wing’ of the Eurasian entity 
into a pan-Euro-Atlantic one. “The ‘immature’ states of the former Soviet Union (i.e. 
Central Asia) … which ‘belong to another world,’ will by the persistence and dynamism 
of an ‘enlightened Russian big brother’ become part of the Euro-Atlantic family. The 
‘continuer state,’ now ‘civilized’ and ‘normal,’ will shed not only her Asiatic baggage but 
will become the bridge that transforms the Central Asian part of the Union.”282 
United States 
For much of American history, Central Asia has not registered on the strategic radar 
of U.S. officials. Remote and inscrutable, the region was too distant to matter much for 
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American security and too impenetrable during the time of the Soviet empire to be of 
interest.283 Yet, after the demise of the Soviet bloc, the region slowly began to open to 
American capital and, much later, political and military objectives.284 American strategic 
interest in Central Asia underwent a radical transformation after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. “Some in the United States, as elsewhere, see Central Asia as a pivotal 
point in global politics, a bridge between east and west and between north and south, as 
well as, in the terms of Mackinder, the heartland of the heartland. Some have seen it, in 
contrast, as a backwater lying between essentially marginal regions-the periphery of the 
periphery. Perspectives on the centrality of the region shift over time. For the United 
States, the attacks of September 11 shifted Central Asia from the marginalia of foreign 
policy to its centre.”285 
As suggested by Miller, constraints and incentives factor into the calculus of 
American strategic interests in Central Asia. During the Cold War, the cost of intervening 
in the region was prohibitive. The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly lowered the 
costs of intervention, and the strategic necessity to base troops in the region to fight the 
war in Afghanistan greatly raised incentives.286 Currently, U.S. objectives in the region 
are to fight terrorism, open the energy-rich Caspian basin to American capital and 
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development, support human rights and foster democratization.287 Key to this strategy has 
been the stationing of American troops in Kyrgyzstan, which has been an important 
command post for antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. American security concerns, 
too, are tightly interwoven into its normative agenda, although some might question the 
sincerity to which the United States values human rights and civil liberties when 
juxtaposed against its core national interests. 
The primary strategic goal of the United States is to see the development of 
independent democratic and stable states, committed to the kind of political and 
economic reform that is essential to modern societies and on the path to integration and to 
the world economy. The United States follows a strategy in Central Asia (and elsewhere) 
that is based on simultaneous pursuit of two related goals. The first of these goals is 
security. The United States cooperates with the Central Asian republics to provide them 
with an alternative to their Russian security umbrella. U.S. policymakers believe that 
American models of democratization could bring stability to the smaller states, and thus 
open them to Western norms and investment, particularly in the energy sector. Second, 
the development of Central Asia’s economic potential, including its extensive natural 
resources, requires free market economy reforms and foreign direct investment. Such a 
normative agenda would integrate Central Asia into the world economy.288 
More disturbing for Moscow and Beijing, however, is the potential for the American 
presence in Central Asia to function as an offshore balancer against Chinese hegemony 
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and a revanchist Russia. Ren Dongfeng asserts this point when he writes: “The USA 
appears to have at least a potential objective of containing both China and Russia in 
geostrategic terms by its military presence (especially its long-term presence) in Central 
Asia, even if the primary purpose of its deployment was to combat terrorism.”289 Many 
observers view coordination between Russia and China via the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization as a counterforce to this trend. The SCO was created in part as a “politico-
security bulwark” against NATO expansion into Central Asia and U.S. military aid to 
regional governments, “which China and Russia feared would have worked against their 
geo-political interests as great powers bordering the region.”290 
External Pressures and Regional Formation 
 
A number of scholars have argued that endogenous factors are the main causes 
behind the formation of the Central Asian RSC in general, and the SCO and CSTO in 
particular. More specifically, they argue that the regional groupings such as the SCO and 
CSTO were mainly to address the internal security concerns faced by China and Russia, 
respectively (see Chapter Six).291 That view is indeed true. However, regional security 
complex theory suggests that RSCs can evolve over time and change focus. Neoliberal 
institutional theory also has demonstrated that evolutionary nature of international 
institutions, including security organizations such as NATO.292  
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The intervention of an external power can greatly alter the dynamics of a RSC, even 
if there is a great deal of underlying tension among regional members. In the case of 
Central Asia, the stationing of American forces in the region has intensified and 
amplified the Russia-China “strategic partnership.” Indeed, regional cooperation can be 
affected – positively or negatively – by actors outside the region. A history of 
intervention by an external power might generate a shared sense of threat that produces 
efforts to create and sustain a collective defense. In some cases, “the absence of threat 
emanating from outside powers removes an often potent incentive to cooperate. 
Moreover, outside powers may seek to structure cooperation within a particular region in 
a manner consonant with their perceived interests, either to deny influence in the region 
to an adversary or to establish control over the region's affairs.”293 
 In fact, many scholars argue that the U.S. presence in Central Asia is a main causal 
mechanism solidifying their partnership, despite the latent conflict between Beijing and 
Moscow – at least for the present. This was made clear during a joint appearance between 
Chinese premier Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008. 
“China welcomed the fact that the newly elected Russian president chose China for his 
first foreign visit outside the CIS. The significance of Medvedev’s visit to China, held on 
23–24 May 2008, was highlighted by the signing of a Joint Declaration outlining their 
agreement on major international issues. The joint declaration reaffirmed the 
commitment of both countries to civilizational and cultural diversity within the world 
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community and to the formation of a multipolar world.”294 In fact, as Vladimir Portyakov 
points out, “relations with Washington will most likely have a greater impact on Russian-
Chinese cooperation in the future than it has played before.”295 
The SCO has reinforced the Central Asian security complex. Initially, the Shanghai 
Forum (or Shanghai Five), as it was originally known until 2001, was designed to 
delineate borders among the former Soviet republics and China following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The forum also urged cooperation to combat the “three evils” of 
terrorism, separatism and extremism that engulfed the region after the collapse of the 
USSR. Each individual state had its own self-interest in strengthening regional 
cooperation. Russia, as explained above, wanted to secure its southern flank and China 
wanted to discourage separatism among the Uighur Turkic ethnic group in its restless 
Xianjiang province.296 With little experience in self-governance, the smaller states of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also viewed regionalization as 
crucial to their regime survival and economic and energy security because threats such as 
“terrorism, extremism and separatism” crossed their porous borders with relative ease, 
given the common linguistic, ethnic and religious bonds among the region’s peoples.  
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For the major actors, regionalization goes beyond shared threats of the “three evils” 
or concerns of external influence. Economic development and energy security also have 
played a major role in the development of the Central Asian RSC and is another source, 
for now, of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in the region. In fact, soft 
balancing theory suggests that these sectors are more likely to be used to offset or 
counterbalance American encroachment in the region. 
Irrespective of the global economic crisis of 2009-10, economic ties between China 
and Russia have made progress. Indeed, economic cooperation between the two countries 
continues to be significant, with cooperation on energy improving from 2009 to 2010. 
According to some analysts, future developments look promising as well. For instance, in 
2009 China and Russia signed formal agreements exchanging loans for oil. “China will 
provide long-term loans of $25 billion to Russia, with $15 billion going to the Russian oil 
company Rosneft and $10 billion to the Russian oil transportation company Transneft. In 
return, Russia will repay the loans by providing China with 300 million tons of oil, at an 
average annual volume of 15 million tons, from 2011 to 2030.”297 Notwithstanding the 
worldwide financial recession that impacted the economies of many world capitals, such 
cooperation between the two regional powers is expected to continue in the absence of 
transformational change at the systemic level. 
Regionalization and the Military Balance 
The regional politics of Central Asia has had an impact on the long-term strategic 
military calculus of each major power (See Chapter Six). Consistent with offensive 
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realism, the United States has begun to slowly encircle the PRC with military bases and 
instillations in East Asia (Japan and Korea), South Asia (ASEAN members Singapore 
and the Philippines and commitment to Taiwan), and now in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan 
and until recently, Uzbekistan). Offensive realists have argued for the past decade that 
Beijing views American foreign policy in the Pacific and Northeast Asia as a long-term 
threat to China’s national security, national unification and modernization.298  
Whether or not Washington consciously seeks to constrain the rise of a hegemonic 
China in Asia, the growing American military presence on the Eurasian landmass is 
viewed by China as a long-term threat. For one, Beijing fears that the U.S. military’s 
presence in Central Asia could inhibit its access to energy resources in the region in the 
event of a confrontation, for example over Taiwan. To counter this threat, China would 
like to diversify its energy imports from the Middle East and establish energy 
independence in the region.299  Militarily, the PRC has purchased naval ships, including a 
refurbished Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier, from Russia specifically because of its 
concerns that the United States could strategically deny China access to energy, for 
example, via a naval blockade of the Straits of Malacca.300 China also has an active 
aircraft carrier research and development program and the PRC’s shipbuilding industry 
could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of [2010] with the goal of 
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having multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the next decade.301 As 
Evelyn Goh points out, China has created an “inside-out” model of Asian regional 
politics in which an indigenous state – rather than an outsider [i.e. the United States] – 
has become the primary security focus.302 Additionally, Chinese strategy of sea and air 
denial is designed with an armed conflict against the United States in mind.303 “One 
theme that continues to underlie many of the relationships China has established has been 
the perceived need to act as a counterbalance to the U.S. In China’s eyes, the U.S. is not 
only a global hegemon that needs restraining, but may also pose a threat to the stability 
and status of China itself.”304 In order for China to assert its dominance in the region, it 
must first remove the U.S. presence.305 
Russia shares with China the fear of U.S. encroachment on its borders. NATO 
expansion to the east and the U.S. establishment of bases in Central Asia has placed the 
American military directly in Russia’s strategic backyard. In its weakened state, Russia 
no longer possesses the military capabilities to internally balance against the United 
States through an arms buildup. Its current strategy, therefore, is to rely on China, a 
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policy that Dmitri Trenin describes as “leaning on the east to raise its stakes in the 
west.”306 Although a number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that the Sino-
Russian tensions outweigh their respective fears of U.S. hegemony, such concerns were 
for the time muted by American unilateralism, particularly the previous Bush 
administration proposal to install a theater missile defense system based in Poland and 
Czech Republic, a plan that the Obama administration has adopted with a few changes.307 
Russia considers the growing American influence in Eurasia as more threatening to its 
interest than a rapidly growing China. Thus, China and Russia are eager to foster a 
stronger relationship to block American ability to extend its global dominance in the 
region.308 Such thinking is made clear in Russian military strategy. The National Security 
Concept of February 2000, for example, “reflected Russian reaction to the changing 
strategic scene. With the new keywords of ‘multipolarity’ and ‘unipolarity,’ these 
documents provided a conceptual basis for criticism of US policy and in favour of tactical 
alliances in order to counter a growing US and Western influence in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.”309 
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Conclusion 
 Viewing Central Asia as a regional security complex provides a strong reference 
point for discussing the contemporary mechanics of balancing behavior. Even if a Central 
Asian security complex organized around the SCO or CSTO is the result of endogenous 
factors, as skeptics of soft balancing often point out, external pressures have hardened it. 
Indeed, as RSCT and neoliberal institutional theory have shown, states can use regional 
organizations for tasks beyond those for which they were envisioned.   
In fact, the history of Central Asia, in specific, demonstrates the role external 
powers play in heightening regional tensions.  During the multipolar European system of 
the early Twentieth Century, Mackinder feared a continental alliance between Russia and 
Germany because “the oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, 
resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of 
vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in 
sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.”310 Fate, ironically, 
has turned Mackinder’s logic on its head. In the past, the people of the Eastern and 
Western rimlands trembled at the thought of the Horde storming like a bolt of lightning 
from the steppe. Those ancient fears have subsided and the threat now is penetration of 
the Heartland by a great maritime power from the Rimland.  
Regional coordination, i.e., soft balancing, between China and Russia is 
predicated on their anxieties of American penetration into their sphere of influence and 
encroachment on their borders. Although endogenous factors have contributed to the 
formation of the Central Asian security complex, it is structural considerations that play 
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the greatest role in the “strategic partnership” between Chinese and Russia. Analytically 
and theoretically, it would be difficult to explain why two powers with so many divergent 
interests would coordinate their expectations to frustrate the United States in the absence 
of structural considerations. Soft balancing offers much insight. There is a convergence 
of interests between Russia and China due to their shared suspicion of the American 
military presence in the region, their common concern about Islamic radicalism in 
Central Asia, and ‘the strategic partnership’ formed in response to a U.S.-dominated 
unipolar world. “But this could change, and probably will. In time, the U.S. military 
presence is bound to be scaled back, perhaps even eliminated; Central Asia is quite 
unlikely to become a region of abiding strategic centrality in Washington’s eyes; indeed, 
absent 9/11 it would have not. An American disengagement and the continuing shift in 
the balance of power between Russia and China in the latter’s favor in the decades ahead 
could alter the calculations in Beijing and Moscow.”311 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NORMATIVE VISION OF CHINESE AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Regional Institutionalism, Multilateralism and Democratic Pluralsim 
If the Western vision of global norms is developed from the concept of solidarism 
grounded in the universality of liberal values, Russian and Chinese views rest on the idea 
of pluralism, or the view that the good life can be achieved through a diversity of political 
and cultural traditions. The former has framed the global discourse since Bretton Woods; 
the latter, though maybe much older, has resurfaced as a challenger to the established 
normative order.  In the contemporary international system, the pluralistic tradition has 
reemerged as a rival to the dominant liberal order championed by the United States. 
Unlike the Western concept of institutions, with their formal procedures, binding rights, 
rules and obligations, the new pluralist model avoids legalistic rules, is informal and 
decides by consensus rather than majority vote.312  In contrast to the Western concept of 
democracy, which focuses on the right of citizens, either directly or through 
representation, to determine their fate, the pluralistic view of asserts the right of states to 
pursue governance models that they believe best help them best position themselves 
within the system. 
 For the past century, the liberal model advocated by Western powers has largely 
been responsible for shaping the contemporary global landscape. Although these policies 
– in recent years termed neoliberalism or the “Washington Consensus” – have served 
some developing nations, the promulgators of liberalism have been the main 
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beneficiaries, despite the economic downturn that hit world financial markets in 2009. 
Emerging powers recognize that their interests are not always in harmony with the norms 
of the hegemonic system. The recourse for emerging powers, therefore, is to develop new 
norms that can help them achieve their own preferences. 
This chapter analyzes how China and Russia view Western norms in general, and 
American ones in particular, while exploring their own unique perception and utilization 
of soft power. Attempts to develop normative capabilities are essential for a soft 
balancing strategy because they could attract allies alienated by the hegemonic bloc.  In 
the Twenty-first Century, the power of persuasion will be as critical, if not more so, than 
military power or economic prowess. States that effectively harness their soft power will 
have substantial opportunities to alter the normative structure of the international system. 
Building new alliances, opening up new areas for capital investment and resource 
extraction, and creating new institutions without Western input, might not only increase 
Chinese and Russian prestige, but substantially improve their hard power, putting them in 
a better position to hard balance the United States. 
 It is necessary to understand the strategic vision of Chinese and Russian foreign 
policy to grasp the indirect role soft power plays in their partnership. The Russian and 
Chinese regional institutional model, for example through the SCO, is viewed as 
inefficient by many critics because it lacks formal protocols and transparency. However, 
what Western observers view as informal and opaque, China and Russia consider flexible 
and adaptable.313 The Chinese and Russian norm of “non-interference,” slammed by 
many liberals as irresponsible, is nevertheless considered a strategic advantage by the 
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thinkers in Beijing and Moscow. As argued in Chapter Two, such tactics are part of an 
overall soft balancing strategy because they allow China and Russia to challenge the 
United States indirectly and without recourse to military measures. 
The rival Eurasian normative model rests on three main precepts: the promotion 
of Chinese and Russian soft power (e.g., through culture and language); the creation of 
regional institutions to limit American influence (both hard and soft) in their “spheres of 
influence;” and support for alternative concepts of democracy and the rule of non-
interference. Each of the three is an indirect challenge to the American grand strategy of 
primacy (unipolarity), globalization of universal liberal norms, and intervention in cases 
of gross human rights violations.  
By attempting to reshape the normative order, China and Russia are setting what 
Arnold Wolfers referred to as “milieu goals,” which can create an environment that is 
more conducive for states to pursue their social or economic progress.314 The rivalry over 
these goals can be intense because they help set conditions for states to achieve their 
preferences. Additionally, identifying the “milieu goals” of great powers can lead to a 
greater understanding of soft balancing. Milieu goals are the underlying – or latent – 
source of a state’s normative capabilities; they link the domestic characteristic of a state 
to its foreign policy and, thusly, to the international level. The greater a state’s material 
capabilities, the greater opportunities to project its soft power abroad. However, a state’s 
soft power is a reflection of its own internal makeup. 
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Although late to the game in recent times, China and Russia are rapidly trying to 
advance their global vision in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia.315 To be clear, however, this study does not make the case that China and Russia 
are functioning democracies, regardless of the definition, or are spreading a truly 
democratic doctrine. Rather, it maintains that both countries use the language of 
democracy to present their own global outlook in accord with extant global norms. The 
discourse about democracy is a form of “strategic language politics” in which actors 
compete over the meaning of words and their functional usage.316 “Strategic language 
politics” is not a simple debate over words, but an important struggle to frame the global 
agenda. The remainder of this chapter assesses how thinkers in Beijing and Moscow 
conceive of norms as a strategic asset to balance the United States and restore the system 
to multipolarity. That assessment, however, is preceded by a brief discussion of the role 
soft power played in Soviet and Maoist China foreign policy. 
The historical use of soft power in China and Russia  
 Historians have pointed to the successful use of culture in diplomatic relations 
over time, from ancient Persia to the British Empire.317 Like their predecessors, modern 
Russia and China are rediscovering the utility of culture, ideas and norms as an 
instrument of power. To be sure, soft power was an integral part of Soviet and pre-
Communist Chinese foreign policy. For example, in addition to offering military and 
                                                 
315 Russia lost much of its soft power after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which promoted a socialist 
vision to the world in its heyday.  
 
316 The term “strategic language politics” is adopted from William A. Callahan ‘Future imperfect: The 
European Union's encounter with China (and the United States),’ Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4, 
(2007): 777-807. 
  
317 Breslin, Beyond Pain. 
120 
 
economic aid to allies, the Soviet Union promoted socialist norms, Russian language and 
culture to developing nations during the Cold War. Before “sovereign democracy” was 
invented, Soviet ideologists developed the concept of "national democracy" in an effort 
“to promote political and socioeconomic conditions conducive to the strengthening of 
local Communist parties and [as] a means of obtaining neutralist support for Soviet 
foreign-policy objectives.”318  
Like their Western counterparts, Soviet officials wanted to spread their socialist-
inspired economic models. Nikolai Fedorenko, the Soviet ambassador to the United 
Nations in 1964, described Moscow’s socialist agenda in Africa as advocating 
nationalization of the properties of foreign monopolies, development of local industry, 
creation and strengthening of a state-owned sector of the economy, and radical 
agricultural reforms.319 To help implement these reforms, the Soviet Union would 
provide credits, low-interest loans and guaranteed market access to African states.320  
From the time of Lenin to Khrushchev, Soviet policy was to support various anti-
colonialist movements as a bulwark against expanding Western influence. This policy 
was carried out through the financial and political support of local socialist and 
communist organizations. “The building of communism-socialism in Communist states, 
the national-liberation revolution, and the struggle of the working class in capitalist states 
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were seen as comprising this process.”321 However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Marxism-Leninism, the mythical raison d'être of the Soviet state322 no longer provided a 
viable normative alternative at the systemic level. To redress this deficit, Russia under 
Putin increased funding a number of soft power initiatives to repair its image.323 
China has used cultural influence in its dealings with foreigners throughout its 
long history. For instance, the Manchu dynasty absorbed tribes into their rule through 
spreading language and culture.324 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted 
during the Mao era are another example of Chinese attempts to spread international 
norms to better position members of the non-Aligned Movement.325 In recent years, much 
of China’s soft power outreach has been in developing nations, particularly in Africa. 
Over the past decade, China has developed the so-called “Beijing Consensus” model as a 
competing framework to the neoliberal “Washington Consensus.” The term describes 
PRC investments, aid, and trade agreements with developing nations outside the purview 
of Western international institutions and without the “strings attached” to Western norms, 
rules and regulations.326  
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Although China and Russia have long histories of using soft power (although the 
term is of rather recent coinage), their capacity to project it badly trails that of Western 
powers.327 Nevertheless, both states are keen to increase their capabilities across this 
strategic dimension. After a period of insularity during the Cultural Revolution and 
hostile relations with other powers, China has embraced a softer approach to foreign 
affairs since its Open Door policy.328 Russia’s relative soft power, too, has increased 
considerably. “Although Russia is hardly in a position to compete with Western nations 
on a world scale for instance, it might take a long time before the above noted channel 
can move closer to such heavyweights as the BBC and CNN Russia's soft power capital 
in the former Soviet region is undoubtedly special.”329 
The remainder of the chapter details how Russia and China have increased their 
soft power to project a more positive image abroad, in general, and as method to balance 
American influence, in particular. Indeed, their development of soft power capabilities in 
many cases is in direct response to the influence of American norms in their spheres of 
influence. “Demonstrating a heightened awareness of soft power’s potential for wielding 
influence abroad, rising global players are mobilizing resources accordingly. China’s soft 
power advances reflect this wider trend and the shifting diplomatic balance.”330 
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The Culture of Chinese and Russian National Security 
Chinese Charm Offensive:  Confucianism meets Socialism  
 As part of its new “charm offensive,”331 China has begun to draw upon its ancient 
Confucian heritage to provide an alternative cultural program to the Classical Western 
tradition. This theme was expressed during the 17th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China in October 2007, when President Hu called for enhancing the “soft power” 
of Chinese culture. In a keynote speech, Hu said, “Culture has become a factor of 
growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.”332  
 To complement its “peaceful rise” strategy, the PRC has followed in the footsteps 
of the British Council, the French Alliance Francaise and the German Goethe-Institut by 
opening Confucian Institutes to promote Chinese language and culture abroad.333 China 
has set up 320 such institutes around the world, including 10 in Africa, and plans to open 
more than 500 by 2011. Beijing has spent more than US$26 million to build new 
institutes,334 paltry by Western standards but a substantial sum for what until recently was 
considered a developing nation.  “The Chinese plan of launching Confucius Institutes 
worldwide is less an attempt to use Confucius as a Father Christmas-like symbol of 
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avuncular Chineseness than a pitch in forging a soft power platform modeled on the UK's 
British Council.”335 
For the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security 
realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy, but also more coercive 
economic and diplomatic levers such as aid and investment and participation multilateral 
organizations.336 The advancement of soft power has not been limited to just the political 
or cultural sphere in China. Fan Yinhua, deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy, 
also called for increased spread of Chinese socialist ideology to combat the spread of 
what he termed a strategy of “cultural subversion and infiltration” and “smokeless” 
ideological and cultural warfare used by Western capitalism to undermine China. “We 
must take the building of the socialist core values system as an important strategic 
project,” Fan wrote in an essay on Chinese soft power.337  
Because China is concerned that its policies will be misrepresented in Western 
media, the dean of Tsinghua University’s journalism school proposed building a set of 
soft power-promoting institutions, including home-grown media outlets with global 
reach, NGOs, and think tanks to compete with similar Western institutions.338 In 2010, 
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the Chinese Communist Party called for increasing the nation’s soft power when it 
released its 12th year plan on National Economic and Social Development. According to 
the plan, the PRC would increase the use of news media outlets, including the Internet, to 
enhance the nation’s communication capabilities; increase support for non-profit cultural 
undertakings and cultural heritage protection, and enhance international competitiveness 
and influence of Chinese culture.339  
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were an opportunity for China to showcase its soft 
and hard power. During the Games, officials touted the “Chinese Dream.” Unlike the 
“American Dream,” which focuses on individual achievements and success, the “Chinese 
Dream” applies to nations as a whole and provides an attractive development model for 
emerging nations.340 In fact, it was China’s close relations with African states that helped 
Beijing secure the Olympics in the first place.341 According to news reports, “Beijing 
appeared to receive broad international support beyond the developing nations where it 
has gained favor by building sports stadiums over the years.”342 Continuing to follow in 
the path of the United States, China has started its own version of a Peace Corps-style 
organization to send skilled volunteers abroad and is increasing the number of 
international students who attend Chinese universities, particularly those from Africa and 
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Asia.343  While the Voice of America was cutting its Chinese broadcasts to 14 from 19 
hours a day, China Radio International was increasing its broadcasts in English to 24 
hours a day. As Joseph Nye argued in a 2005 essay on China’s soft power, “In a global 
information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy 
are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but 
also on whose story wins.”344 
Russian Soft Power: Sovereign Democracy as a New Global Norm   
Similar to China, Russia has been developing its own normative vision and is 
attempting to promote it abroad. The two powers’ strategies share much in common and 
often complement one another. They consistently promote their mutual visions in forums 
such as United Nations and in regional organizations such as the SCO. In Central Asia, 
for example, Russian authorities are aware of the possibilities of new media and have 
established a state-funded international television network to broadcast in English. Prime 
Minister Putin's has called for the creation of a special department for Interregional and 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Kremlin to utilize Russia’s soft power 
dimension more seriously.345 In response to the “Color Revolutions” in Eurasia and 
Central Asia, Putin endorsed “continuing the civilizational” role for the Russian nation in 
post-Soviet space.346   
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Moscow has taken a more assertive foreign policy since the U.S. entry into 
Central Asia after the 9-11 attacks and the resulting influence of Western NGOs. In 
response to increased Western exposure in the region, Russian has trained its own youth 
organizations, restricted the activities of western NGOs in Russia and warned the United 
States against interference with Russia’s domestic developments.347 Russia’s soft power 
strategy was articulated in a Foreign Ministry report called “A Review of the Russian 
Federation’s Foreign Policy.” Commissioned by the Kremlin and released 27 March, 
2007, the report advocated for a “more equitable distribution of resources for influence 
and economic growth” and defended the notion of collective leadership and multilateral 
diplomacy as an alternative to unilateralism and hegemony in international relations.348  
Russia has taken a greater role in developing its own version of democracy as 
well. The Kremlin’s leading ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, defined sovereign democracy 
as “the need to defend an intellectually determined path to political development and to 
protect economic prosperity, individual freedom, and social justice from potential threats 
… [such as] ‘international terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness, 
and soft takeovers by ‘orange technologies’ in a time of decreased national immunity to 
foreign influence.”349 Surkov’s notion of democracy shares much in common with his 
Chinese counterparts.  
The renewed focus on soft power is not simply a passing fancy for the Kremlin. 
Increasing Russian soft power is deemed a vital national security interest and one that is 
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necessary to offset the United States’ hegemonic ambitions.  “We view the appearance of 
a powerful military bloc on our borders … as a direct threat to the security of our 
country,” Putin said of the Western promotion of “Color Revolutions” after a 2008 
NATO summit. “National security is not based on promises.”350 
Non-interference as a new global norm 
The role of strategic language politics 
China has made great strides in transforming its international image. Indeed, 
China’s increasing engagement in Africa and Asia is part and parcel of a wider policy 
that manifests itself equally in China’s relations towards other regions of the world such 
as Latin America and the Middle East 351 The charm offensive strategy is particularly 
shown in China’s (and Russia’s) tendency to reach out to countries that have strained 
bilateral tensions with Washington, Venezuela, Iran and Sudan being the most prominent 
examples.352 Many of these countries have an affinity for China’s development model, 
which expresses the right of sovereign states to choose their own path of development. 
Rooted in Confucianism, China’s democratic model is “founded, not upon homogenizing 
universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of 
commonality and difference.”353 Such a development route is appealing for countries that 
feel straightjacketed by the one-size fit all policies of structural adjustment mandated by 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
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This development model is founded upon the Chinese philosophy of non-
intervention as a fundamental premise of democratization. In contrast to the liberal notion 
of democracy as a bottom up process, China views democracy as top down. In other 
words, democratization for China resides at the systemic level and applies to the self-
determination of states, not necessarily of citizens within those states. Beijing’s vision of 
democracy corresponds with the realist notion of the “state” as an autonomous actor. For 
China and many other non-Western nations, including Russia, the state is viewed as a 
singular unit and development and prosperity is measured by national power. Human 
security under this concept of sovereign or managed democracy emphasizes economic 
well-being and stability over political or individual rights, what Fareed Zakaria calls a 
form of “illiberal democracy.”354 
The illiberal paradigm of democracy is attracting smaller powers to the Beijing-
Moscow axis. For example, “the Central Asian states, finding the American liberal 
democracy a price too high, followed the Russian model … in which states, through the 
vote of their people, can choose the social system they feel best for them. Unlike liberal 
democracies, with institutions committed to upholding liberties through a system of 
checks and balances, the Russian model is conceived of a strong elected executive who 
coordinates institutions of national power.”355 This magnetic appeal is not limited to the 
Central Asian members of the SCO, but also is gaining traction in other regions of the 
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world, where democracy is a tertiary concern to social justice, economic security and 
stability. 
 These language games go beyond mere rhetoric; they point to states’ broader 
strategic concerns about balance of power and national interest. From this standpoint, 
norms become a crucial capability that allows weaker states to engage with the 
predominant rules of the system while simultaneously seeking to transform them. In this 
way, China and Russia reflect the language of democracy used in the West while 
refracting its usage to correspond with their own interests. Such a strategy shifts the 
narrative in their favor because, although they adopt the language of the norm, they 
encode it with their own meaning.356  
To illuminate this point, William A. Callahan found that the meaning of 
“democracy” was substantially different when he compared policy papers drafted by the 
European Union and China concerning bilateral relations between Brussels and 
Beijing.357 “While the EC underlines its stake in China emerging as a power that ‘fully 
embraces democracy, free market principles and the rule of law’, the PRC paper repeats 
‘democracy’, but in a way that shifts the meaning from domestic political reform to 
safeguarding national sovereignty in international space: ‘China will, as always, respect 
diversity in the world and promote democracy in international relations in the interest of 
world peace and common development’ [emphasis added].”358 These “strategic language 
                                                 
356 Callahan ,“Future imperfect.’ 
 
357 Callahan reviewed the 2003 European Commission policy paper “A Maturing Partnership – Shared 
Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations” and the 2003 Chinese response, “China’s EU Policy 
Paper.” 
 
358 Ibid, 788 
131 
 
politics” are indicative of soft balancing because they can organize a new normative 
framework into an alternative pole of power without directly challenging the hegemonic 
order.  They also reveal the underlying tension between great powers at the systemic 
level that many analysts often neglect because of their narrow focus on material 
capabilities. 
Regional organizations: A Multivector approach 
To increase their power, emerging states can turn to international institutions to 
bind the reigning hegemon through bureaucratic inertia or denial of access. Russia and 
China have sought such a strategy by increasing their leverage against the United States 
in arenas such as the UN Security Council and at G-8 summits. Additionally, the two 
powers have worked through regional institutions in an attempt to limit or deny American 
access to geographical areas deemed sensitive by Beijing and Moscow. Working through 
such institutional arrangements allows Russia and China to “play the whole field” rather 
than be limited by their inability to project power globally.359 This strategy has not 
always been successful – the unsuccessful attempt by the UN Security Council to deter 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the SCO’s inability to completely dislodge U.S. forces from 
Central Asia are glaring examples – but they do raise the cost of doing business for the 
United States by forcing it to go alone or shoulder the burden through unilateral action. 
Nevertheless, unsuccessful balancing should not be considered an absence of balancing.  
The changing configuration of the international system has forced great powers to 
adapt their behavior as well. Russia has followed a similar path in Central Asia, where it 
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prefers to act in the context of multilateral regional organizations such as the SCO when 
balancing U.S. power. In the past, Russia acted independently in its foreign relations with 
the Central Asian republics. Today, however, Moscow’s relations with the republics are 
mediated through regional organizations and treaties, such as the CSTO and CIS.360 
Under Putin and his predecessor, Medvedev, Moscow considers regional institutions a 
central element in the security architecture of Central Asia. Leadership positions in 
regional and international institutions do more than protect Russian influence; they also 
increase Russian prestige. “Another important factor that effects the Russian perception 
of security was her rotating presidency of the G-8 in 2006. It gave Russia a chance to 
promote her own vision of leadership in the modern world.”361 
The Chinese share a similar multivector view in regards to regional institutions. In 
Central Asia, Beijing recognizes that it must work through institutions to achieve its 
interest, which include balancing against the United States. China also operates within 
these institutional confines to alleviate fears Russia might have of Beijing’s rapid growth.  
“Throughout its vast history, Chinese strategy towards its Central Asian frontier was 
cognizant of the fact that the power of the center was linked to its ability to project its 
influence into the distant periphery.”362 One way to connect to the “periphery” is through 
the SCO, which has allowed China to deepen its ties in the region without alienating 
Russia. 
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At the global level, China continues to raise its profile in the UNSC and broaden 
its role in regional organizations such as ASEAN. The Chinese conception of regional 
organizations, however, differs markedly from that of the Western viewpoint. Whereas 
the Western notion of institutions is based on liberal precepts of rule of law, transparency, 
formality and efficiency, the Chinese model is guided by general governing principles 
that recognize collective interests and allows actors to maneuver in concert toward a 
shared goal while maintaining the freedom to pursue their agendas at different speeds.363 
“This kind of flexibility permits multilateral cooperation to take root and maintains a 
shared identity within a disparate group.”364 Russia also emphasizes institutional 
frameworks that “create mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit.” Such language is 
usually code for obtaining a veto over American unilateralism “to ensure that any major 
changes in the international system require consensus” – something that would be 
unnecessary if power was more evenly distributed globally.365 
Conclusion 
As Zakaria notes, Russia and China’s search for political and economic systems 
that work for them will have enormous ramifications for the global balance of power.366 
Whether China and Russia are truly democracies – illiberal or not – is beyond the scope 
of this study. From the standpoint of soft balancing, however, Moscow and Beijing’s 
strategic use of the “democracy” norm is extremely relevant. An assessment of their 
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thinking demonstrates that developing norms is a major component of their concept of 
national power. The analytic used in my study does not ignore the consequences of raw 
material power. Indeed, as neoclassical realists argue, soft power is an extension of hard 
power and a reflection of domestic characteristics. However, as a separate strategic asset, 
soft power can be applied as a balancing mechanism when states cannot match the hard 
power of a hegemon.  
American unilateralism is disturbing middle and great powers and at times even 
chafes U.S. allies.367 Outright violation of the hegemonic order, however, can draw the 
focused enmity of the United States, something Russia and China can ill afford because 
of their lack of military capabilities relative to the United States. Co-opting the language 
of democracy and utilizing institutions, however, presents China and Russia as 
responsible powers and potential allies for emerging powers. In the absence of vast 
material or military incentives to offer allies, China and Russia provide ideological cover 
for states that seek to evade the normative structure of the system, which can be as 
binding as its material structure. Beijing and Moscow’s continued opposition to stricter 
American-backed sanctions against Iran is a case in point. For example, Moscow’s 
consistent objection to tougher sanctions against Tehran – which the West accuses of 
clandestinely seeking a nuclear weapons program – could be viewed as a “declaration of 
independence from the United States … [because] Russian foreign policy elites have 
finally abandoned any beliefs that Moscow should work with the United States to define 
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paradigms of world order in general and to influence Iranian behavior in particular.”368 
Chinese support for Iran is based on similar concerns about American hegemony. 
For smaller states ostracized by the hegemonic system, this new axis is a strategic 
alternative to complete isolation. Nevertheless, it would be misguided to dismiss the 
alignment between Moscow and Beijing as one of simple convenience. Great powers are 
not “great” only because they are strong, but because they want to be leaders; and 
leadership requires vision. A state’s vision is rooted in its milieu goals, which in turn is 
based on its unique nature. Material capabilities remain the central concern at the 
strategic level of balance of power, however, if that structure cannot readily be altered, 
then the competition can shift to the normative dimension. Military strategy requires an 
understanding of an opponent’s force structure, weapons systems and doctrine. A similar 
approach is necessary for the study of normative strategy.  
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CHAPTER VI 
SOFT BALANCING AS A GRAND STRATEGY: THE SCO CASE 
 Proponents of soft balancing argue that the strategy uses indirect measures to 
check hegemonic power. These tactics are unlikely to involve formal military alliances or 
arms buildups because such measures are ineffective against a hegemon whose 
capabilities far outstrip those of its nearest competitors. According to Robert Pape, the 
logic of balancing against a sole superpower is about coordinating expectations of 
collective action among a number of second-ranked states. “In the short term, this 
encourages states to pursue balancing strategies that are more effective at developing a 
convergence of expectations than in opposing the military power of the leading state. 
Building cooperation with nonmilitary tools is an effective means for this end.”369  
 This chapter focuses primarily on the balancing methods outlined in Chapter 
Three, particularly the use of “normative capabilities” to offset hegemonic encroachment 
or influence in a regional security complex. Generally unable to compete with the United 
States in the military and economic spheres, great powers have turned to the normative 
dimension to balance U.S. hegemony. The normative dimension of capabilities should be 
taken as seriously as military and economic threats, given the fear U.S. normative power 
has stoked in Beijing, Moscow and other world capitals.  
Soft balancing methods also include attempts at territorial denial (especially 
basing rights), entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening (regional trading blocs, 
e.g.) and signals of resolve to balance. These methods are most likely to occur at the 
regional level, which as explained in Chapter Four, offer a ready-made buffer zone for 
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great powers attempting to check American unilateralism and U.S. penetration into their 
spheres’ of influence. While these low-level efforts are designed to balance against the 
United States, they do so in a manner that will not harm economic ties or draw the 
focused enmity of the hegemonic power.370 However, “if the unipolar leader’s aggressive 
policies do not abate, increasingly intense balancing efforts could evolve into hard 
balancing.”371   
 This chapter explores how China and Russia have “coordinated expectations” via 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, their bilateral relations with one another, and 
their multilateral relations with the smaller Central Asian republics. It looks for consistent 
behavior by the two powers to undermine the United States using primarily normative 
means, both independently and through the SCO. The main focus of this chapter is how 
the Beijing-Moscow axis has countered American normative power projection, including 
its promotion of Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, and its support for 
the varied Color Revolutions in the region. It begins with a brief overview of the SCO 
and its evolution over the past two decades. Next is an analysis of Chinese and Russian 
attempts, both through the SCO and in tandem with other regional actors, to soft balance 
against U.S. influence in the region. The chapter proceeds with a response to the criticism 
of the SCO as a balancing mechanism in Central Asia and concludes with an assessment 
of the successes and failures of the soft balancing alignment and the likely causes for 
those outcomes. It finds, in this case, that the intensity of soft balancing correlates with 
increasing American intervention in Central Asia. 
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At the outset of this discussion, a word of caution is necessary. Soft balancing 
proponents, including the author of the current study, do not argue that such alignments 
are deeply integrated or derived from shared principles other than those involving 
measures to counteract a hegemonic power. In other words, it does not make the case that 
China and Russia have formally cooperated at the official level to balance the United 
States. Theoretically, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, the partnership is an 
alignment rather than alliance, a key distinction. According to Snyder, “alignments, 
whether or not they have been formalized as alliances, are essentially expectations in the 
minds of statesmen about future interactions. These expectations will, of course, be held 
with varying degrees of confidence. Their principal sources are conflicts and common 
interests among states, differences in capability, observation of each other’s past 
behavior, and formal alliances.”372 From this standpoint, a pattern of behavior that 
demonstrates coordinated expectations could be considered soft balancing, particularly 
when such actions are repeated over time by the same actors and in the face of the same 
systemic constraints. As He and Feng ask (rhetorically), if not soft balancing, then 
what?373 
 
Evolution of the SCO 
From Shanghai Spirit to Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
 
During the Cold War, Moscow and Beijing had frequent skirmishes over 
borderlines. However, with the waning of the Soviet Union, China and Russia moved 
toward rapprochement with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese President 
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Jiang Zemin signing a joint communiqué in 1989 to resolve their border disputes. The 
entente between Beijing and Moscow led to the formation of the Shanghai Five (also 
called the Shanghai Forum) in 1996, which later evolved into the SCO. After the demise 
of the Soviet Union, the Shanghai Forum demilitarized the border between China and the 
former Soviet republics of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.374 “Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship evolved even more quickly, and during 
the April 1996 summit between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, the two sides formally 
declared they would ‘develop an equal and trustworthy strategic partnership aimed at the 
21st Century.’”375 The “strategic partnership” continued to solidify, with former Russian 
president Vladimir Putin and Chinese premier Hu Jintao calling for a return to a 
multipolar world order. The two leaders worked together to turn the Shanghai Forum into 
a more effective institution.  
The partnership was expressed publicly once more in a Joint Declaration of the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on 26 March 2007. The 
declaration mentioned the intention of both sides to contribute in every way possible to 
the expansion of the SCO’s ties with the Eurasian Economic Community and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, institutions in which Russia plays a major 
role.376 Vladimir Portyakov argues that his joint announcement demonstrated Chinese 
respect for Russia’s interests and strategic roles in the region. The expansion of the SCO, 
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Portyakov writes, showed that “the consistent implementation of [a] course aimed at 
cooperation, but not rivalry, between Russia and China in the SCO could serve the 
progress and greater efficiency of the organization.”377 
Indeed, such “strategic partnerships” can be adopted “in lieu of formal alliances. 
It is a preferred option because it provides security cooperation without cementing 
security commitments,” which appears to be the case of contemporary Chinese-Russian 
relations.378 For example, current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev continued to 
endorse the partnership during his May 2008 trip to Beijing, saying it was necessary for 
maintaining global, not regional, balance. “Some don't like such strategic cooperation 
between our countries, but we understand that this cooperation serves the interests of our 
people, and we will strengthen it, regardless of whether others like it or not,” he said. 
“Russian-Chinese relations are one of the most important factors of maintaining stability 
in modern conditions.”379  
His counterpart, Chinese President Hu Jintao, also said the SCO was necessary to 
combat both regional threats and unilateralism: “Unilateralism and power politics still 
exist, traditional and non-traditional threat is still severe, and economic globalization 
failed to bring benefits to the majority of developing countries,” Hu said at the 2007 SCO 
summit.380 Hu and Medvedev continued this theme at the 2009 SCO summit in 
Yekaterinburg. “The China-Russia strategic partnership of cooperation has become a 
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model for relationships between big countries and neighbors,” Hu said.381    
Establishment of the SCO 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was officially established 15 June 2001 
with the addition of Uzbekistan as a sixth member for the purpose of “strengthening 
mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the member states; encouraging 
effective cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, scientific 
and technological, cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment and other 
fields; devoting themselves jointly to preserving and safeguarding regional peace, 
security and stability; and establishing a democratic, fair and rational new international 
political and economic order.”382  The basic principles of the SCO include adherence to 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; respect for each other's independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
mutual non-use or threat of use of force; equality among all member states; settlement of 
all questions through consultations, non-alignment and not targeting at any other country 
or organization; openness and willingness to carry out all forms of dialogues.383 
The SCO’s founding charter states that it “adheres to the principle of 
nonalignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the outside,” yet 
Section 10 of the declaration makes clear the organization seeks to alter the strategic 
balance at the global level: “In the current international situation, it is of particular 
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significance to preserve global strategic balance and stability.” Implicit in this statement 
is a concern about American unipolarity, although conforming to soft-balancing the target 
of the alignment remains unnamed.384 Indeed, “the tone of the founding documents of the 
organization repeatedly censured U.S. hegemony and favored instead the establishment 
of a multipolar world order.”385 
Structure and Organization of the SCO 
The SCO institutions consist of two parts: the meeting mechanisms and the 
permanent organs. The two permanent organs are the Secretariat and the Regional 
Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) in Tashkent, which was formerly called the 
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). The highest SCO organ is the Council of 
Heads of State (HSC), which appoints the Secretary-General and the RCTS Executive 
Committee Director for three-year terms. In 2004, the SCO created an observer status for 
other regional states. Mongolia joined as an observer in June and Pakistan, Iran and India 
were granted that status in July 2005. Sri Lanka and Belarus were granted “dialogue 
partner” status at the 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg. 
The main duties of the Secretariat include overseeing over the SCO’s 
bureaucracy; executing resolutions passed by the HSC; and performing as a liaison 
between the SCO and other regional and international institutions and states. 
Responsibilities of the RCTS include coordinating counterterrorist maneuvers among the 
member states’ law enforcement and security apparati, including coordinating security 
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for the 2008 Beijing Olympics; and directing exercises to quell separatist and extremist 
movements. describes the functions of its mechanisms (councils) as the following: The 
HSC is the highest decision-making body in the SCO and consists of the presidents of the 
member states. It meets once every year to take decisions and give instructions on 
important decisions regarding the SCO. The Heads of Government Council (HGC) meets 
once every year to discuss strategy and priorities, including economic and trade issues, 
and to adopt the organization’s annual budget. There are also mechanisms (councils) for 
the respective members’ national Speakers of Parliament; Secretaries of Security 
Councils; Foreign Ministers; ministers of Defense, Emergency Relief, Economy, 
Transportation, Culture, Education, Healthcare; Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies; 
Supreme Courts and Courts of Arbitration; and Prosecutors General. The Council of 
National Coordinators of SCO Member States (CNC) is in charge of coordinating 
interaction within the SCO framework.  
From Regional Institution to Global Actor 
Gradually, the SCO evolved from a purely regional outlook to an organization 
seeking international recognition. In 2004 the SCO received an observer status at the UN 
and in the following year, the SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev was allowed to 
make a speech to the UN General Assembly. Additionally, the SCO has broadened its 
involvement in Asia by signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization.386 Nurgaliev and his counterpart, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai 
Bordyuzha, signed the memorandum in Dushanbe on 5 October 2007. The document 
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envisages joint efforts for the establishment and development of equal and constructive 
interaction between the SCO and CSTO on issues covering regional and international 
security and stability; counterterrorism; drug and weapons interdiction; transnational 
organized crime; and other areas of mutual concern.387 During a 19 November 2008 
meeting, Nurgaliev and ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Soeung Rathchavy agreed to 
deeper integration in the areas of economic and trade relations; transportation and 
communications; energy, environmental protection and sustainable development; and 
information technologies.388 
The sheer size of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization makes it an important 
actor in regional politics. The territory of the SCO member states constitutes 60 percent 
of the Eurasian landmass (30 million square kilometers) and has a population of about 1.5 
billion. Together, with the four SCO observers – India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran – the 
organization possesses huge energy resources and a significant number of the world’s 
nuclear weapons (See table 6-1).389  
Over the past several years, the SCO increasingly has become the focus of 
scholarly inquiry and interest of foreign policy and military analysts because of its rapid 
growth and potential influence as a regional security regime. The organization has largely 
evolved beyond its initial mission of resolving outstanding border disputes. It now 
focuses on improving trade, energy and economic development in the region as well as 
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combating terrorism and separatism. This growing influence has translated into increased 
economic integration.390 
Moreover, the organization has matured into what some describe as “an 
institutionalized multilateral body” that has adopted a more confrontational tone with the 
West.391 In addition to the official declarations concerning Central Asia, the SCO has 
joined Russia and China in denouncing the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001 during the administration of President Bush II; opposed 
the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program; and supported China’s position on 
the status of Taiwan as lawful territory of the PRC.392 In fact, a detailed analysis of SCO 
statements, declarations, pronouncements and proclamations validates the conception of 
the organization as a countervailing coalition to Western and American interests in 
Central Asia. Although the SCO cannot be considered a formidable military bloc yet, “its 
rhetoric and actions have included elements of deliberate ‘counterbalancing’ and 
‘blocking’ of Western nations and organizations that also have legitimate interests and 
partnership goals in the regions concerned.”393  
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Table 6-1 – Capabilities of SCO Members and Observers 
Member Area in square km Population  GDP in $US trillions Military spending 
in US Billions* 
Nuclear weapons 
China 9,596,961 1,338,612,968 $4.758 $98.800 Yes 
Russia 17,098,242 140,041,247 $1.232 $61.000 Yes 
Kazakhstan 2,724,900 15,399,437 $0.175 $1.500 No 
Kyrgyzstan 199,951 5,431,747 $0.011 $0.185 No 
Tajikistan 143,100 7,349,145 $0.013 $0.063 No 
Uzbekistan 447,400 27,606,007 $0.075 $0.053 No 
Observers  
India 3,287,263 1,156,897,766 $3.561 $36.600 Yes 
Iran 1,648,195 66,429,284 $0.876 $9.174 No 
Mongolia 1,564,116 3,041,142 $0.009 $0.071 No 
Pakistan 796,095 174,578,558 $0.449 $4.823 Yes 
Source: CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
*Military spending from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for FY 2009; Numbers for Kyrgyzstan are from 2008; Numbers for Tajikistan 
from 2004; Numbers from Uzbekistan from 2003; Mongolia for 2007. 
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Reducing U.S. normative influence 
Because second-tier powers lack the military and economic capabilities to do so 
in a unipolar system, they are likely to adopt indirect balancing strategies that are less 
provocative to a hegemonic power. One way to do this is to remove the political 
influence of a hegemonic power that has penetrated into the region of lesser powers 
Russia and China, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have attempted to 
undermine the American normative (and strategic) interests in this manner. In this area, 
there have been three highly visible exploits the SCO has undertaken to counter 
American influence in Central Asia: rejecting a request by American observers to attend 
the 2005 summit; creating its own cadre of elections observers to respond to criticisms 
from their counterparts in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and American officials and NGOs; and promoting the concept of “sovereign 
democracy” as an alternative to Western concepts of democratization and human rights. 
SCO Attempts at Strategic Denial  
 Strategic denial is a prominent goal in any balancing context, let alone soft 
balancing. In the case of Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization clearly has 
attempted to reduce America influence in the region, although with mixed results. There 
have been several prominent moves by the SCO in an effort to reduce U.S. influence in 
the region. First, the SCO has rejected requests by the United States to observe its official 
functions and meetings,394 although U.S. diplomats were invited to the SCO special 
                                                 
394 Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”; Oldberg, “The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization: Powerhouse or Paper Tiger”; Rumer, “China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central 
Asia,” Strategic Forum, no. 223, (Nov. 2006): 1-8. 
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conference on Afghanistan held in Moscow on 27 March 2009.395 Second was the 2005 
Astana declaration, which called for a timetable for the removal of the military 
contingents of the “antiterrorist coalition” from the territories of the member states, a 
clear signal to the United States and its allies.396 Finally, Beijing and Moscow, through 
the SCO, supported Uzbekistan’s eviction of the U.S. military from its territory. Outside 
of the SCO framework, Moscow also pushed for the removal of American troops at the 
Manas base in Kyrgyzstan with tacit support from Beijing, although the outcome still 
remains to be seen. Finally, the Peace Missions conducted by member state militaries 
have been cited as a signal to the United States that balancing between China and Russia 
could harden if American unilateralism continued unabated. (The role of soft balancing 
across the military dimension is dealt with in Chapter Seven).  
The most demonstrable evidence of strategic denial came at the July 2005 summit 
in Astana, where at the behest of Russia and China, the SCO called for a timetable for the 
removal of the military contingents of the “antiterrorist coalition” from the territories of 
member states. Many Western commentators have viewed the bold declaration as part of 
“concerted efforts to attack U.S. regional sway.”397 Just five days before the declaration, 
“the Chinese and Russian presidents had issued a bilateral statement castigating unnamed 
                                                 
395 “US, Iran Attend Afghan Conference in Moscow,” accessed from Voice of America website, March 25, 
2010, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-03-27-voa54-68678047.html 
 
396 The declaration reads in part:  “Considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist 
operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sic) consider it 
necessary, that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use 
of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of 
the SCO member states.” Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 5 
July 2005, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html Also, for a U.S. response, see the 2005 Report to 
Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
397 Tim Murphy, “East of the Middle East: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and U.S. Security 
Implications,” Center for Defense Information, (2006), 2. 
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states that ‘pursue the right to monopolize or dominate world affairs’ by seeking to 
‘divide countries into a leading camp and a subordinate camp’ and ‘impose models of 
social development.’ While the Astana summit declaration reaffirms ‘the supremacy of 
principles and standards of international law, before all, the UN Charter’, it provides a 
characteristic twist by stressing above all the principle of non-interference and arguing 
that ‘it is necessary to respect strictly and consecutively historical traditions and national 
features of every people’ and the ‘sovereign equality of all states.’”398 
 The Astana declaration was preceded by the May 2005 Andijan incident, when 
Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s forces conducted a bloody crackdown that killed 
hundreds of “democratic” protestors in the city of Andijan. Karimov officially 
characterized the protest as “terrorist acts.”399 The incident was denounced by the United 
Nations, United States and European Union, but Karimov’ pointedly received the strong 
backing of SCO members China and Russia. Although the Uzbeks used the SCO as a 
cover to eject the Americans, there were greater underlying concerns. “To be sure, the 
Russians and Chinese also welcomed the exit of the Americans from the region, but the 
SCO provides sufficient weight so that all the countries in the region could speak in 
concert.”400 
The U.S. rebuke of the Karimov regime over the Andijan incident resulted in a rift 
that led to the eviction of U.S. forces from the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base in Uzbekistan. 
                                                 
398 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Pál Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 
17, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007), 7. 
 
399 “Uzbekistan: Saving its Secrets, Government Repression in Andijan,” report by Human Rights Watch, 
published May 2008. 
 
400 Mihalka, “Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency,”  147-148. 
150 
 
Although the removal of U.S. forces from the K2 base was the result of bilateral tensions 
between the United States and Karimov over human rights concerns and the lack of 
democratization, the incident nonetheless pushed Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (which also 
had come under pressure from Washington to democratize) firmly back into the orbit of 
the SCO.401 “For Russia and China, the temptation to use Karimov’s fury to throw the US 
out of the region proved irresistible.”402 
Another method of strategic denial, Robert Pape argues, is entanglement, 
particularly through regional and international institutions such as the United Nations. 
The SCO has held true to this logic as well; it routinely calls for international disputes to 
be resolved through the United Nations Security Council and repeatedly rejects unilateral 
undertakings, which are thinly disguised criticisms against the United States. At the most 
recent the 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, the organization declared:  
Serious changes are taking place in the contemporary international environment. 
Aspiration to peace and sustainable development, promotion of equal cooperation 
became the spirit of the times. The tendency towards true multipolarity is 
irreversible. There is a growing significance of the regional aspect in settling 
global problems…. Settlement of international and regional conflicts must be 
conducted by political diplomatic means on the basis of the principles of equality 
and mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. The 
attempts to achieve unilateral advantages in defense field are counterproductive as 
they undermine the strategic balance and stability in the world, do not benefit 
confidence building reduction of arms and disarmament. 403 
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The month after the Astana declaration, the SCO also held its first-ever joint 
military exercise through the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), which was created 
at the July 2002 summit in St. Petersburg. Dubbed “Peace Mission 2005,” the war games 
were ostensibly an anti-terrorism exercise. Another “peace mission” was held in August 
2007 and included 10,000 troops from land, sea and air units. Some commentators 
viewed the exercises as sending a strong message to Washington: “The fact that the 
exercise took place so soon after the SCO’s Astana summit, at which the organization 
made its clearest ever protest against US involvement in Central Asian affairs, indicates 
that the signals it conveyed about Chinese–Russian capacity and resolve were not aimed 
exclusively at potential non-state adversaries.”404 
Moscow’s strategy to remove the U.S. presence from Central Asia appeared to 
pay off when, on 3 February 2009, Bakiyev announced, in Moscow, that Kyrgyzstan 
would close the Manas base shortly after the Russian government reportedly agreed to 
lend Kyrgyzstan US$2 billion, write off US$180 million in debt and add another US$150 
million in aid. “The Manas installation is viewed as ‘the premier air-mobility hub’ for 
U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, with about 1,000 military personnel from 
America, Spain and France stationed there, according to a U.S. Air Force website.”405 
Negotiations between the United States and Kyrgyz governments continued, however, 
and the U.S. lease for the base was extended to July 2010 after the Pentagon agreed to 
triple the rent it had paid to lease the base.406 The status of the base remained unclear 
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after April 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, which overthrew the Bakiyev government. 
According to news reports: 
The opposition has declared that it wants to permanently close the base, although 
it is unclear whether this was at the behest of Moscow or the result of domestic unrest. 
According to news reports, Russian President Medvedev urged the opposition to close the 
base, while the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama pushed for its 
continuance.407 Reports stated that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recognized the 
interim government formed by opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva because Bakiyev had 
failed to fulfill a promise to close the U.S. base. However, U.S. officials said it was 
unclear who was running Kyrgyzstan, although he added Washington did not see the 
upheaval as a Russian-sponsored or anti-American coup.408 
Promotion of Sovereign Democracy 
 The proliferation of Western NGOs promoting democratic reform in the region 
clearly has disturbed its autocratic rulers, who despite initially benefiting from American 
aid because of the “war on terror,” view democratization as a threat to their rule. Because 
of the SCO’s strong support of sovereignty in regards to domestic affairs, it is not 
“burdened” with democratization and human rights issues that hamstring Western 
interests.409 To counter the normative agenda of the West, the organization has adopted 
the alternative Russian doctrine of “sovereign democracy,” which treats foreign support 
                                                                                                                                                 
406 On 23 June 2009, reports indicated that Kyrgyzstan had reached a tentative deal to allow the United 
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for domestic democratic movements and nongovernmental organizations as a form of 
external meddling in the internal affairs of its members.410 
The doctrine has been heavily promoted by Russia. Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov published a 2007 article about “sovereign democracy” that criticized NATO’s 
“bloc” policies.411 In the final year of his presidency, Russian President Putin made a 
number of speeches indicating that he also saw the United States and other Western 
countries as seeking to infringe on the sovereignty and interests of Russia and other 
countries. In a February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference, Putin warned 
the United States that it should not attempt to create a world “of one boss, one 
sovereign,” and that the Americans should stop interfering in Russian domestic 
politics.412 “Without mentioning the United States specifically, Putin also complained 
about countries that were trying to expand their power in the world much as the Nazis did 
before World War II. In a number of other speeches in the run-up to the 2008 Russian 
presidential election, Putin continued this theme, suggesting that current policies on the 
part of some states present threats similar to the peacetime roots of World War II.”413 
The powerful role that norms play in the systemic balance of power is illustrated 
in Russian and Chinese responses to Western support for various “Color Revolutions” in 
Central Asia and Central Europe. Indeed, these “revolutions” have been as troubling as 
U.S. military power projection to Moscow and Beijing, which view the normative agenda 
                                                 
410 Rumer, “China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia,” 6. 
 
411 Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources 
and Implications, (Arlington, Va.: Rand Corporation, 2009), 86. 
 
412 Ibid. 
 
413 Ibid. 
154 
 
as U.S. stratagems to destabilize the region. “The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Color 
Revolutions that deposed pro-Moscow governments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan 
have (sic) led influential Russians to view the continued U.S. presence as a major source 
of instability. In February 2005, the Russian Foreign Ministry pressured the Kyrgyz 
government to reject a U.S. request to station AWACS aircraft at Ganci. Since then, 
Russia’s state-dominated media has repeatedly urged Central Asian governments to crack 
down on U.S.-supported civil liberties groups.”414 
American officials are aware of the threat democratization in Central Asia poses 
to Moscow, Beijing and the smaller authoritarian states in the region. Speaking to the 
U.S. Congress in 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher criticized the SCO’s 
disinterest in human rights and democratization, saying: “I think the first thing to note is 
the organization doesn’t take up human rights questions itself, and that is probably our 
big criticism of Shanghai Cooperation in the human rights field, that there’s no effort at 
all to match economic agreements, border agreements, security cooperation, 
counterterrorism efforts with any standards of human rights or even, I suppose, what we 
would say is sort of understanding of the political environment in which those things 
have to operate. And so it’s kind of, as I said, no-questions-asked cooperation in these 
fields. And that in itself is not helpful to bring a balanced development in the region.”415  
The U.S. continues to use normative capabilities as a fungible asset to promote its 
agenda in Central Asia. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. awarded grants to civil-
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society development, grants to independent media outlets (pro-Western), and grants to 
finance a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Service. In addition, the United States 
finances Kyrgyzstan’s most active democracy NGO, the Coalition for Democracy and 
Civil Society.416  
 
American financial assistance also has funded peace, security and democratization 
efforts in the Central Asian states. In 2008, the U.S. provided US$324 million in aid to 
the region, although the amount dipped in 2009 to US$134.51 million.417 Cumulative 
spending for the region was US$1.5 billion, which includes Defense and Energy 
department spending on areas such as nonproliferation and counterterrorism.418 
 Such aid could be viewed as low-level measures to support potential Central 
Asian allies, who in turn would be more loyal, or at least amenable, to Washington than 
                                                 
416 Erica Marat, “The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After,” published by the Jamestown 
Foundation, March 2006, 61. 
 
417 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report For 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 11, 2010, 63. This amount excludes Defense and Energy 
department funding.  
 
418 Ibid. 
Table 6-2: How China and Russia soft balance through the SCO 
Military Political Economics 
Astana Declaration Opposition to democratization 
in Central Asia 
Control of Central Asian 
pipeline routes 
Creation of RATS Opposition to U.S. plans for 
National Missile Defense 
Potential for exclusive 
economic zone in  
Central Asia 
Increasing troop strength 
in Central Asia 
Push for alternative norm of 
“sovereign democracy” 
Possible “energy cartel” 
including Iran 
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to Beijing and Moscow. In other words, by securing the allegiance or acquiescence of the 
smaller republics in the region, the United States could hinder Russian and Chinese 
interest. “U.S. elevation of democracy promotion into an existential struggle for victory 
over terrorism and an essential foundation for peaceful relations among states has put it 
squarely at odds with China and Russia, both of whom have approached the task of 
combating terrorism as a matter of defeating specific organizations and strengthening 
regimes currently in power. They see noninterference in internal political affairs as the 
key to regional peace and cooperation.”419 
America’s democracy promotion in the autocratic Central Asia states, ironically, 
has pushed their regimes closer to China and Russia.420 After the infamous Andijan 
incident, the U.S. called for an international investigation of Karimov’s government, an 
action that moved Uzbekistan closer to its SCO members (all six members declared that 
any investigation should be the internal matter of Tashkent). More troubling for Beijing 
and Moscow was the American-supported “Tulip Revolution,” which led to the ouster of 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akiyev in March 2005. The United States immediately 
recognized the elected government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, an opponent of Akyev. 
However, an increasingly autocratic Bakiyev – eventually recognizing his tenuous hold 
on power in the face of “democratic” forces – quickly returned to the orbit of Beijing and 
Moscow and initially endorsed Russia’s call for the removal of U.S. forces from the 
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Manas air base in Bishkek.421 Despite his vacillation between American and Russian 
suitors, Bakiyev had become more pro-Moscow than his predecessor until his ouster.422    
It has not solely been the leaders of the major powers to speak out against what 
they perceive as a one-size-fits-all approach to democracy by the West. Tajik President 
Ismali Rahmonov aired similar concerns during a 6 November 2006 interview with the 
BBC. “I have been saying and reiterate now that this should be taken into account. It is 
not worth imposing some kinds of new ideologies on Asian countries as a chess-board 
model. This is not worth. As for the OSCE standards and meeting conditions or 
requirements of international norms, particularly of the OSCE, 100 percent, I think there 
is not a single country in the world which can meet demands and standards of the OSCE 
100 percent,” Rahmonov said.423 In a unipolar and increasingly globalized world, norms 
can be a serious threat to states. If norms can be used to weaken states, then they can 
theoretically be used to strengthen them. Like weapons and money, norms thus can be 
considered a fungible capability.  
Creation of SCO election observers       
 So far, this section has demonstrated the threat the “Color Revolutions” have 
posed to the rule of the Central Asian autocracy and the negative externalities they have 
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produced in Beijing and Moscow. If norms can be projected – and have substantial 
material outcomes such as regime change – then this power theoretically can be 
balanced. To counter this “democratic” onslaught, the SCO “has formed its own cadre of 
election observers, who since their debut in Kyrgyzstan in February 2005 have endorsed 
every election held in a member state – in contrast to monitors from the OSCE 
[Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and Western Organizations.”424  
In response to American and Western pressure on the political systems in Central 
Asia, the SCO established its own Observer Mission to oversee the electoral process in 
member states. Two recent elections stand out for review in this study: the 2009 
presidential election in Kyrgyzstan and the 2007 presidential election in Uzbekistan. 
Neither election was deemed free or fair by the U.S. State Department or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Nevertheless, The SCO 
and its members endorsed both elections. Determining whether the elections were “free 
and fair” is beyond the scope of this study, however. The examples below are provided to 
demonstrate the nature of balancing at the normative level (soft balancing), which can be 
just as intense as any military rivalry and whose outcomes can be just as transformative 
as warfare. 
 Kyrgyzstan: The 23 July 2009 Kyrgyz presidential elections pitted incumbent 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev of the Ak Jol party against challengers Almazbek Atambaev 
(independent candidate representing the United People’s Movement [UPM] and 
Chairperson of the SDPK party); Jenishbek Nazaraliev (independent); Temir Sariev (Ak 
Shumkar party); Nurlan Motuev (independent, aligned with the Joomart movement); and 
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Toktaiym Umetalieva (independent). The Kyrgyz government invited the OSCE mission 
to observe the election, and the mission deployed 277 observers from 39 OSCE 
participating states.425 The Observer Mission from the SCO was composed of three 
Secretariat officers and five representatives from SCO member states (three from the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and two from the Republic of Uzbekistan).426 
 Although observing the same election, the two missions came up with radically 
different conclusions. OSCE observers found the election marred by many problems and 
violations, including inaccuracies in the voter lists, evidence of ballot box stuffing and 
some evidence of multiple voting, and evidence of direct manipulation or falsification in 
numerous instances. The OSCE report concluded: “The 23 July 2009 presidential election 
in the Kyrgyz Republic failed to meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections, 
in particular the commitment to guarantee equal suffrage, to ensure that votes are 
reported honestly and that political campaigning is conducted in a fair and free 
atmosphere as well as to maintain a clear separation between party and state. The field of 
presidential candidates offered a genuine choice to voters and the continuing engagement 
of civil society provided an important element of transparency and accountability. 
Notwithstanding these positive elements, public confidence in the electoral process 
remains a fundamental challenge.”427  
 In contrast, the SCO report found that voting at the polling stations observed by 
its mission was conducted in accordance with Kyrgyz election law in a free, calm, 
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transparent and well-organized environment with no violations reported. “The Mission 
notes that the election took place in a democratic environment, which basically 
conformed to the requirements of the national legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic and its 
international obligations.”428 
Uzbekistan: A similar pattern was found during the 23 December 2007 
presidential elections in Uzbekistan. In the election, the incumbent Islam Karimov 
(Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [PDPU]) faced challenges from Asliddin 
Rustamov (People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan); Dilorom Tashmukhamedova 
(Social Democratic Party, Adolat Party); and Akmal Saidov, head of the National Centre 
for Human Rights, who represented NGOs organized in a government-initiated NGO 
umbrella. During the Uzbek presidential election, the OSCE sent only a small contingent 
of observers and no systematic or comprehensive observation of polling stations were 
conducted because of the tightly controlled political environment in the country.429  
The mission, nonetheless, found numerous problems. Among them were “legal and 
administrative obstacles that prevented political movements representing alternative 
views from registering as political parties or initiative groups, thereby precluding them 
from fielding presidential candidates.”430   
 The findings of the OSCE were in marked contrast to those of the SCO Observer 
Mission for Uzbekistan. The mission reported the election was conducted in accordance 
to Uzbek election law and conformed fully to international standards and provided the 
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necessary democratic and legal preconditions for free expression of the voters’ will by 
secret ballot.431 According to the U.S. State Department, however, “Uzbekistan has no 
meaningful political opposition. Four pro-government political parties hold all seats in 
the parliament, and independent political parties have been effectively suppressed since 
the early 1990s.” 
The Strategic Role of Democratization 
 These two cases demonstrate the significant role normative capabilities can play 
in the international system and how states have developed soft balancing strategies to 
counter them. Indeed, such strategies cannot be easily dismissed. Given the widely 
divergent findings each group had of the elections in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the 
SCO seems to have created its own election observers to provide a counterbalance to the 
election observers from Western states. In the current international system, democracy is 
a major component of state legitimacy and a site of contestation both within and without 
borders. The threat democratization poses to many leaders in the developing world is as 
serious – and in some cases more serious – than military threats. For instance, the United 
States has pursued “regime change” via military capabilities in Iraq, but also through the 
use of normative capabilities in countries such as Ukraine and a combination of economic 
and normative capabilities in Iran.432  
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Generally, the regime targeted for change is considered an “enemy,” “rogue” or 
“pariah” state by the hegemonic power. In the case of a liberal hegemonic power, 
democratization, theoretically, would remove the “hostile’ regime in power and bring 
about a new ruling class more amenable to the liberal world order. In other cases, the 
targeted regime might be the ally or vassal of another great power. In this situation, 
regime change in a smaller power – whether via military or normative means – can 
reduce the power of its great power ally or patron through realignment, thus altering the 
balance of power.  
 
The “Color Revolutions” are a case in point. The 2005 Orange Revolution 
resulted in the electoral victory of pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko over pro-
Russian incumbent Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine;433 and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan led to the ouster of Moscow-supported incumbent Askar Akiyev in favor of 
then U.S.-favorite Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In both “revolutions,” Western- and American-
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Table 6-3: Status of Democracy in SCO Member and Observers 
SCO Member Status of Democracy 
China Not Free 
Kazakhstan Not Free 
Kyrgyzstan Partially Free 
Russia Not Free 
Tajikistan Not Free 
  
SCO Observer Status of Democracy 
India Free 
Iran Not Free 
Mongolia Free 
Pakistan Not Free 
Source: Freedom House World 2007 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=372&year=2007 
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funded NGOs and U.S. democracy assistance played a significant role in the electoral 
outcome. In the Ukrainian election, the United States spent more than $18 million in 
election-related efforts in the two years leading up to the 2004 presidential vote.434 Of the 
$36.4 million in U.S. aid to Kyrgyzstan in 2005, 14.6 percent supported democratization 
programs, including legal and judicial programs, support for NGOs and support for 
independent media.435 
The strategic role of democratization is a major objective of U.S. national security 
policy and the United States and European Union spend nearly $1.5 billion on democracy 
promotion to this end.436 In fact, U.S. national security strategy is infused with liberal 
theories of international security. Those theoretical underpinnings are imbedded in the 
March 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States, which states on page 3: 
“Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, 
promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening 
international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-
supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.” Like its predecessor, the 
2010 NSS states that democratization can be pursued through the formation of 
partnerships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society voices 
to support and reinforce their work.437 
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As argued throughout this study, the role of normative capabilities has not been 
lost on China and Russia, either, although Moscow has taken the lead in this category. 
Ivan Krastev, an analyst of Russian foreign policy, argues that Moscow is seeking to 
increase its normative capabilities to counter U.S. advocacy of Western democratization: 
“The search for soft power is what characterises Russia's return to the world stage. The 
dynamism of the energy sector and the attractiveness of sovereign democracy are the two 
weapons of choice in Russia's current march on Europe. Contrary to the assertions of 
Putin’s critics, the concept of sovereign democracy does not mark Russia’s break with 
European tradition. It embodies Russia's ideological ambition to be ‘the other Europe’ – 
an alternative to the European Union [emphasis in the original].”438 
Russia’s opposition to Western democratization has manifested itself in a number 
of ways. Moscow has criticized OSCE election-observer missions, particularly in post-
Soviet states, as biased. Russian restrictions on OSCE observers led the organization to 
decide not to monitor either Russia’s parliamentary elections in 2007 or its presidential 
elections in 2008.439 “The leadership group that surrounds Putin and helped put 
Medvedev in the president’s office has explicitly rejected a number of Western 
democratic norms. They see freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly—to say nothing 
of political opposition—as some of the major contributors to the weakness and division 
of Russia in the 1990s. This group of leaders views U.S. efforts to promote democratic 
norms as cynical, hypocritical, and motivated by the U.S. drive to remain the dominant 
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global power. U.S. efforts to spread values of freedom and democracy in Russia and its 
neighboring countries are seen as nefarious efforts to reduce Russia’s influence, impinge 
on Russian sovereignty, and weaken and destabilize Russia’s own successful political 
system.”440 
Not only do Russia and China see democratization as a source of instability 
internationally, but as a threat to their own internal rule. In an extensive overview of 
Chinese elite perceptions of global norms, Daniel C. Lynch finds that the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) rejects the role of democratization in international relations 
because it views the norm as a Western machination.441  One Chinese academic Lynch 
cites, Xu Chongwen, argues that the West actively manipulates democratic norms for the 
purpose of subverting developing countries. In a 2005 article in Leadership Reference, 
Xu said the Color Revolutions in Central Asia and Eastern Europe were products of 
American intervention similar to the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq. According 
to Xu, the Bush administration pursued a “secret and dangerously effective strategy” to 
overthrow authoritarian states and replace them with Western democracies. “To provoke 
the Color Revolutions, Bush mobilized the Agency for International Development to: 
first, prod NGOs into cultivating relations with opposition elements in the countries to be 
subverted; second, stir up dissatisfaction with domestic economic arrangements and 
ethnic relations; third, subsidize oppositional media outlets, and encourage journalists to 
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publish news stories damaging to leaders’ reputations; and fourth, assist in the 
organization of opposition parties.”442  
In regards to soft balancing, many Chinese elites share the view of this author that 
norms are a distinct capability and a fungible asset of power. As People’s Liberation 
Army scholar Tang Guanghong writes, ‘‘the current international regimes, including the 
UN, World Bank, IMF, and WTO, are products of American hegemony.’’443 
Accordingly, Lynch concludes: material power can fuel ideational power. To which I 
might add, ideational power can delegitimize and undermine material power. 
Criticism of SCO as a Balancing Mechanism 
Critics and skeptics of the balancing role of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization have pointed out a number of reasons why the organization should not be 
considered a viable balancing mechanism: first and foremost, it is not a formal security 
alliance; secondly China and Russia may be pursing their interests in the SCO for other 
power-seeking motives such as dominating the region’s energy resources or controlling 
pipeline routes, irrespective of the presence of American troops; and finally, critics argue 
that China and Russia have a number of conflicting interests that will likely doom any 
Sino-Russo “strategic partnership” against the United States.444 
Each of these issues can be addressed within a soft balancing framework. As Hans 
Morgenthau once pointed out, “Not every community of interests calling for co-operation 
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between two or more nations, then, requires that the terms of this co-operation be 
specified through legal stipulations of a treaty alliance.”445 Furthermore, soft balancing 
theories, including the one explicated in this study, maintain that indirect and non-
military measures are likely the best strategies in a unipolar system. As for the second 
criticism, actors can pursue more than one interest within the confines of an institution. 
The fact that the SCO is utilized for the purposes of regional stability does not rule out its 
potential use for off-shore defense; both strategies can be pursued via the SCO and 
should be viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  
The final criticism raised by skeptics – that the latent tensions between China and 
Russia are likely to undermine any long-term attempts to balance the United States – can 
be turned back against them: Given these serious underlying problems, why does the 
Chinese-Russian “strategic partnership” continue to persist?  Despites Moscow’s 
concerns about China’s exploding economy, it continues to supply its energy thirsty 
neighbor with Russian oil; although China’s military capabilities are increasing by leaps 
and bounds relative to those of Russia, Moscow continues to sell its most advanced 
weapons systems to its larger neighbor; and notwithstanding Moscow’s concerns (real or 
perceived) about a Chinese “yellow peril” invading and occupying the Russian Far East, 
Moscow continues to align with Beijing on almost every important international issue. As 
Yong Deng points out, “These accelerated developments are remarkable, especially in 
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light of the many domestic obstacles, stemming notably from the border demarcation, 
Chinese immigrants in Russia, and mutual security suspicion.”446 
Indeed, as pointed out in the preceding chapters, neoclassical realism offers a 
strong explanation for the persistence of the Russo-Sino “strategic partnership.” 
Domestically, the Russian oil and arms industry benefits greatly from trade with China. 
Culturally, Chinese and Russian nationalism provide a strong impulse against Western 
globalization, particularly those concerning democratization and human rights. But the 
overarching reason is structural. As long as the system remains unipolar, China and 
Russia will be forced to partner if they wish to counter American intervention, which 
threatens both their interests. “Such an alliance would experience real friction, but to 
protect their interests, states will find allies where they can, when they must.”447  
Conflict frequently besets allies and partners at the international level. Serious 
friction among NATO members over the Second Gulf War has not led to the demise of 
that alliance. France and Germany vigorously opposed the United States invasion of Iraq 
in March 2003, but the alliance remained intact. Indeed, skeptics of soft balancing via the 
SCO appear to have raised the bar too high when it comes to cooperation between Russia 
and China.448 The SCO is a relatively young organization and cannot be expected to 
become a major power broker within a few years, although it has made some remarkable 
                                                 
446 Yong Deng, “Remolding great power politics: China's strategic partnerships with Russia, the European 
Union, and India,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5, (Aug.-Oct. 2007), 868. 
 
447 Bruce Russett and John R. O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and 
International Organizations, (New York: Norton, 2001), 285.  
 
448 Collins and Wohlforth, “Central Asia: Defying the ‘Great Game’ Expectations” are among the most 
skeptical. In 2003, Collins and Wohlforth touted the U.S. relationship with Uzbekistan, which severed ties 
with the United States and renewed its relationship with Moscow and the SCO just two years later after the 
Andijan incident. For a counterargument to Collins’ and Wohlforth’s assertion that U.S. intervention could 
foster stability in Central Asia, see Akbarzadeh, “Keeping Central Asia Stable.”  
169 
 
strides over the past decade. It took the European Union, one of the most touted examples 
of regional integration, nearly half a century to evolve from the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951 to the supranational organization it is today. Nevertheless, despite 
deep integration within the EU, there remain rifts among members over immigration, 
security and defense policy.449 True, the potential conflict between China and Russia is 
greater than any policy disputes among the Atlantic alliance. Yet, as many have pointed 
out, “despite such concerns, Russia appears to regard the growing American influence in 
Eurasia as more threatening to its interest than a rapidly growing China. Thus, both China 
and Russia are eager to foster a strategic partnership aimed at heading off American 
ability to extend its global dominance in the region.”450 
Conclusion 
 This chapter demonstrates the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 
soft balancing the United States. It argues that China and Russia have attempted to use 
the SCO as a buffer to American hegemony in Central Asia. Drawing on neoclassical 
realism and regional security complex theory, it demonstrates the interplay between the 
domestic and international forces that shape Chinese and Russian foreign policy in the 
region and the role the organization plays in Moscow and Beijing’s calculus of strategic 
denial. Furthermore, it highlights the roles norms play in great power politics.  China and 
Russia recognize that they cannot counter U.S. influence simply through denunciations of 
American “hegominism” alone.  
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By offering alternative means of legitimation and strongly supporting state 
sovereignty, the SCO can provide another pole of power around which smaller and 
midsize powers might gravitate. Attracting the small, autocratic Central Asian republics 
and middle powers such as Iran to the Beijing-Moscow axis will not alter the strategic 
balance of power, but it could undermine U.S. hegemony and in some cases restrain 
American unilateralism. Nevertheless, it has become “a kind of center of attraction, or an 
object of interest for a whole number of Asian countries. Having obtained the observer 
status in the SCO, Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran have not only contributed to the 
broadening of the potential area of the organization, but also demonstrated the real 
possibility of the SCO to directly influence the institutionalized structure of the interstate 
units, and the international relations of Asia as a whole.”451 
As for the success of the soft balancing strategy, the results have been mixed at 
best. The removal of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan could be counted as a success, even if 
it were the result of bilateral tensions between Washington and Tashkent, because it 
furthered the goals of Russia and China, which supported the outcome. However, despite 
intense Russian pressure, Moscow has not been able to push the Kyrgyz government to 
evict American troops from the base in Manas. The joint Peace Missions held by the SCO 
signal that Russia and China are willing to take steps to harmonize their military force 
structures, although that is still at a rudimentary stage. However, “the organization’s 
influence in the region is considerable, and its biggest members—China and Russia—
have the ability to undercut American initiatives there. But the SCO’s power to produce 
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concrete results where they matter the most to its members—security and stability—is 
limited at best, and all its members have a strong interest in the success of the principal 
U.S. mission in the region, which is to secure Afghanistan.”452 
In the arena of regional security, the SCO has made some progress. It has 
promoted effective cooperation among member states in the economic and humanitarian 
spheres; reduced the armed forces in the border areas; coordinated the fight against 
separatist and terrorist elements, fostered economic development and promoted 
cooperation across the environmental, scientific and cultural spheres. Proper 
implementation of cooperative measures by the member states “is capable of improving 
the socioeconomic situation and stabilizing the domestic political situation in the Central 
Asian countries … [and] lowering the destabilizing influences of radical Islam and 
western ideology fraught with the danger of ‘orange revolutions.’”453 
Irrespective of these shortcomings, the establishment and cementing of the 
“strategic partnership” through the SCO should be considered a success in and of itself. 
The fact that Beijing and Moscow have forged a relationship to counter American 
hegemony has not gone unnoticed by U.S. officials. In an interview with the Russian 
ITAR-Tass news service on 2 February 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake 
said the United States continues to closely monitor the organization. “I think the SCO can 
be a good engine for cooperation and for partnership in the region, but I think our interest 
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is ensuring that the SCO is not exploited by any country to try to use it as a vehicle for 
domination of that region. It should be, again, a vehicle for equal partnership.”454 
Leszek Buszynski points out: “Both Russia and China nonetheless regard the 
SCO as a balancing mechanism to the American presence in Central Asia, which 
stimulates their cooperation.”455 Because soft balancing is a non-traditional strategy and 
one that works best indirectly, the tentative steps taken by Moscow and Beijing to 
undermine U.S. policy might easily be overlooked as simple self-aggrandizement or 
dismissed as traditional diplomatic friction.  Yet, systematic engagement in a policy to 
counteract U.S. interests should be viewed as part of a larger strategy, not simply the 
vagaries of regional powers. Eugene Rumer, an expert on Central Asia, sums this point 
up quite adequately: 
A close look at the organization, the behavior of its members, their motivations, 
and the practical impact of their declarations suggest that the SCO’s challenge to 
U.S. interests and policies in Central Asia is less than meets the eye.  But ignoring 
the SCO simply because of its limited capabilities for action and concrete results 
would be a mistake; it is more than a paper tiger. As a political organization, it is 
an important vehicle for Russian and Chinese diplomacy aimed to counter U.S. 
influence in the region. The SCO also provides a forum where Central Asian 
states, dwarfed by their giant neighbors, can sit at the table with them as equals, at 
least nominally. For all these reasons, the SCO is worth the attention of the United 
States. The question is what kind of attention we should pay to it.456 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF SOFT BALANCING 
 
Soft balancing is a response to the military imbalance in the international system, 
and therefore, a soft balancing strategy could affect the global strategic balance. From a 
strategic standpoint, soft balancing can set favorable diplomatic conditions that can 
increase the chances a state has of fending off superior military power. This chapter 
assesses the impact soft balancing has had on Chinese and Russian military doctrine and 
strategy. It argues that both states have undertaken military modernization efforts to 
address their shortcomings vis-à-vis the United States, though each has done so in a 
manner that does not jeopardize its relations with the hegemonic power.457  
Counterbalancing U.S. military power requires indirect methods similar to 
balancing at the normative level. Detailed analysis of Chinese and Russian military and 
foreign policy thinking indicates that both seek to offset U.S. military superiority without 
engaging American power directly. Chinese defense doctrine in regards to the United 
States is predicated on the concept of “strategic denial” or “anti-access,” which Russia to 
a lesser extent shares. In the case of confrontation, the goal is not to engage the superior 
forces of the United States head-on, but to utilize measures that attack American 
vulnerabilities, such as logistics, forward basing, command and control and satellites 
capabilities. Regional denial, which is discussed in Chapters V and VI, plays a significant 
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role in the calculations of Moscow and Beijing because it could foreclose the possibility 
of American basing rights in a third country. 
The first part of this chapter covers Chinese contemporary military strategy, 
followed by a similar examination of Russian doctrine. The third section analyzes the 
bilateral relations between Russian and Chinese militaries and the role the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization could play in any military confrontation between China and/or 
Russia and the United States. It concludes with a discussion of the role normative 
capabilities could play in the future use of military force. 
Chinese Defense Posture  
Contemporary Chinese military doctrine follows Sun Tzu’s ancient and timeless 
maxim: “in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.”458 
Following this logic, PLA military planners have developed weapons systems designed to 
exploit relative Chinese military strengths against relative military weaknesses of the 
United States. Parallel to its soft balancing strategy, China has adopted an “active 
defense” military doctrine, which is based partially on non-linear, non-contact and 
asymmetric operations. Under the “active defense” doctrine, China's strategic goals are 
viewed as defensive, including defending China's maritime periphery, although limited 
offensive measures “might be employed as necessary to safeguard China's core strategic 
interests (for instance, by using an ASBM [anti-ship ballistic missiles] to target a US 
carrier strike group dispatched to preclude China from coercing Taiwan). Non-linear 
operations involve launching attacks from multiple platforms in unpredictable fashion 
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that range across an opponent's operational and strategic depth.”459 Present Chinese 
defense strategy was heavily shaped by the post-9/11 policies of the United States. The 
Bush doctrine’s unilateralism and advocacy of preventive force suggested to PLA 
strategists that American restraint and self-restraint were weakening.460 
Furthermore, China’s sharply rising dependence on imported oil and concerns 
with maritime access rights coupled with pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan in the 
early years of the decade led Beijing to be more explicit about solving the dispute with 
force if all else fails.461 Although the Bush administration’s unilateralism played a major 
factor in Beijing’s military calculus, it is the unipolar nature of the international system 
that most concerns the PLA, a scenario that is expected to persist under the Obama 
administration and into the near future, despite the administration’s more nuanced and 
multilateral approach to international relations. China, for example, continues to assert 
contested sovereignty over much of the South China Sea, which is an important maritime 
route. To protect those sea routes from American access in times of crisis, China is 
developing and testing anti-ship ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable reentry 
vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea.  
According to Congressional testimony in the United States, “Observers have 
expressed strong concern about this development, because such missiles, in combination 
with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to 
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attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies 
operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from 
highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea.”462 
China’s concern about U.S. maritime supremacy in the Pacific is deep-seated, and 
persists despite changes in American leadership. Regardless of administration, Beijing 
remains troubled by American support for Taiwan. One PLA theorist, for instance, 
“blames America’s hegemonic impulses that have led to a ‘new buildup of American 
forces based in Asia’ and ‘blocked the realization of unification [of China and 
Taiwan].’”463  Indeed, unipolarity trumps many of the PLA’s concerns with potential 
regional rivals. David Gompert makes this point when he argues that China has tabled 
conflicts with other regional actors such as India and Russia to deal directly with U.S. 
hegemony. Although China’s calculations and motives might be complex, Gompert 
argues that there is coherence in Beijing’s strategy and programs. To counterbalance the 
U.S., “China has placed its long-standing disputes and rivalries with India, Russia, and 
Vietnam on the back burner and its Pacific interests, access, and defenses on the front 
burner, which constitutes a shift of focus from the continental west to the oceanic east of 
the Middle Kingdom. While being careful not to antagonize the United States—economic 
partner, leader in the war on Islamist terrorism, guardian of world oil supplies and routes, 
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and in any case the world’s superpower—Chinese military planning now revolves around 
Sino-American contingencies.”464 
Chinese weapons programs indicate that the PLA’s focus is squarely on the 
United States.465 In addition to rapidly modernizing its undersea warfare capabilities, the 
PLA Navy (PLAN) is developing conventionally armed missiles that could provide 
China with a potent capability against regional bases and U.S. aircraft carriers operating 
in the vicinity of Taiwan. Beijing also is determined to modernize its strategic nuclear 
forces. China is deploying road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 
developing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). China currently has about 20 silo-based, 
liquidpropellant DF-5 ICBMs capable of striking targets in the continental United States 
and some older missiles that are more limited in range and serve primarily as a regional 
nuclear deterrent.466 In the area of space defense, China’s successful testing of “ground-
based, midcourse missile interception technology” on 11 January 2010 “was another 
example that the People's Liberation Army is looking to challenge the United States in 
space.”467 
                                                 
464 David C. Gompert, Coping With the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military, 
(Washington, D.C.: Center For Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense 
University, December 2007), 13. 
 
465 Erickson and Goldstein, “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China's Response to US 
Hegemony.” 
 
466 Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile 
Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1, 
(Feb. 2009): 71-73.  
 
467 Richard D Fisher Jr., Reach for the stars - China develops its military space technology, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, Feb. 11, 2010. Last accessed May 22, 2010, http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml 
178 
 
Anti-access themes are pronounced when Chinese strategists discuss options 
available to the PLA for wresting the initiative from the United States or for preventing 
the timely deployment of additional U.S. forces in Asia.468 “The United States is the key 
security focus for China and the Chinese strategy of sea and air denial is designed with an 
armed conflict against the United States in mind. No doubt, the United States military 
presence in Asia-Pacific is a significant military factor.”469 The bulk of weapons 
platforms Beijing has purchased from Russia suggest an “access denial” strategy that is 
wholly consistent with Beijing’s focus on the Taiwan issue, particularly its naval 
modernization program.470 In submarines, the PLA Navy has found a weapon system that 
provides a cost-effective instrument for deterrence, or if necessary, to engage in combat 
against a superior foe. According to reports, the PLAN launched 13 submarines between 
2002 and 2004 in addition to the eight “very quiet” Kilo class-diesel submarines that 
were delivered from Russia by end of 2006. The exchange signified a major effort by the 
PLAN in undersea warfare.471 From a strategic standpoint, China’s anti-access denial is a 
combination of Mackinder (Central Asian strategic rear) and Mahan (Pacific blue water). 
In classical terms, China is challenging U.S. sea control of the Western Pacific. 
Sea control implies an unchallengeable ability to use particular waters and routes 
while also being able to deny such use to others. It does not mean that others 
would routinely be deprived of their freedom to use the seas in question for 
commercial or military purposes, but, rather, that use may be denied at the sole 
discretion of the controlling power, e.g., in a crisis or conflict. In fact, sea powers 
like the United States and Great Britain have been champions of freedom of the 
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seas for one and all, except when they choose to curtail that freedom. Sea control, 
classically understood, does indeed describe fairly what the United States 
currently seeks in the Western Pacific. Thus, the Chinese would be right to 
understand this to mean that China could be denied use of these international 
waters in the event of trouble—e.g., Chinese military action against Taiwan—but 
wrong to interpret it to mean that China could be denied use of the seas and access 
to the world under normal peacetime conditions. 472 
 
Soft Power as a Military Asset in PLA Doctrine 
 
In addition to military anti-access strategies, Chinese security analysts also 
discuss a number of diplomatic and political means of denying or limiting U.S. military 
access to the region in the event of conflict. As outlined in Chapter Six, diplomatic and 
political anti-access would be part of a strategy aimed at pressuring countries in the 
region to deny use of forward bases and refuse to provide other critical forms of 
assistance to U.S. forces.473 To do this, Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein argue that 
China will rely heavily on “soft power” in any future confrontation with the United 
States. “Beijing intends to increase its soft and hard power in ways that could pose a 
challenge to U.S. hegemony, which it fears threatens its core national interests. China not 
only wields increasing commercial clout in all regions of the globe, but is also willing to 
deliberately ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with 
respect to the United States.”474 
Beijing also uses its cozy relationship with Iran to indirectly balance U.S. 
interests. Backing Tehran in its confrontation with the West over Iran’s nuclear energy 
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program could be considered a “strategy game” that deflects attention from Chinese 
policies (as well as the important strategic objective of allying China with an energy-rich 
nation). Iran’s continued intransigence over its nuclear program, with help from China 
and Russia, forces the United States to focus firmly on the Middle East while neglecting 
the equally strategic-important Pacific theater. “With China also pursuing a foreign 
policy that currently overtly avoids direct conflict with other states or entities such as 
Taiwan, and hence fails to encourage U.S. interventions, this situation is allowing Beijing 
to expand its economic and diplomatic influence in Asia unhindered, creating for itself 
the role of a regional hegemon.”475 With the American forces focused on the Middle East, 
China can increase its capabilities under the radar in the Pacific, and thus avert a direct 
challenge to the United States.476 
Russian Defense Posture 
Russia has consistently opposed American hegemony since the early 1990s and, 
holding consistent with a soft balancing strategy, Moscow has sought to create a world 
overseen by the UN Security Council and several power centers supporting an anti-
hegemonic axis.477 Similar to the Chinese position, Russian opposition to U.S. 
intervention in Central Asia has been largely reactive and non-confrontational.478 Like 
their counterparts in Beijing, military strategists in Moscow were particularly concerned 
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about aggressive American unilateralism under the Bush Doctrine and are unlikely to 
change their views regardless of the “reset” of Russian-American relation sought by 
President Obama. Unipolarity, too, is another key factor in Russia’s calculations, 
especially with the United States possibly on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy 
against Russia and other great powers irrespective of the recent signing of the new 
START treaty.479 “Strategic stability vis-à-vis the U.S. is another element of Russia’s 
self-image and the cornerstone of its security policy in the global dimension. Although 
Moscow cannot afford to maintain numerical parity with the U.S… it is still obsessed 
with qualitative equilibrium.”480 
In both the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the 2003 
Military White Paper, Moscow detailed its view of reviving multipolarity at the systemic 
level. “A trend is growing toward the establishment of a unipolar world structure that 
would be dominated by the U.S. economically and through force . . . the strategy of 
unilateral action can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and an arms 
race and exacerbate the contradictions between states and national and religious strife.”481  
 Regional denial is another element of Russian defense doctrine, although it is an 
objective the Russian army has been unable to fully achieve. Nevertheless, Russia’s 
military assets in Central Asia give it substantial hard and soft power.482 Over the past 
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decade, Russia has been increasing its defense-related activities in Central Asia. For 
example, In October 2003, Russia established its first new military base since the USSR’s 
implosion at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, which made Kyrgyzstan the only country hosting Russian 
and American military bases on its territory. “The approximately 20 military aircraft and 
1,000 troops deployed there lie only some 30 kilometers from the U.S. base at Manas, 
which was also used by some U.S. allies with military contingents in Afghanistan.”483 
Similar to China, this strategy focuses on asymmetric responses in the case of armed 
conflict with the United States, what Russian Gen. M.A. Gareyev calls “strategic 
deterrence” or “flexible strategic containment.”484 
 Russia’s initial acquiescence to the American presence in Central Asia to combat 
Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was partly self-
serving. After 9/11, Moscow reluctantly accepted the American presence in Central Asia 
because the United States was the one entity that could effectively deal with Islamic 
extremists along Russia’s borders. However, Moscow concluded that the U.S. risks 
associated with a continued U.S. presence in Central Asia far outweighed the benefits. 
The Color Revolutions deposed pro-Moscow governments and many in the Russian 
foreign policy elite came to see the U.S. presence as a major source of instability. In 
November 2005, for instance, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov 
wrote: “What we see are practical attempts to interfere in the political life of new 
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independent states under the guise of advancing democratic values and freedoms, putting 
pressure on authorities via processes.’”485 
 Andrew Monaghan argues that Moscow’s vision of a multipolar foreign and 
security policy thinking is marked by the attempt to construct an anti-American 
international axis and forge counterbalances to U.S. dominance through the development 
of strategic relationships.486 This point is echoed by Gen. Gareyev, who lambastes what 
he calls “subversive activity” by the West because of its support for the varied “Color 
Revolutions” along Russia’s borders. Given the widespread distrust of American 
intentions in Moscow, the “reset” in Russian-American relations started under the Obama 
administration is likely no more than a patina, which simply covers the long-term 
structural problems lurking underneath the façade of U.S.-Russian cooperation.  
One Russian expert considered the relationship to be similar to an iceberg – the 
top, smaller part creating the impression of good partnership and cooperation, but 
the larger, underwater part giving no grounds for optimism, and acting as … 
deadweight to relations.  For its part, the Russian political and security elite is 
arguing that a world dominated by the US and particularly US military might is 
inherently unstable and threatening to Russia’s interests. There is widespread talk 
of the erosion of the partnership established in 2001, the disappearance of the 
common agenda and a downhill slide in relations.487 
 
Russian force posture also is tailored for intervening in its near-abroad. This is 
largely due to its lack of power projection capabilities outside of Russia’s immediate 
sphere of influence. The inability of Russia to launch long-range forces means it must 
focus its balancing efforts regionally. The 2008 limited war in Georgia exemplifies the 
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type of strategies and tactics Moscow will use to insulate itself from outside influence. 
Such missions likely will be limited deployments in support of friendly regimes in the 
post-Soviet near-abroad. These hostile interventions into post-Soviet space will be “along 
the lines of the August 2008 Georgian campaign, to chastise a regime, protect Russian 
nationals or interests or otherwise assert strategic interests in what Moscow regards as its 
sphere of influence; the defense of Russian interests in contested regions such as the 
Arctic; and the assertion of Russia's global role as a major power, such as by participation 
in multinational peacekeeping missions or participating in exercises in theatres far 
beyond Russian territory.”488 
Soft Balancing and Military Rivalry: The Case of Kyrgyzstan 
Russian intervention in Central Asia has been much more pronounced than that of 
China, which does not come as a surprise given the region’s intimate relationship with 
Moscow. Recent activities in the region appear to indicate that Russia is quickly losing 
patience with the U.S. presence there. The overthrow of the regime of Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan is a case in point. In April 2010, nationwide protests led to the 
resignation of Bakiyev, who was replaced by interim President Roza Otunbayeva. 
Bakiyev had come to power during the 2005 Tulip Revolution, but, like his predecessor 
Askar Akiyev, was accused of intimidation and corruption by his opponents. Although a 
wave of popular discontent drove Bakiyev from power, many analysts argued that 
Moscow played a key role in his ouster. 
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Stephen Blank pointed to Bakiyev’s failure to close the American base at Manas 
as the main reason Moscow withdrew its support for him and instead backed his 
opposition. Blank argued that Russia prepared a concerted plan to undermine the Bakiyev 
government and replace it with one more openly dependent upon Moscow. “Certainly 
Bakiyev’s successor, Roza Otunbayeva, thanked Russia for helping oust Bakiyev, for 
offering humanitarian aid, and for recognizing the new government before anyone else 
did. And members of the new government hinted at forthcoming changes in foreign 
policy while asking for Russian aid and hinting that they could ask as well for Russian 
peacekeepers. Moscow also sent 150 (if not more) paratroopers to its base at Kant.”489 
Bakiyev himself admitted that Russian support for Otunbayeva was largely based 
on his decision to not shut down the American base at Manas. Asked about speculation 
that Moscow may have played a role in the uprising, Bakiyev said Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had been unhappy at his decision 
in 2009 to extend the lease on the U.S. base. “They told me: ‘Why are you holding on to 
this Manas base, this worries us, this does not suit us,’” Bakiyev told reporters in Russian 
at a news conference in Minsk, where he fled after the revolt that led to his ouster. 
“Russia's leadership was irritated, annoyed by the presence of the base and this factor 
also played a certain role.”490 Although the coup was primarily backed by Moscow, 
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Beijing quickly indicated its support as well, in hopes that Russia could provide stability 
in the country and prevent increased influence by U.S. forces in the country.491 
An article in the Nation summed up Russia’s anger with Bakiyev: 
Despite its seeming neutrality, it's clear that Moscow largely orchestrated the 
palace coup that ousted President Bakiyev last week. Last year, Russia offered 
Bakiyev $2 billion in aid on the apparent condition that he close the U.S. base at 
Manas, but after Bakiyev collected more than $400 million in Russian aid he 
decided to accept a U.S. offer to triple the Manas rent, angering Prime Minister 
Putin of Russia. The Russian media carried out a well-orchestrated campaign 
attacking Bakiyev, accurately, as a thieving kleptocrat, and they compared him to 
Genghis Khan. (In some countries that would be taken as a compliment, but it 
wasn't meant that way.) Then Moscow used its economic muscle to build 
momentum for popular opposition to Bakiyev.492 
 
 It is still too early to determine whether Russia’s support for Otunbayeva will 
yield substantial dividends. After initially vowing to evict the American forces, 
Otunbayeva later backtracked and promised to extend the lease on the base at least 
another year after it expired in July 2010. However, the Kyrgyz government has sent 
mixed messages about the future of the base, which also faces substantial public 
opposition in Kyrgyzstan. Russia continues to pressure the new administration to shut 
down the base, and Kyrgyz officials are wary of American intentions; many felt U.S. 
concern about the country’s future centered squarely on the status of Manas rather than 
true democratization and economic development that would help improve Kyrgyzstan’s 
condition. Moscow could exploit its close relations with the Kyrgyz government to obtain 
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concessions from the United States by muting Russian opposition to the base. However, 
the situation remains in flux and the outcome is far from clear. 
Military Dimensions of the Strategic Partnership and the SCO 
Relations between Russia and China, long complicated, have probably never been 
better.493 China has become an important trading partner and is a major arms customer of 
Russia. Friendship with Beijing helps Moscow further a number of its goals and enhance 
its prestige. The two countries support one another in international and bilateral forums 
on issues such as missile defense, terrorism, sovereignty, territorial extremism, and North 
Korea. They have carried out joint military and police exercises, both bilaterally and in 
the SCO. “These exercises mark a radical change for China, which had not engaged in 
exercises of this sort with other states in the past.”494  
 The relationship consistently shows elements of soft balancing: the use of 
regional organizations, reliance on international institutions and non-entangling 
diplomacy. One of the more concrete expressions of this pattern of behavior came in July 
2006 with the issuing of the joint Sino-Russian statement “Regarding the International 
Order of the 21st Century.” According to analyst John Hill, the statement demonstrated 
China’s continued objective of engaging partners bilaterally without acquiring the 
entanglement of formal alliances or giving the appearance of being aimed at third 
parties.495 The gist of the statement, Hill suggests, “is concerned with changing how 
                                                 
493  Oliker et al, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications. 
 
494 Ibid.  16. 
 
495 John Hill, “China's Strategic Diplomacy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 01, 2006. Last accessed 
May 23, 2010, from http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml 
 
188 
 
international security is currently arranged [and] is found in a series of observations 
around a single (unstated) theme of harnessing the U.S.'s freedom of international action. 
Three main issues drive this shared perspective: the paramount nature of each country's 
unique situation and sovereignty; the centrality of a (reformed) UN to the international 
order; and the importance of encouraging regional supra-national organizations.”496 
 The declaration also promotes the goal of developing regions as poles of power 
within the international system. Because of overwhelming U.S. hard power, China and 
Russia believe regional complexes can be used to offset Washington's hegemony. 
“Therefore, organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU are seen as the best 
locations for the necessary alternate poles to balance the current international system. 
These organizations are therefore to be encouraged to develop broader security 
functions.”497 
Another area of cooperation is within the United Nations. In the UN, the two 
countries consistently vote together. In 2006, they voted together 100 percent of the time 
on resolutions concerning nonproliferation, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan. China is 
a solid supporter of Russia when Russia questions U.S. actions and policies, and, like 
Russia, it views the United States as destabilizing in Central Asia and other post-Soviet 
states. Both countries are strongly opposed to U.S. democratization efforts abroad (and to 
U.S. criticism of their own domestic policies and institutions). Some Russians argue that 
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China should be Russia’s most prominent partner and ties to China, including those 
extended through the SCO, should eclipse Russia’s relationship with NATO.498 
Military cooperation between the two Eurasian giants has intensified significantly 
since the mid-2000s.499 The month after the Astana declaration, the SCO held its first-
ever joint military exercise through the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), which 
was created at the July 2002 summit in St. Petersburg. Dubbed “Peace Mission 2005,” 
the war games were ostensibly an anti-terrorism exercise. Another “peace mission” was 
held in August 2007 and included 10,000 troops from land, sea and air units; another 
Peace Mission was held in July 2009, which included 2,600 soldiers from. Some 
commentators viewed the exercises as sending a strong signal to Washington: “The fact 
that it involved amphibious landings, sea blockades, and other operations that were 
irrelevant to the geography of landlocked, desert Central Asia suggests that the SCO is 
primarily a vehicle for a new Moscow-Beijing condominium in Asia, and is not intended 
as a true multilateral security framework for Central Asia.”500 Coming off the heels of the 
Astana declaration, the Peace Mission signaled that “Chinese-Russian capacity and 
resolve were not aimed exclusively at potential non-state adversaries” but at Washington 
as well.501 
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Other areas that demonstrate growing coordination, if not outright cooperation, 
include the SCO’s focus on security of the seas and space. Russian Lt. General Anatoly 
Klimenko writes that “with granting the status of SCO observers to other three sea 
powers (India, Pakistan and Iran), who in due course will probably become its full 
members, SCO can control an overwhelming part of the Asian coastline.”502 In terms of 
securitizing space, Russia is pushing for the SCO to adopt its GLOSSNAS global 
navigating system as an alternative to American Global Positioning System (GPS). “Only 
by developing this navigating system our two countries [India and Russia] could put an 
end Pentagon dependence. It should be said here that other SCO participants are also 
interested in using this system both in peaceful purposes and in defense perspective.”503 
In bilateral relations, Russian weapons transfers to China are reinforcing their 
strategic partnership. Although the main rationale for Russia’s arms sales to China is 
economic, it should also be examined within the context of overall Russian arms trade 
policy within the global environment. Paradorn Rangsimaporn argues that while Russian 
arms trade policy with China is primarily based on economic benefits, it is also a 
political-strategic tool useful in affirming the Sino-Russian relations and increasing 
Russia’s global influence. Rangsimaporn counters those skeptics who warn that Russians 
fear that arms transfers to China will fuel the beast. In fact, such transfers “do not pose a 
threat because if China intended to attack Russia, Beijing would be buying land-force 
equipment and low-flying assault aircraft, hardware in which it has expressed no interest. 
Alexander Lukin at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations also asserted 
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that the Chinese military threat is groundless because China’s technological level is 
‘insufficiently high to present a threat to Russia in the visible future’” and points out that 
‘the [current] thrust of China’s defense policy points southeast, toward Taiwan and the 
South China Sea, rather than toward Russia and Central Asia.’”504  
 The logic of Russian weapons transfers to China as a form of strategic balancing 
is supported by an examination of U.S. conventional defense doctrine. For example, the 
2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review specifically singles out China for the lack of 
transparency that surrounds its nuclear program, which “raises questions about China’s 
future strategic intentions.” And although it acknowledges the urgent nature of the 
possibility of nuclear terrorism, the NPR still identifies Russian and Chinese arsenals as 
the greatest challenge to ensuring strategic stability.505 Politicians and military strategists 
on each side of the strategic triangle appear to agree that the greatest likelihood of 
conflict among members of the triad is between China and the United States. “The often 
contrasting strategic goals of China and the U.S., alongside Beijing's extension of its 
power projection, will necessarily undermine to some extent U.S. preponderance in the 
East Asian theatre and implies that apprehension rather than acceptance will dominate 
Washington's reaction to continued Chinese military expansion.”506 
Furthermore, major U.S. defense platforms and strategic weapons appear to be 
directed at China, which in turn looks to the West rather than East when devising 
                                                 
504 Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia’s Debate On Military-Technological Cooperation With China From 
Yeltsin To Putin,” Asian Survey 46, no. 3, (2006), 481. 
 
505 April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, published by U.S. Department of Defense. 
 
506 Ellen Hallams, “Diverging Paths –Obama's Policies May Affect Sino-US Relations, Jane's Intelligence 
Review, Feb. 9, 2009. Last accessed May 24, 2010 from http://jir.janes.com. 
192 
 
strategies for its long-term military defense.507 Washington has built up its military forces 
throughout East Asia and American bases in Guam have been upgraded and are now 
home to several new forces. Three new U.S. nuclear attack submarines based there will 
be able to triple their time on patrol off the Chinese coastline. A new wing of B-52 
bombers permanently based in Guam can reach throughout Asia, including penetrating 
the Chinese mainland. The 2006 quadrennial defense review shifts the U.S. Navy’s 
surface fleet westward, with one aircraft carrier being redeployed from the Atlantic fleet 
to the Pacific (bringing to six the number stationed there, more than half the U.S. fleet).  
Furthermore, all of the navy’s SM-3 equipped Aegis ships (the Navy’s most modern 
system) are deployed to Asia. That number has recently doubled, from three to six, and is 
likely to continue to rise.508 “The Pentagon is planning to enhance its conventional strike 
capabilities in ways that seem tailor-made to target China.”509  
Conclusion 
The examination of Chinese and Russian defense doctrine reveals that their 
defense postures, hard and soft power are largely aimed at warding off the United States 
and not each other. On the other hand, U.S. conventional defense doctrine and buildup –
outside of its continued focus on the Middle East and counterterrorism efforts – is 
directed mainly at a potential Chinese threat in the Pacific. The dynamics of the strategic 
triangle can be explained by soft balancing. Unlike past balancing behavior, which 
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consisted of formal alliances and/or arms buildups, Moscow and Beijing have focused on 
less direct means to challenge U.S. supremacy. These include military modernization that 
seeks to exploit American vulnerabilities, the use of regionalization to buffer against 
American forward-basing rights, and tactics that avoid direct confrontation by striking the 
“soft underbelly” of U.S. military power, including command and control, systems 
networks and logistics. The balancing efforts are not only limited to the military domain; 
information security and cyberwarfare are two other dimensions in which Russia and 
China have tried to balance the United States by using non-confrontational means.510 
“The PLA has established information warfare units and is also able to harness extensive 
civilian resources to conduct cyberwarfare operations, even during peacetime. Taiwanese 
authorities have said that they regard a cyberwarfare attack from China as much more 
likely than an actual invasion.”511 
Moscow and Beijing also have added “soft” or “normative” dimensions of power 
to their military doctrines to counter American normative influence among leaders of 
various minor powers in Central Asia. The development of alternative norms would be 
crucial in winning over allies in the event of confrontation. Russian Col. A. Yu. Maruyev 
highlights the importance of soft power as an asset of military strategy when he writes “it 
is extremely important to formulate a national ideology that could be aimed, in the realm 
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of international relations, at turning Russia into a world power capable of influencing 
world events from the perspective of its own national interests.”512  
Leading figures in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also want to strengthen 
China’s soft power. In May 2004, for example, “the CCP Politburo held its 13th 
collective seminar on ‘Development and Prosperity of Chinese Philosophy and Social 
Science.’ The backdrop to this seminar was the introduction of the Beijing Consensus and 
increasing international interest in the Chinese development model.”513 According to 
Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “the seminar was significant because it served as an 
example of Chinese leaders beginning to pursue the strengthening of China’s soft power 
from a strategic point of view.”514  
 In conclusion, this chapter has offered a systematic analysis of the Chinese and 
Russian military doctrine through the framework of soft balancing and its impact on 
strategic studies. To this point, strategists and area specialists in Chinese, Russian and 
Central Asian politics have been the main source of scholarly and general literature about 
the organization. However, their analyses have been confusing; for example, both 
skeptics and alarmists of the SCO generally agree that one of its goals is to reduce 
American influence in Central Asia, but their views diverge radically from there. A 
theory of soft balancing resolves this quandary. Furthermore, there has been a dearth of 
literature on the actual strategic deployment of soft power assets in world affairs. 
Traditional strategic literature has focused on the military balance, whereas balance of 
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power dynamics among great powers in a unipolar system are likely to play across other 
dimensions of power, where violent conflict can be avoided. Furthermore, the use of 
norms can be an effective way for states to achieve their political and military interests 
without resorting to violence. The 2010 National Security Strategy adopted by the Obama 
administration is infused with normative language and promotes a liberal agenda that by 
and large benefits the United States and its allies. China and Russia seek to match the 
West’s superiority in this crucial dimension of power, especially since it is much less 
expensive to increase normative capabilities than military ones. The potential payoff of 
achieving political interests through a normative strategy also could be greater than using 
destructive force, something Gramscian theorists have recognized on their writings about 
hegemony and legitimacy.   
From a military standpoint, Russian Gen. Gareyev makes a similar observation: 
“In order to achieve greater rationality in our actions it is necessary to respond to 
emerging threats more flexibly and, whenever possible, not with direct but with 
asymmetric measures. Military force must not be resorted to unless every other means 
has been exhausted [emphasis added].’’515 Avoiding military conflict and achieving 
strategic objectives can be achieved through political, economic, diplomatic, 
informational and other non-military means and methods, according to Gareyev. 
 China, too, is forming its own normative agenda and incorporating it into its 
overall grand strategy. Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the CCP Central Party 
School and former senior policy advisor for President Hu Jintao, has promoted extending 
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Confucianism to diplomatic ideas.516 Confucian norms, according to Bijian, include 
principles such as “live peacefully with neighbors, bring prosperity to them, and provide 
safety to them” and build a “harmonious world. … This is clearly different not only from 
Marxism-Leninism but also from realism and liberalism in international politics. Through 
greater systemization, China plans to re-establish Confucianism as an inherently Chinese 
value and vision. In fact, some Chinese opinion leaders have openly revealed this 
agenda.”517 The joint ‘Russian-Chinese Declaration on the Multipolar World and the 
Establishment of a New International Order’ demonstrates the mutual goals of China and 
Russia to create additional poles of power in the system, each with its own set of norms. 
Political intrigue and machinations are not new to international politics. However, 
new tactics and strategies have evolved apace with technological innovations and 
systemic changes such as globalization. Chinese and Russian strategists have adapted 
their military doctrines to incorporate soft power, given the role norms play in the current 
international system. States cannot rely on traditional hard power alone to balance one 
another. Norms are increasingly becoming a source of capabilities for great powers that 
can be deployed just as effectively as military assets. The Sino-Russo strategic 
partnership is an example of how soft power can be integrated into military strategy and 
exploited in an overall soft balancing strategy.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: REASSESING NORMS IN GRAND STRATEGY 
In this study I have endeavored to achieve two objectives – one theoretical, the 
other empirical and analytical. In regards to the former, the goal was to develop a 
rigorous definition of soft balancing than found in the existing literature and integrate it 
more fully in the overall balance of power framework. Current formulations of soft 
balancing suffer from indeterminacy or drift too far from the essence of balance of power 
theory, which largely concerns security matters. Developing a framework that focuses on 
logics of balancing based on systemic configuration gives theoretical footing to soft 
balancing rather than ad hoc explanations based on the capriciousness of contemporary 
politics. Such a conceptual framework identifies the major mechanisms behind balance of 
power outcomes (system polarity) and the types of balancing expected under each logic: 
alliances, arms buildups and soft balancing (alignments). Furthermore, this study 
explicated the conditions under which soft balancing likely would operate and a method 
to identify patterns of behavior derived from the theory, for example the use of regional 
complexes as buffers or insulators to hegemonic interventions. 
 As for the latter goal, this study has sought to demonstrate the empirical evidence 
for initial soft balancing in Central Asia and the utility of soft balancing as an analytical 
framework for geopolitics. Through the SCO, Beijing and Moscow have called for a 
timetable for the removal of U.S. military troops from the Central Asia and have 
supported the smaller authoritarian members in their quest for international legitimacy. 
These moves include support for Uzbekistan’s eviction of U.S. troops from Uzbek 
territory and continued pressure on the Kyrgyz government to boot NATO and U.S. 
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troops from the Manas airbase. Diplomatically, China and Russia have continued their 
efforts to reduce American political influence in the region by co-opting the leaders of the 
smaller republics and building regional institutions such as the SCO, which is one of the 
few, if not only, major regional security organizations in the world without direct U.S. 
participation.518  
 Analytically, the study has sought to develop a robust definition and 
methodological framework to determine whether soft balancing is occurring in a specific 
instance. The definition provided in this study has gone further than those found in the 
existing literature by rethinking norms as a capability.519 Re-conceptualizing norms (or 
soft power) along these lines distinguishes hard balancing from soft balancing. Instead of 
trying to increase relative strength through internal arms buildups or alliances, states 
faced with overwhelming hard power can develop and increase their soft power assets to 
restrain a superpower. Such a strategy is much more cost effective than costly internal 
balancing and less perilous than risky alliances. Furthermore, soft balancing is unlikely to 
draw the “focused enmity” of the reigning hegemon, which reduces the potential for 
defections. For these reasons, soft balancing (whether acknowledged or not by the 
balancers) is the ideal strategy for states that are not currently worried about physical 
attack by a hegemonic power, but rather are looking for ways to counter the objectives 
and preferences of the hegemon.  
                                                 
518 Yu Bin, “Living with Russia in the Post-9/11 World,” in Shen and Blanchard, Multidimensional 
Diplomacy of Contemporary China. 
 
519 For some examples of norms as a strategic asset, see Mesbahi, “Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and 
Policy;” Mesbahi, “Iran and the International System”; and Mesbahi, “Iran and the Caspian Basin: 
Diversity, Inequality, Security and Securitization.”  
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Making hard and soft balancing analytically distinct also will help policymakers 
and scholars avoid possible misperception in international politics. Because of its indirect 
nature, soft balancing could easily be overlooked. In fact, some scholars argue that there 
is little or no evidence for the concept. I argue the opposite and demonstrate the necessity 
of analytically distinguishing between hard and soft balancing. If soft and hard forms of 
balancing are not kept distinct, there is the possibility of misinterpretation of behavior. 
For example, actions by China and Russia to counterbalance norms might be 
underestimated and dismissed because they are indirect and therefore difficult to perceive 
or quantify. On the other hand, conflating all forms of balancing into the traditional 
variety could lead to an overestimation of Chinese and Russian motives and capabilities, 
leading to unnecessary confrontation, escalating tensions and spiraling security 
dilemmas.  
Furthermore, it is important that scholars begin to recognize that the distribution 
of norms in the international system can serve as a causal mechanism for alignment 
formation. In fact, norms are becoming a crucial capability in geopolitics. The fear stoked 
in Russia and China by the spread of the Color Revolutions, for instance, demonstrates 
the efficacy of soft or normative power. The fallout from these movements impelled the 
leaders in Beijing and Moscow to counter these “revolutions” with their own alternative 
norms of “sovereign democracy.” The states involved in these “revolutions,” although 
small and minor, are strategically significant. Some, for example Georgia, are vital to 
Western-proposed oil and gas pipeline routes that would bypass Russia if ever 
constructed. Others, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, provide basing for the United 
States in proximity to China and Russia, both of which consider such bases forms of 
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encirclement regardless of American denials. The Ukraine, another strategically 
important state that faced a Color Revolution, had been considered for possible 
membership in NATO. 
 Intermittent opposition by Russian and Chinese to Color Revolutions could be 
dismissed as simple diplomatic friction, but this does not appear to be the case. There is 
consistent resistance by Beijing and China to the spread of Western norms, particularly 
within their sphere of influence, and their attempts to block such ideologies have been, in 
part, through normative means such as strong support for sovereignty and non-
intervention. Concrete examples of alternative norms include the creation of observers in 
the SCO to officially sanction elections among its members, almost all of which have 
been disputed by Western organizations. Many of these leaders are allies of Moscow and 
Beijing, and their demise would increase Western leverage with the smaller states at the 
expense of Russia and China. The overarching concern for Beijing and Moscow, 
however, is that Western norms of democratization and human rights will infiltrate their 
own borders, setting off protests and demonstrations that could lead to political 
instability, or worse, the overthrow of their own regimes. The spread of norms, in this 
case, parallels the projection of other capabilities that can threaten regime survival. 
Success or Failure: The Result of Soft Balancing  
From “strategic partnership” to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the soft 
balancing alignment between Moscow and Beijing has manifested itself in a number of 
ways. The fact that the alignment has lasted for nearly a decade despite the myriad of 
external and internal factors that could undermine it is testament to its endurance. 
However, longevity itself does not a success make. Nevertheless, there are achievements 
201 
 
that can be pointed to. The transformation of the SCO into a major international actor 
stands as one of the major accomplishments of the alignment. Coordination in venues 
such as the United Nations Security Council is another area of mutual benefit for Russia 
and China in regards to curtailing U.S. preferences. Such coordination includes their joint 
opposition to what they refer to as American “hegemonism” – or the intervention of the 
United States in the sovereign affairs of other states, for example their strong opposition 
to the Iraq War. 
On the military front, Russia and China increasingly have focused on soft power 
assets in their defense modernization efforts to counterbalance U.S. superiority. Moscow 
continues to supply China with some of its most advanced weaponry despite latent 
tensions that exist between the two powers and concerns that Russia is feeding the beast 
on its doorstep. Both states have sought to build relations with emerging powers in the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America to increase their global influence and power 
projection capabilities.520  Institutionally, Russia has partnered with China via the SCO to 
undermine and perhaps reverse the U.S. military presence in Central Asia.521 These 
strategic objectives are consistent with balance-of-power theory, although the means to 
achieve them are non-traditional. Such a strategy doesn’t combine military forces in an 
alliance, but rather combines soft power assets such as diplomacy to restrain the United 
States from imposing its preferences.522  
                                                 
520 Minton F. Goldman, Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, The United States and the War on Terror, (Santa 
Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2009) 
 
521 Ibid. 
 
522 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World.” 
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Although the formation of a soft balancing alignment could be viewed as a 
success in its own right, the strategy has had mixed results in regards to restraining 
American power. The United States still retains its military presence in Central Asia, 
albeit a reduced one given its eviction from Uzbekistan. China and Russia have not been 
able to transform the system from one of unipolarity to multipolarity primarily through 
soft power means, although the purpose of soft balancing is not necessarily systemic 
transformation but rather preference setting. Nonetheless, the evidence appears clear that 
China and Russia are each other’s closest partners and that their partnership is directed at 
the United States, something recognized by U.S. defense analysts.523  
The partnership itself could lay the groundwork for a future hard-balancing 
strategy against the United States if Washington returns to the aggressive unilateralism of 
the past Bush administration. It also could transform into an axis that emerging powers 
such as Iran and Venezuela could gravitate around.524 The so-called BRIC states are 
widely viewed as a potential bloc to counter the United States and its Western allies, and 
Russia and China could serve as the nexus that binds them together.525 However, soft 
balancing theory, as with balance of power theory overall, cannot be judged solely on 
whether the alignment or alliance achieves its goals. Theory predicts that given certain 
conditions, alignments or alliances will form. It cannot predict the efficacy of such 
                                                 
523 U.S. Defense Department , “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People’s Republic of China 2010,” 38. 
 
524 Manochehr Dorraj and Carrie L. Currier, “Lubricated With Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing 
World,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 2, (Summer 2008): 66-80 and Dodson and Dorraj, “Populism and 
Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran.” 
 
525 The BRIC states are Brazil, Russia, India and China.  Russia, for example, “find the idea of a BRIC 
grouping appealing as a counterweight to U.S. and NATO dominance and, perhaps more important, as a 
dynamic economic grouping shifting the balance of power away from the West,” in Charles Ziegler, 
“Russia and the CIS in 2008: Axis of Authoritarianism?” Asian Survey 49, no. 1, (Jan.-Feb. 2009): 144. 
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alignments. Notwithstanding their unpredictability, unsuccessful alliances and alignments 
can teach scholars much about the world. “Even if soft balancing efforts fail,” writes 
Christopher Layne, “they are important for two reasons. First, they indicate that other 
major states regard U.S. geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. 
Second, soft balancing efforts to rein-in American power may help the other major states 
learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the 
U.S.”526 
The SCO in Geopolitical Context  
Situating the SCO within the context of soft balancing helps clarify its role as an actor 
in international and regional affairs and eliminates much of the confusion about its place 
within the global balance of power. The SCO is neither an “axis of evil” nor simply a 
“paper tiger.” The organization is not a “club of dictators,” as it is sometimes ridiculed, 
although it does support authoritarian regimes. Rather, it has adopted the alternative 
doctrine of “sovereign democracy,” which treats foreign support for domestic democratic 
movements and nongovernmental organizations as a form of external meddling in the 
internal affairs of its members.527 Although the SCO was largely a creation by Beijing, 
Moscow has been the main driver in trying to turn the organization into a pole or bloc 
that can counterbalance U.S. interests in Central Asia.  
This arrangement is acceptable to China, which prefers to take a backseat in this 
regard. Russia is too weak to serve as a traditional alliance partner for China and Beijing 
                                                 
526 Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy After Iraq: The Moment for Offshore 
Balancing has Arrived,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 1, (2009), 9. 
 
527 Rumer, “China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia,” 6. 
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commands far greater strategic maneuverability than Moscow.528 Nevertheless, Chinese 
leaders continue to see ties with Russia from the perspective of Beijing’s relative position 
in the international system. “For China, cooperation with Russia helps to promote greater 
multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening U.S. influence. Russian leaders share 
Chinese elites’ discomfort with U.S. power and relative predominance, in particular with 
the U.S. perceived penchant for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion, 
and unilateral diplomatic and military actions.”529   
The Endurance of the Strategic Partnership  
 As long as the status quo – unipolar and hegemonic – remains in place, the strategic 
partnership between Russia and China is likely to endure. Offensive realist theory 
predicts that interventions by an external hegemonic power will likely trigger 
countervailing coalitions, though not the traditional alliances formed in the past. And 
balance of threat theory argues that distribution of capabilities and threats play a role in 
alignment and alliance formation. Empirical evidence appears to back both positions. If 
norms are viewed as a system-wide capability, a concentrated distribution of normative 
power in the hands of the unipole can be as threatening as a concentration of hard power 
(in this case, both forms of power are concentrated in the hands of the hegemon). This is 
increasingly true in Central Asia, where the United States has aggressively promoted its 
liberal agenda, which includes support for democratization and Western norms of human 
rights. For states facing a hegemonic power, threats can emanate across any of the three 
dimensions of power – military, economic or normative. Traditional realist theory has 
                                                 
528 Lo, Axis of Convenience. 
 
529 Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 103. 
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neglected the latter category, which is an important aspect of contemporary international 
politics.  
 To be sure, traditional security concerns still play a role. Beijing and Moscow not only 
fear Western norms, but encroachment on their borders by the U.S. military and NATO. 
Each state feels hemmed in by Washington and its allies, which have systematically 
encircled China and Russia with forward bases, whether consciously or no. The concern 
of encirclement remains irrespective of changes in U.S. presidential administrations. 
Despite an attempt by President Obama to “reset” relations with Russia, Moscow remains 
conjoined with Beijing in its opposition to American hegemony, including Obama’s 
revamped theater missile defense program.530  Pointedly, neither China nor Russia trust 
American motivations. 
Although primarily normative in nature, soft balancing is reflected in Chinese and 
Russian defense doctrine, too. The major objective of Chinese defense strategy is to deny 
the United States military or naval access to its territories and coastlines.531 Russia’s 
strategic objective is to retain nuclear parity with the United States while increasing its 
capabilities in the areas of command and control and providing an alternative set of 
norms to counter Western ideas. As detailed in Chapter Six, these strategies aim at 
American vulnerabilities rather than directly focused on balancing U.S. military 
supremacy. Particularly, they focus on creating or maintaining regional security 
complexes, where states could attain greater freedom of maneuver, and diplomatic 
measures, such as pressuring regional states that host U.S. forward bases.  
                                                 
530 Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 
 
531 China is purportedly developing the Dong Feng “carrier-killing” missile in an attempt to deny the U.S. 
Navy access to the South China Sea, which Beijing claims exclusive sovereignty over. 
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Overall, the strategic partnership, whether through the SCO or the United Nations, 
provides states with a different security arrangement than in the past. In fact, narrowly 
conceived in their geopolitical context, strategic partnerships could be viewed as a new 
model of alliance and alignment formations. These alignments rely mainly on diplomatic 
measures to stymie the goals of the hegemonic power, but they could be strengthened in 
the event of changing international circumstances. Realist international relations theory 
has failed to keep pace with these changing developments in global politics; however, 
viewing the strategic partnership along the lines of alliance and alignment politics 
integrates new forms of balancing strategy into the realist tradition without undermining 
realist theory. 
Implications for U.S. foreign policy 
 For U.S. policymakers, soft balancing might be difficult to discern. However, its 
implications are far-reaching. Although American military power makes the United 
States secure from any existential threat, regional alignments could undermine U.S. 
interests around the globe. In this sense, hegemony suffers from its own internal 
contradictions. America’s role as the only global superpower inevitably involves it in 
almost every region of the world; yet U.S. intervention is likely to result in a backlash 
from disaffected regional powers. To redress this, U.S. policymakers should make 
prudent use of America’s role as an off-shore balancer. The United States should only 
intervene in regions of strategic interest, and only then when potential hegemons threaten 
to overrun the regional balance of power. Additionally, retrenchment of U.S. forces from 
areas of little strategic value could likely preclude any attempts at soft balancing, at least 
for the foreseeable future.  
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Furthermore, American policymakers must recognize that a normative-driven 
foreign policy can lead to reactionary blowback.532 The Bush administration made 
democratization a pillar of its foreign policy, which alienated potential partners in the 
“war on terror.” The administration of President Barack Obama continues this liberal 
tradition, albeit in a more multilateral fashion. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers must 
rethink the aggressive promotion of democracy without abandoning core American 
values in the process. Such a “realist” policy would admittedly be difficult to implement 
because the very nature of hegemony involves at least some management of the 
international system. Neoclassical realism, liberalism and Gramscians all argue that 
domestic political considerations in the United States factor into its normative-driven 
foreign policy. Overcoming such considerations might be difficult, but Obama has made 
it a point to project a benign face of American power abroad, which might alleviate, 
though not fully eliminate, soft balancing by other great powers. 
Whether China and Russia can sustain their “strategic partnership” or “marriage 
of convenience” depends largely on U.S. foreign policy. A return to American 
unilateralism practiced from 2001-2008 could harden the Sino-Russian alignment into a 
formal alliance, no matter who is president in the United States. However, a more 
multilateral approach that respected Russia and China’s sphere of influence in Central 
Asia and along their borders would make the partnership largely unnecessary.533  
                                                 
532 Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy After Iraq.”  
 
533 “For now, there is an intersection of interests between Russia and China because of the shared suspicion 
of the American military presence in the region … An American disengagement and the continuing shift in 
the balance of power between Russia and China in the latter’s favor in the decades ahead could alter the 
calculations in Beijing and Moscow” in Rajan Menon, “Introduction: Central Asia in the Twenty First 
Century,” in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing,, 12. 
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  For doubters of soft balancing, the Sino-Russo “strategic partnership” offers 
compelling evidence to the contrary. Despite a number of potential pitfalls that could 
afflict Chinese-Russian relations, from Han immigration into Russian Siberia to the rapid 
pace of Chinese military modernization, external factors have forged an axis of 
convenience between the two great powers. These exogenous variables don’t just include 
U.S. military and economic superiority, but American norms and values, too. From this 
author’s standpoint, it would take a significant change at the systemic level for the 
strategic partnership to break up. For example, if China were to emerge as a second 
superpower, Russia might tilt to the West rather than become Beijing’s junior partner. 
The status of India, Japan and Europe Union could affect the regional balance of power in 
Eurasia as well, pushing Russia and China closer together or pulling them apart based on 
differing dynamics. Despite these different scenarios, the United States remains the major 
factor in affecting the Sino-Russo partnership because the alignment is intrinsically tied 
to the structure of the international system. 
Implications for theory 
The concept of soft balancing should go a long way in improving International 
Relations theory. Since the time of E.H. Carr, there has been tension between those who 
advocate a materialist interpretation of international politics and those who support an 
idealist version. This tension need not exist, at least if scholars of international politics 
rethink norms as capabilities. From this standpoint, norms can be used as an asset in a 
state’s strategic arsenal. As neoclassical realism argues, such norms are based on the 
unique domestic characteristics of each state. Theorists of hegemony – realists, liberals 
and Gramscians – argue that powerful states will attempt elevate their domestic norms to 
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the systemic level. Once elevated, norms can create systemic structures if they are 
codified and create “rules of the game” that constrain actor behavior, a position taken by 
many constructivist scholars. Institutions embody and legitimate the rules of the 
hegemonic power and can even absorb counterhegemonic ideas.534 
Similar to other capabilities, norms can provoke balancing alliances or alignments 
based on levels of concentration and/or threat. Powerful states can commit great amounts 
of resources on normative expenditures, such as foreign aid, support for NGOs and 
media. Additionally, norms can provide an ideological substance for a state’s foreign 
policy. When the Cold War ended, for example, the United States adopted “human 
rights” to replace “anticommunism” in its ideological arsenal. Although the concept of 
human rights “refers to transcendental abstractions … the fact that it is universal rather 
than particular is essential for it to serve as a platform for the transnational projection of 
foreign policy.”535 In this case, the projection of ideals could be a potential threat, 
particularly when such ideals can challenge the legitimacy and authority of rival states. 
Indeed, Kenneth Waltz admonition against maximizing hard power continues to hold true 
for soft power: states should make prudent use of their normative capabilities to avoid 
provoking balancing coalitions, whether hard or soft. 
What the Future Holds for Soft Balancing  
 For the foreseeable future, traditional balance of power theory is unlikely to 
explain great power behavior because contemporary systemic dynamics differ from those 
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of past. Therefore, if scholars and analysts wish to explain how states respond to 
concentrations of power under unipolarity, they must find alternative frameworks that 
correspond to differing systemic logics. The status of the United States is unique; there 
have been few states or empires to accumulate the power that is concentrated in its hands. 
International Relations theory must catch up to these changing realities by developing 
cutting edge theories that don’t focus solely on material capabilities and that can deftly 
respond to the nuances of globalization. 
 Furthermore, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of norms as an 
important variable in international politics. Realists have been behind the curve in this 
regard, disregarding the strategic value of normative power. My study has attempted to 
break ground by systematically demonstrating the importance of norms or soft power as a 
valuable asset. I do not argue that the use of norms is a better (or worse) strategy than 
using hard power. Both have their benefits and limitations and concentrations of either 
can provoke balancing by other states. However, recent events in international politics 
continually point to norms as a great source of consternation for states. The balance of 
military capabilities will continue to hover in the background, setting the base of the 
strategic balance. Norms, however, are the superstructure. In the Marxist sense, this 
relationship between the base and structure is reciprocal. Hard power provides the basis 
for a normative superstructure, which reinforces the material base. It is the superstructure, 
however, that major powers currently are concerned with. 
 In practical terms, theory will have to account for the way states respond to the 
superstructure of international politics when the base is essentially unassailable, as it is 
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under unipolarity.536 In other words, when the military balance overwhelmingly favors 
one power, how can states not allied with the unipole create conditions favorable to their 
interests? How can they “change the rules” of the game without changing the power base 
from which the rules emanate? The case of China and Russia finds that great powers that 
can’t forcibly rewrite rules will try to develop alternatives. To do this, they will seek to 
carve out their own space within the system – their own regional spheres where they can 
set preferences to their liking.  
 The trend towards increased regionalization and norm proliferation in the 
international system supports this contention. In the future, states will rely on such 
subsystems to buffer the reach hegemonic power. These subsystems can create rules that 
benefit states seeking greater autonomy. In fact, as Western-led globalization continues to 
spread, emerging powers dissatisfied with the status quo are likely to adopt soft balancing 
strategies to unshackle themselves from an economic and political system they do not 
believe benefit their interests and consider detrimental to their culture and social systems. 
These strategies will require the accumulation of normative capabilities to attract minor 
and midlevel powers interested in forming such subsystems. Scholars no longer need to 
wait for evidence of balancing against the United States. Soft balancing is here, and it is 
likely to be the wave of the future. 
                                                 
536 Changing the superstructure of the international system has been a concern of critical theorists and neo-
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whole. To put in other words, realists are more concerned about what strategies states might use to overturn 
or transform international systems rather than which system is preferable.  
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